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AWARD RECIPIENT SPEECH
AWARD RECIPIENT
Steven J. Eagle, Professor Emeritus of Law, Antonin Scalia Law
School at George Mason University
INTRODUCTION
Lynda L. Butler, Chancellor Professor of Law and Director, Property
Rights Project, William & Mary Law School
BUTLER. Each year, the Brigham-Kanner Prize is awarded to someone who has made significant contributions to our understanding of
property and its role in society. The Prize is awarded to someone
condition and about the importance of property rights to political,
economic, and social systems.
erty scholars, a Supreme Court Justice, a leading practitioner, and
of the most committed property rights scholars we have recognized.
y as a writer and his willingness
to tackle property rights issues totally and completely, no matter
tions address such topics as environmental regulation, affordable
housing, other tough land use issues, telecommunication and energy
siting matters, and of course every aspect of regulatory takings.
His treatise on Regulatory Takings, in particular, is widely regarded as the leading treatise on the subject. The work dives deep
into murky waters, never leaving the reader disappointed. Thoughtful commentary and analysis confront key issues head on, providing
readers much to ponder. Both academics and attorneys find the
treatise to be a remarkable resource.
A member of the American Law Institute and a fellow of the
American College of Real Estate Lawyers, Steve has served the legal
profession in significant ways. He has testified before Congress and
has served in a number of leadership positions on ABA committees,
1
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including as an advisor to the National Conference of Commissioners
of Uniform State Laws.
Professor Eagle received his bachelor of business administration
from City College of New York and his law degree from Yale University. He taught at a number of law schools before joining the faculty
of George Mason University in 1987.
Both academics and practitioners have praised his contributions.
of the award. Jim Ely agreed, noting

attorneys to navigate the murky waters of regulatory takings. He also
stitutionally protected property by encouraging conversation about
critical issues. And I like to think of Steve as providing a very strong
bridge between the academe and the practicing bar.
Steve: We are deeply honored that you are here to receive the
Brigham-Kanner Prize. Please come forward.
EAGLE. Thank you, Dean Douglas and Professor Butler. I also want
to thank the many of you here tonight who helped and inspired me
accept the 2019 Brigham-Kanner Prize,
which since 2004 has honored towering figures in our field.
I want to mention Joe Waldo, who has been a real leader in initiating and supporting the Brigham-Kanner program; Lynda Butler,
Director of the William & Mary Property Rights Project; and Robert
Antonin Scalia Law School, Henry Butler, came down from Arlington
for this program, and I want to thank him for his support of me and
my work. Not least, I thank my wife and companion, Carolyn, and
our son, Alexander, who came from California for this occasion.
program. Gideon Kanner, that lion of the property rights bar and
academia, and also Mike Berger, who epitomizes the practitionerscholar, and had been slated to speak at the first panel tomorrow.
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***

way to school. He was slightly injured, and I was called to the princi. . . I pleaded lack of jurisdiction:
demoted to the fifth grade, where I remained for a week. The principal summoned my mother and gravely told her that her son ought
to be a lawyer.
In college, I minored in Elizabethan Literature, which is still a fine
way to learn about human nature. I majored in Economics, which
forces us to think about trade-offs, although it cannot tell us what
is worth maximizing. But it was clear even in those days that a
successful academic career in economics was increasingly about
mathematics. I neither had an affinity for math, or, for that matter,
for the sight of blood. With being an economics professor or doctor
At Yale, I did research for Harold Lasswell, the mid-century preeminent political scientist, and Myres McDougal, who became my
mentor. Mac was president of the Association of American Law
ce and my earlier interest in becoming a college professor came together.
As a novice law professor, I was assigned Property Law, which I
took to readily. A thousand-year sweep of history, and the growth of
individual autonomy amidst a changing society and economy, were
exciting stuff. My inchoate interest in property rights and takings
first became manifest regarding residential rent control. (Current
developments on that topic, by the way, point to the fact that you can
never keep a bad idea down.)1 In 1992, I wrote an article with Institute
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council was a breakthrough in the protection of individual property rights and that its
1. Steven J. Eagle, Takings as Compulsory Purchase of Commercial Units, 9 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. J. 249 (2020).
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scope would be expanded rapidly.2
quite that way.
done a fair amount of writing, spoken on many panels and at many
law schools, and generally tried to make sense of the tangled relaan exciting ride. Thank you all for sharing it with me and helping
along the way.

2. Steven J. Eagle & William H. Mellor III,
turn to Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV

OPENING REMARKS: THE STATE OF REGULATORY
PANELIST
Steven J. Eagle, Professor Emeritus of Law, Antonin Scalia Law
School at George Mason University
INTRODUCTION
Lynda L. Butler, Chancellor Professor of Law and Director, Property
Rights Project, William & Mary Law School
BUTLER. We are ready to start our first panel, which focuses on the
work of Steven Eagle. Your program gives a good description of the
lar on the regulatory takings doctrine because that is where much
of the legal uncertainty lies. Before we hear from our three wonderful panelists, we are going to begin with some opening remarks from
our award recipient, Professor Eagle.
EAGLE
such a distinguished panel here to give a retrospective critique of
my past work. So, I want to spend my time talking about some prospective things. My remarks last night at dinner were light-hearted.
about regulatory takings, taking stock of problems I see coming up.
mand that laws and property rights be adjusted to take into account
things like climate change and the economic agglomeration that leads
to extremely successful and high-cost areas, but also to areas that are
less than thriving. The public is increasingly concerned about this.
They want something done, but they
see lots of attempts to place the costs of these changes on narrow
groups of people like owners of selected types of land, landlords, and
the like. Cases involving these groups are becoming more prominent.
Alas, our regulatory takings doctrine is built on somewhat shaky
having to do with the great adjustments that I see coming down the
road are going to be litigated. So, both for theoreticians and for
5
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practitioners, I believe that regulatory takings is going to be undergoing a lot of stress in the next few decades.
I have a friend who is a staunch libertarian, and he complained to
me a few years ago that a nearby landowner was planning to develop his parcel with low-income apartments. My friend added that
he and other neighbors were asking local officials to intercede and
block this. Somewhat tongue-in-cheek, I told him that I was shocked
that someone of his political persuasion would invoke the heavy hand
of the state to interfere with private property rights. He looked at
Well, yes, it is indeed about externalities, as is every development
regulation case, where litigants are concerned with the effects of
what happens in one parcel on other parcels and their owners. From
residential developers to heavily subsidize low-income units as a condition for new projects, and also to reinstate strict rent control. The
California Supreme Court has referred to such inclusionary zoning
as normal land use regulation.1
law review articles elaborating
struck by transient self-interested
factions in city politics which would be enforced, against subsequent
democratic change, by their entrenchment as property rights.2 And
who can forget the deregulatory takings cases, where owners claimed
that subsequent deprivation of the monopolies they were granted by
the state constituted a taking?3
congressional staff members who
made it clear that they regard any regulation that has any effect in
reducing the value of any property as ipso facto illegitimate. So, you
going to have to be dealing with in
in the past. Zoning is pummeled on all sides. The only people who
1. See, e.g.
of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 979 (Cal. 2015).
2. See Steven J. Eagle, Property Rights and Takings Burdens, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP.
RTS. CONF.
See also
Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91
(2015).
3. See generally J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach
of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851 (1996) (citing cases).
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have a good word to say about it
fluent, progressive suburbanites who like their neighborhoods just
the way they are, thank you, through working-class homeowners,
and urban minorities resisting gentrification. Indeed, local land use
controls are most under attack by those demanding state top-down
controls over localities.
The most definitive guide to regulatory takings law remains Justice
Pennsylvania Coal
at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
4
if regulation goes too far, it
When
Penn Central.5

Penn
Central is in fact both incoherent and not very predictive.6 We all
know that Penn Central has three principal tests.7 Well, or maybe
8
Justice Brennan
seems to have appropriated Penn Central
Frank Michelman,9 who was the first Brigham-Kanner Prize recipient, I should add. Michelman thought that if someone buys land subject to particular zoning and spends substantial amounts of money
constructing a project consistent with that zoning, the zoning ought
not be yanked out from under the landowner.10 We agree that far.
Penn Central has at least three conventional factors: economic
impact, investment-backed expectations, and character of the regulation.11 Some of us, including me, have spent a great deal of time and
paper and footnotes poking holes in each one of those tests.12 The
4. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
5. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118
PENN ST. L. REV. 601, 604 (2014).
7. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
8. Eagle, supra note 6, at 604.
9. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 128 (citing generally Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV
10. See generally Michelman, supra note 9.
11. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
12. See, e.g., Eagle, supra note 6.
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California Supreme Court in Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Board has indicated an additional ten relevant tests and cautioned
13
I have to say that this reminded
me of French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, who upon hearurteen points to save the world
14
Now, if you think things
Murr v.
Wisconsin, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that determining
the relevant parcel for Penn Central analysis did not even presume
in favor of honoring discrete individually deeded parcels, but was
itself based on a separate ad hoc test, interacting with the Penn
Central ad hoc test.15 Chief Justice Roberts noted in dissent that the
majority authorized governments to do precisely what the Court
rejected in Penn Central: to create a litigation-specific definition of
property itself, usable only in regulatory takings cases.16
Pennsylvania Coal decision predated
our modern notion of regulatory takings.17 Maybe the best expression of the goal of regulatory takings is in the 1960s case involving
Armstrong v. United States, where the court said
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
18
I
know that progressives are terrified of economic Substantive Due
Process. Conservatives, who are leery of open-ended approaches more
19
Nevertheless, regulatory takings seems most likely to become a deepening
morass. Maybe a non-timid originalist is needed to point out that
the emperor has no clothes.
In his dissent in Murr, Justice Clarence Thomas noted that the
ts regulatory takings] precedents
13. Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997).
14. Mario R. DiNunzio, Introduction to WOODROW WILSON: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF THE SCHOLAR-PRESIDENT 36 (Mario R. DiNunzio ed., 2006).
15. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
16. Id.
17. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
18. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
19. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
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in the Constitution as it was orig

for us to take a fresh look at our
regulatory takings jurisprudence, to see whether it can be grounded
in the original public meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
20

think courts will be immediately amenable to the change, but I do
rs to try to find a better framework for analysis of the dilution of property rights through placing
unfair burdens on property owners.
our doctrinal ducks in a row in order to deal with the immense pressures I mentioned that will be placed on property rights in the next
few decades. From a legal perspective, the first thing to recognize is
municipalities act in good faith. From a practical perspective, litigation will flow from governmental actions asserted in response to
climate change. And of course, in states where the judiciary seems
pro-government, especially after Knick,21 much of this litigation is
going to be brought in federal courts.
The presumption of good faith was explicitly brought into question by Justice Alito in Koontz v. St. Johns River Valley River Water
Management District.22
valuable than any just compensation the owner could hope to reExtortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to
compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits
Zoning for Dollars,
them.24
he pointed out zoning is often the result of an explicit bargaining
process, so that government no longer limits its police power to exclude the harmful, but tries to encompass within its police power soge to achieve what officials regard
23

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
Id. at 605.
See generally id.
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as optimal development, optimal collection of fees, or some combination never quite specified.25
The Justices seem to regard the 1999 Del Monte Dunes case26 as
exemplifying this notion of bad faith, and in the context of Koontz
itself, where a landowner was told he could obtain a development
permit by, among other alternatives, contributing money for a project on land owned by the regulating agency.27
In June, in Knick v. Township of Scott, the Supreme Court repudiated the state litigation prong of its Williamson County doctrine
and held that a taking occurs the moment that a compensable state
action occurs.28 But the other prong of Williamson County, the final
determination prong, remains on the books.29
someone to give you a final answer as to how you could use your land
them not doing that. In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island in 2001, the Court
made it clear that it would focus on the practicalities of when the
30
final determination took place,
The upshot of all of this is that in the future, individual bargains
between developers and regulators may be examined in a more critical light. In a post-Koontz article, I likened informal bargaining
between local land use officials an
shall I put it, less than scrupulously observed.31 Regard for the nicetoo late. So, how does one deal with this question of bad faith and extortionate conduct? I think this is going to lead to less flexibility and
to more general and more objective sets of tests being established.
Climate change is going to generate immense takings problems.
Many believe that the mitigation of climate change is crucial for preshandy, ostensible justification for the densification of development
25. Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the
Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991).
26. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
27. See Koontz
28. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2019) (overruling the state-litigation
29.
30. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
31. See Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW. 1 (2014).
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that planners and city elites have long pined for. Collective action
problems are immense, since almost all of the benefits of greenhouse
gas mitigation will go to others: other land owners, other communities, other nations, and other generations.32 The failed recent California attempt to compel suburbs to accept dense housing near transit
stations is one example of the po
ingly see.33
Adaption to climate change on the individual parcel level is much
more palatable, since that benefits the landowner him or herself.
But, it also makes individuals who have made those expenditures
far less amenable to spending money on more community-based solutions to the same kind of problem. Managed retreat is going to be
the most formidable and difficult of all.34 There was a triage plan
developed by the Urban Land Institute for New Orleans in the wake
of Hurricane Katrina that would have resulted in large areas of the
city being condemned.35 These areas were below sea level, typically
occupied by lower-income people, and often minority group members.36 In theory, this kind of condemnation could have been done
very cheaply since the post-Katrina value of that land was pretty
close to zero. But even when there was talk of paying pre-Katrina
value condemnation awards, politically it went nowhere.37 The city
just could not accept that kind of distinction between the haves and
the have-nots.
In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court upheld the condemnation of a sound building in a blighted neighborhood on what I think
is the specious theory that once something is in the authority of
e it through the exercise of emi38

Well, I think that the Just

32. See generally Steven J. Eagle, A Prospective Look at Property Rights and Environmental Regulation, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725 (2013).
33. See, e.g.
34. See generally Eagle, supra note 32.
35. URBAN LAND INST., NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA: A STRATEGY FOR REBUILDING
(2005), available at http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/Articles/ULI_Draft_New_Orleans%20Report
.pdf.
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., Alexander B. Lemann, Stronger Than the Storm: Disaster Law in a Defiant
Age, 78 LA. L. REV
38. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
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Compensation Clause and the public use requirement are a little
more than merely things that the
sure other panelists will pick up on that.
The point though is that the Go
case39 nevertheless consolidated popular resistance to the notion that
there was carte blanche for the government to take private property
for generalized purposes. And certainly a government-mandated coordinated retreat, moving an entire community from one area to
another, seems something the current Court would also find disagreeable.
A final legal problem I wanted to mention is affordable housing.
This has come to the fore largely because of agglomeration. Agglomeration refers to the fact that once you start getting a critical mass
of workers and businesses of a certain industry in the same locality,
it feeds upon itself.40 More workers come to work in that industry.
More businesses settle there. Silicon Valley is the perfect illustration of that kind of situation. Some areas of the country are becoming extraordinarily productive. Others largely are decaying. And
there are endless political ramifications of that growing disparity,
Affordable housing often is given as a panacea in this situation.
article that affordable housing is
simply a metaphor.41
no agreement on what it means.42 We know that all housing is affordHow much should we give precedence to economic growth? How much
should we give precedence to avoiding gentrification, and keeping
existing moderate-income populations in place? These, too, are going
to be very difficult burdens, and we see them growing. Inclusionary
zoning and similar kinds of requirements forcing isolated existing
landowners to bear the burden is just one illustration of the problem.
Same thing with rent control. Al
39. See Lemann, supra
40. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition: Private and Public
Benefit in an Era of Agglomeration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023 (2011).
41. See generally Steven J. Eagle,
, 44 URB. L.J. 301 (2017).
42. See, e.g., id.
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the way around, except for existing residents who are crying out for
protection of their personal housing situations.43 Given the exacerbaing regulation and cases.
The Penn Central doctrine44 provides no clear doctrinal framework to deal with these questions and practical realities. The contest for primacy between private property as denoting individual
as denoting the advancement
of human flourishing45 will be very much in the courts as well as in
the news. Thank you.
***
BUTLER. I for one have found this first panel to be really exciting. It
is the perfect example of the mission of this conference being advanced
and actually working. That mission is to promote understanding of
property rights through conversation about issues affecting property
Steve about five minutes.
EAGLE. Thank you, Lynda. I want to thank all the members of the
panel for their very insightful co
I appreciate that he picked up on my emphasis on property as an important determinant in structuring society before we get to takings
and public use and so on. I also thank him for picking up on what I
property which are actually traded in the market and therefore possess some objective significance beyond what the government or the
owner might claim about them.
In addition to the notions that Tom mentioned, the other imporIf an owner has property and the owner is compensated in kind, that deals with many of what would otherwise be
46

43. See Bruno S. Frey et al., Consensus and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical
Study, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 986, 988, 991 (1984).
44. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Eagle, supra
note 6, at 604.
45. See Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853 (2012).
46. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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vexing regulatory property questions. If I own land on a street and
if all of my neighbors up and down the street do likewise, all of the
parcels are much more valuable and so I am implicitly compensated
in kind. And the presence or absence of implicit compensation is a
substantive consideration not affected by Knick.47
Professor Lee Anne Fennell recently has done a series of articles
also analyzing what things people normally associate with each other
in a bundle they deem to be property.48
of skepticism about public-private partnerships. George Lefcoe, who
just retired as a professor at USC and who was my property teacher
We take land that government claims is distressed
cials want to get developers involved in doing something with that land. Developers inevitably are
going to pick the things that will be most susceptible to successful
private development, even without large government subsidies. And
when government becomes a partner in addition to being a regulator, I think it kind of obscures the notion of regulation, as opposed
to proprietorship, to the mutual disadvantage of everyone.50
Also, in the Hawaii park illustration, yes, there is investment
value, there is speculative value; as a matter of fact, the more farfetched and ridiculous a regulation might be, the greater the chance
it will be overturned soon and the greater the speculative value is,
since potential purchasers may disregard the immediate potential for
development in favor of a long-ter
ill bring, or how the market will
51
So, bad regulations give rise to lots of speculative
49

47. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
48. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property Beyond Exclusion, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 521
(2019).
49. See George Lefcoe,
for California Redevelopment Law,
52 HASTINGS
just bad enough to clear but good
50. See Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 87,
(2017).
51. Florida Rock Indus. v. United St

2020]

OPENING REMARKS

15

Lucas talks about viable uses as opposed to value,52
am very pleased that Jim, as a leading practitioner and mobilizer of
what you might call the theory class, people who theorize and come
up with doctrines. Some of my academic brethren think that the
more obscure we are, the better off we are. Keep us away from the
hoi polloi, you know. But I think one of our jobs is to be useful, to help
guide not only public discussion, but especially the work of litigators
that he thinks my work exemplifies that.

52. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).

THE EAGLE THEORY

THOMAS W. MERRILL*
ABSTRACT
This Article evaluates three interpretations of the Takings Clause
capable of generating a regulatory takings doctrine. The first, the
Epstein interpretation, puts primary emphasis on what it means to
Penn Central interpretation, centers on what
third, which I call the Eagle theory, in honor of Steven Eagle, this
t, focuses on when the governtheory has the most plausible basis in the original understanding of
the Takings Clause, rests on a theory about the Clause that enjoys
broad contemporary support, and is the most capable of generating
predictable outcomes at a reasonable cost. The primary drawback of
the Eagle theory is that it cannot serve as a general source of protection for property rights against arbitrary or oppressive government
action. If adopted as the basis for the regulatory takings doctrine,
therefore, the Eagle theory would have to be supplemented with a second source of constitutional protection for property, such as substantive due process. This, as it happens, is precisely what Steven Eagle
has urged.
INTRODUCTION: THREE PATHS TO REGULATORY TAKINGS
There are three interpretations of the Takings Clause capable of
generating a regulatory takings doctrine, that is, a doctrine that
requires the payment of compensation to owners for certain types of
regulations limiting their use of property. Each interpretation is
facially consistent with the language of the Clause, which provides:
1

* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. Emilie Klovning provided
excellent research assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The first interpretation, which has been advanced with vigor by
On
means every incident of property,
2

every stick in the bundle.3
priated, but any kind of diminution in value of any incident of
property.4 The combination of these interpretations, without more,
would effectively make any regulation that has any impact on the
value of any incident of property a prima facie taking, which would
be draconian in the extreme. Flexibility enters the picture via a

according to Epstein, means zero compensation when the regulation
in question is designed to rectify some previous action by the claimant
that infringes the rights of others, such as committing a nuisance.5
when the claimant obtains offsetting benefits from the regulation,
as when uniform land use regulations increase the value of all properties that are burdened.6
The second path to regulatory takings is to pay relatively little atCourt has effectively adopted, most notably in its foundational Penn
Central decision7 and in the major qualifications of that decision.
The Court has largely ignored the wo
pretation, to include not just seizures and appropriations but also
8
in upsetting the expectations of the
owner. In pursuing this interpretive strategy, Penn Central listed
three factors for consideration in determining whether a regulation
should be deemed a taking. One is the extent to which the regulation diminishes the value of the property.9 Another is the extent to
2. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
3. Id. at 57.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 196.
7. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
8. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
9. Id. at 124.
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which the regulation interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations about the use of the property.10 The third is whether the
regulation entails a physical invasion of the property or merely affects
the use of the property by the owner.11 This ad hoc structure has
been qualified by categorical rules for permanent occupations and
for regulations that deprive the owner of all value in the property.12
treme regulations of the use of property are regarded as takings.13
The third path to regulatory takings is to adopt a literal construc-

vanced this conception of regulatory takings on several occasions.14
It is also an approach I briefly set forth in a chapter in my book on
Takings coauthored with David Dana and have occasionally discussed in other pieces.15 Basically, the idea is that a regulation should
be deemed a taking when the government acquires, through the
regulation, a set of interests that a private party would ordinarily
have to acquire either by purchase or by exercising a delegated power
of eminent domain. The work here is done by asking whether the

The first thing to note about these three interpretations is that
each is facially consistent with the language of the Takings Clause.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (deprivation of all value);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (permanent occupation).
13. See James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV
14. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS §§ 7-7(e)(5), 7-8, 7-17 (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter
EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS]; Steven J. Eagle, Property Rights and Takings Burdens, 7
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 199, 247 (2018); Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due
Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 899, 901 (2007) [hereinafter Eagle, Property Tests].
15. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS ch. IV (2002); Thomas W.
Merrill,
Doctrine and the Perils of Common Law
Constitutionalism, 34 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
Perils];
Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right, 11 VT. J. ENVTL.
after Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right]; Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional
Landscape].
Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
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Insofar as we are concerned about fidelity to the constitutional text,
the result is a tie. The theories differ in that each adopts an expansive
or creative interpretation of some terms or phrases in the Clause
and a strict or narrow interpretation of others. Epstein offers an exmonetary compensation in many cases. The Supreme Court has ima conventional interpretation of
Since each theory draws upon an understanding of the words that
is plausible, it is not possible to endorse one and condemn the others
on the basis of the text. If we are to do a comparative evaluation of the
rival interpretations, it is necessary to turn to other considerations.
I. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
One obvious basis for assessment is to ask which of the three
approaches is most congruent, not just with the words of the Takings
Clause, but with its original understanding or purpose. This is a
perilous enterprise, since there is very little evidence as to what the
framing generation thought the Clause would do or accomplish.
This is a capsule history of what is known about the origins of the
Takings Clause.16 The States that ratified the original Constitution
proposed over 80 amendments as potential candidates for inclusion
in what became known as the Bill of Rights. The Takings Clause was
not among them. The Clause was added to the list of proposed rights
by James Madison, who took the lead in shepherding the Bill of Rights
through Congress. To be sure, the idea that there is a right to compensation when the government takes property for a public use was
not new. The practice in England, and increasingly in the colonies,
was to provide compensation for compulsory acquisitions of land for
public projects like roads and sewers.17 Two states had included a
16. The following draws on DANA & MERRILL, supra
17. For example, Blackstone observed the established practice of compensating for
compulsory takings of property in his widely read commentaries. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
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provision requiring compensation for takings in their state constitutions before the Bill of Rights was adopted, and a similar clause had
been included in the Northwest Territories Ordinance.18 But when
Madison acted these constitutional provisions were relatively new,
and no published decisions had been rendered interpreting them.
Although the initiative for adding the Takings Clause to the Bill of
what by the Select Committee of the House, for unexplained reasons.
The House then approved the Clause as part of the proposed package
of rights, with no recorded debate about its inclusion. The Senate also
approved the Clause, but since it did not keep a journal at the time,
we do not know if there was any discussion about it. Twelve amendments were sent to the then-fourteen States. Ten of the proposed
amendments were ratified, including what became the Fifth, with
its Takings Clause. There is also no recorded debate about the Clause
in any of the legislatures ratifying the Bill of Rights.
The closest thing to a contemporaneous comment about the Takings
Clause is a brief observation by St. George Tucker, in an appendix
to his edition of
that was most likely
written shortly after ratification, almost certainly before 1795.19 He
oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public
uses, by impressment, as was too frequently practiced during the
20
Assuming this speculation was correct, at least as a partial account of the
purpose of the Takings Clause, it establishes that the Clause would
apply to more than formal exercises of what would come to be called
COMMENTARIES *135. For the emergence of the compensation convention in England, see
William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV
(1972). Some colonies did not compensate for taking rural land for road construction, but this
is easily explained by a presumption that the landowner obtained offsetting benefits exceeding
the value of undeveloped rural land. Id.
18. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE
19. 1 BLACKSTONE S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed, Lawbook Exchange 1996) (1803) [hereinafter T UCKER S
BLACKSTONE].
20. Id.
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eminent domain.21
Clause would apply to more than direct appropriations or seizures
of private property.
Given that we know very little about the purpose or expected applications of the Clause, we should concentrate on what the text
says in conjunction with settled propositions about property rights
at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791. One thing we know,
due to the researches of John Hart and William Treanor, is that the
framing generation was familiar with some relatively aggressive
regulations of the use of property and that colonial governments did
not generally provide compensation when they adopted these regulations.22 For example, some jurisdictions required landowners to
drain swamps on their property, on pain of forfeiture if they failed to
do so.23 Of course, it was not anticipated that the new federal government would have any authority to adopt such regulations. But the new
government clearly had the power to interfere with property in certain contexts, such as provisioning the military and providing for the
construction of post roads.24 Given the equanimity with which the
given the widespread inclusion of virtually identical clauses in state
constitutions adopted after the ratification of the Bill of Rights25
the safe conclusion is that the Takings Clause was not understood to
reflect any change in the legal status quo. That status quo included an
increasingly widespread understanding that compensation should be
given for compulsory acquisitions of private property by the government for public uses, but not for regulations of the use of property.
In short, the limited evidence about the origins of the Takings
Clause reveals nothing that would suggest a specific intention on
did not enter into legal usage in the United States until
after the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the most notable point of entry
Johns. Ch. 162, 166 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (using the phrase and citing to the works of Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Bynkershoeck).
22. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings
supra note 18.
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV
23. Hart, supra note 22, at 1257.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7, 16.
25. The federal Takings Clause did not originally apply to the states. Barron v. Baltimore,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). But most states, in emulation of the federal Constitution, soon
adopted similar clauses in their respective state constitutions. See Kris W. Kobach, The Origins
of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV
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the part of the Framers to adopt a regulatory takings doctrine. This
has been seized upon by the opponents of regulatory takings as a
reason to repudiate or at least limit the doctrine.26 But even Michael
the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment does not cover regula27

Does this mean that it is not possible, consistent with originalist
premises, to interpret the Takings Clause as justifying a regulatory
ic suggestion for avoiding this
conclusion warrants a brief discussion. He argues that although the
Framers did not contemplate a regulatory takings doctrine in 1791,
it is possible that such a doctrine was understood to be incorporated
in the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868.28 If true, this would
mean, on originalist grounds, that the federal government is not
constrained by a regulatory takings doctrine, but the states are.
There are two difficulties with this argument. First, the Supreme
Court, in considering incorporation, has come to the view that the
original provisions of the Bill of Rights and the versions incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment must be given the same meaning.29 This would seem to preclude a two-tier protection against
uncompensated takings, with regulatory takings covered by the
incorporated provision but not by the original Takings Clause. Second,
in deciding which provisions of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has said that this
turns on whether the provision in question is a fundamental right
30
This in turn requires
an historical inquiry into whether the right was considered fundamental both in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was adopted, and in
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.31
26. See, e.g.
dissenting).
27. Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, But the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 731 (2008).
28. Id. at 749.
30. Id. at 778.
31. Id.

24

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:017

evidence is that the Framers
did not regard protection against regulatory takings as a fundamental right in 1791. The evidence as of 1868 is admittedly more mixed.
As of that date, there were virtually no judicial decisions construing
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Nor was there any settled practice about the scope of the Clause. When the federal government needed to exercise the power of eminent domain, it called upon
the states to do so.32 Still, a number of state courts began to struggle
with the line between compensable takings and non-compensable
regulations in the antebellum period, and some of these decisions
extended the obligation to compensate to what we would today call
regulatory takings.33 They did not attribute any obligation to compensate to an understanding of the federal Takings Clause. The
dominant theme of these decisions, as documented by Eric Claeys,
was that compensation for interference with certain uses of property
was required as a matter of natural right.34 To the extent that legal
sources were cited for this conclusion, the decisions referred variously
to Blackstone, the common law, the Contracts Clause, various state
constitutional provisions such as law of the land or due process
35
So, the problem of regulatory takings had raised its head in the state courts.
But it would be a stretch to conc
decisions36 that a right to compensation for regulatory takings had
come to be recognized as a fundamental right, such that it was
understood to be an incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
What are the implications of this generally negative conclusion
about the original understanding of the Takings Clause (in either its
original or incorporated form) for the modern regulatory takings
doctrine? Epstein seeks to avoid the implications of this history by
making a move that has become familiar in recent constitutional
iginal understanding of the Clause
at a very high level of generality, one sufficiently abstract to support
32. See William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J.
(2013).
1738,
33. See generally Kobach, supra
34. Eric Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
See also J. A. C. Grant,
Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L. REV
35. Kobach, supra
36. Id. at 1233.
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the idea of regulatory takings.37 In particular, he argues that the
Clause embodies a commitment by the framing generation to a
Lockean philosophy that would preclude any effort by government
to alter the distribution of wealth. The Epstein version of the FramNedelsky, which shows that members of the framing generation
strongly venerated property and (some of them anyway, namely
James Madison) were fearful about the prospect of future majorities
undermining the security of property through aggressive measures
of redistribution.38 But originalism, if it is to be meaningful, must
remain faithful not just to the presumed ends that motivated the
Framers, but also to the means they selected for realizing those
ends. There is no evidence that the founding generation thought the
Takings Clause would be the vehicle for reigning in future democratic efforts to level the distribution of property. The limited powers
of the federal government and the checks and balances embedded
in the new Constitution were the first line of defense against this.
The Contracts Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
one could not be deprived of prop
a second line of defense.39 This is more or less how things played out
up through the end of the nineteenth century. The federal government
remained small and the states were held in check by the Contracts
Clause and, later, by what came to be called substantive due process. The Takings Clause was largely a no-show.
For different reasons, the modern
Takings Clause as a complex structure of per se rules and a three-part
ad hoc balancing test that applies to both the federal government
37. Epstein in this respect anticipates constitutional theories like that of Jack Balkin. See,
iginalism does not require
e.g., JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM
38. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-

ALISM

39. The Contracts Clause was the most frequently litigated federal constitutional provision limiting the powers of the states prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION xii, 92, 95
(1938). On the understanding that the due process clauses meant that one could not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without a judicial trial, see Edward J. Eberle, Procedural
Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 339 (1987).
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and the states also bears no resemblance to the likely understanding
of the framing generation. The Co
version of common-law constitutionalism, cobbled together from notions about the police power that originated under the Contracts
Clause and the Commerce Clause and ideas about the importance
of preventing interference with vested rights drawn from substantive due process.40
The Eagle theory, or at least my understanding of it, probably
comes the closest to an interpretation that can be squared with the
original understanding. Start with twin assumptions that were widely
shared at the time of the Founding. One is that seizures of property
for a public use require the payment of just compensation. This seems
like the minimal understanding that can be extracted directly from
the language of the Takings Clause, read in light of the widespread
practice of compensating for forced acquisitions of property by the
government. The other is that measures that could be characterized
as a form of public nuisance regulation do not require any payment
of compensation.41 Public nuisance law had been around since the
fifteenth century, and had never been thought to require compensation. A central problem created by these twin understandings is that
they create an incentive for the government to characterize appropriations of property that should require compensation as a type of
public nuisance regulation, or as it came to be called, a police power
measure.42 This is because the government will always be tempted
to avoid paying for public projects if this will incur the displeasure
of taxpayers or limit what the government can otherwise do with its
finite resources. The need to prevent evasion of the compensation
requirement provides the nub of the Eagle theory: if the government
is acquiring for public use what can fairly be characterized as
pay just compensation, regardless
of how the government labels the proceeding.
There is, I hasten to acknowledge, no evidence that any of the
Framers foresaw the potential conflict created by the overlap between
40. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and
, 90 MINN. L. REV
Penn Central
Court attempted to weave a unified takings doctrine out of a pastiche of Fourteenth Amend41. DANA & MERRILL, supra
42. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, A Prospective Look at Property Rights and Environmental
Regulation, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 752 (2013).
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the just compensation requirement and the police power and the
dramatic difference in the consequences of proceeding under one
property for public use, no compensation required by the police power.
But that is not surprising. The notion that compensation was required
for takings as a matter of constitutional right was new, and the potential conflict between this understanding and the long-standing
understanding that public nuisances can be abated without compensation had not yet emerged in any concrete setting. Nevertheless,
hard to imagine they would want the legislature to have unreviewable
discretion to decide which power it was exercising. They would have
wanted the courts to develop some kind of doctrine to prevent the
government from denying any obligation to compensate when it is in
fact engaged in something that is the functional equivalent of eminent
comment about the likely purpose of the Takings Clause.43 Impressment of supplies by military units on the move is not a formal
by an agency of the government, albeit one for a public use.
In sum, although the evidence is admittedly scant, I would submit
that the Eagle theory scores higher on the scale of original understanding or purpose than its two rivals. The argument is a simple one:
the framing generation would not want a right established by the Constitution to be easily evaded or circumvented through a manipulation
of labels. Thus, they would have endorsed the idea of regulatory takings, understood to be an anti-evasion or anti-circumvention doctrine.
II. CONTEMPORARY ACCEPTABILITY
Another ground for assessing the three paths to a regulatory takings doctrine is to ask which interpretation is most likely to receive
general assent today, at least within the larger legal community,
which of course includes judges. As is the case with other constitutional doctrines, the legal community is divided today about the
appropriate scope of the regulatory takings doctrine. Those who favor
43. See TUCKER S BLACKSTONE, supra note 19.
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broad protection of the environment and aggressive land-use controls
worry that the regulatory takings doctrine will unduly inhibit such
measures.44 They tend to favor repudiation of the doctrine, limiting
the Takings Clause to explicit appropriations or seizures of property
for public uses, or at least confining the doctrine to the Penn Central
ad hoc standard, which rarely results in a finding of takings liability.45
Those who are skeptical about big government, and worry about the
potential of regulation to favor special interests or simply to sap
economic growth, tend to favor so
costs of regulation to the government.46 A broad regulatory takings
doctrine is often touted as something that would do the trick. 47
The three interpretations of the Clause outlined above tend to line
up with these broader preferences about the scope of government.
Each interpretation is associated with a legal/political theory, which
can be ranked from extremely bold to highly modest. Unsurprisingly, the modest theory is the one most likely to achieve broad
assent within the legal community.
very aggressive legal/political theory, namely, that the Constitution
is designed to prevent deliberate redistribution of wealth by legislatures.48 Whether this was the shared view at the time of the framing
of the Takings Clause is debatable at best. The theory, or something
like it, had a following in the late nineteenth century, for example
in the scholarship of Christopher Tiedeman.49 But it would be an
44. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
See also, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1,
(2014).
45. For those favoring repudiation, see, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Keynote Address:
Litigating Takings Challenges to Land Use and Environmental Regulations, 36 VT. L. REV.
503, 504 (2012); William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633 (2008). For
those favoring limiting the doctrine to the Penn Central ad hoc standard, see, e.g., Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1047 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. See DANA & MERRILL, supra
e fiscal illusion theory for
compensation).
47. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law
of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999).
48. See EPSTEIN, supra
See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking
and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561 (1987).
49. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 4 (1886). See generally Louise A. Halper,
, 51 OHIO
ST.
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understatement to say that it is controversial today. Government at
all levels engages in various programs of wealth redistribution,
sometimes to benefit the poor, sometimes the rich. The dominant
political trope today, at least on the left, is to demand more redistribution, in the direction from rich to poor. So, Epstein scores poorly
on the dimension of reflecting a theory likely to elicit the consent of
the contemporary legal community.
tory takings doctrine is more difficult to discern, since the Court
speaks through different voices in different opinions. I would conexpectations about the permitted uses of their property. This is reArmstrong
v. United States
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
50
It is a central theme of the
Penn Central, which concluded that
the historical preservation order attached to Penn Station in New
original investment.51 The theme is echoed in subsequent decisions,
including those that carve out exceptions to Penn Central such as
Loretto and Lucas. Loretto says that permanent invasions are uniquely
unsettling to the expectations of owners about their ability to control what happens on their land.52 Lucas
some productive use of the land.53 Most recently in Murr v. Wisconsin,
the Court said that the dimensions of a parcel of land, for regulatory
tations about the scope of the parcel.54
of protecting reasonable expectations about property would garner significant support in an opinion
poll. This no doubt explains why the Court has gravitated to this
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1938 (2017).
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Penn
Central doctrine is employed to protect reasonable expectations on
a very limited basis. Reasonable expectations are protected only if
embodied in discrete assets; extreme or retroactive liabilities not
attached to specific assets, including retroactive taxes, are not covered
by the Takings Clause.55 Reasonable expectations are largely protected
if a regulation interferes with existing uses, but not if it interferes
with prospective uses.56 Sometimes compensation is denied if the
owner is on notice that the property is subject to regulation, thus
defeating any claim of expectations;57 on other occasions, compensation is ordered even if the owner is on notice, often for years, that a
costly regulation applies to the property, making it unlikely that there
is any disappointed expectation at all.58
invokes a theory with broad appeal, but its decisions fail to conform
consistently to what the theory seems to demand.
The Eagle theory, it seems to me, scores the best in terms of reflecting a theory likely to achieve widespread assent in the legal
community. The Eagle theory is very modest. As noted above, it is a
simple anti-circumvention theory. Everyone agrees that the Takings
Clause requires the government to pay just compensation when it
explicitly condemns property using the power of eminent domain or
55. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
and dissenting in part); id. at 554 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (general liabilities not covered);
S. 595, 615 (2013) (reaffirming that taxes are
not covered).
56. The greater solicitude for developed relative to undeveloped property is reflected
most prominently in the exception to zoning laws for nonconforming uses. See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS
on this understanding, must be exempt from zoning measures that would require termination
of an existing use, or at least must be allowed a period of amortization before being downzoned. Undeveloped property is immediately subject to restrictive regulations. The distinction
has been developed primarily by state courts and grows out of nineteenth century doctrine
Penn Central,
indirectly reflect it. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
prevented exploitation of air rights which had not been developed).
57. E.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1987); Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 497 U.S. 986, 1006 (1984).
58. Compare Ruckelshaus, 497 U.S. 986 (notice of regulation defeats expectations), with
(2015) (notice of regulation not relevant), and
Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (notice relevant but not conclusive as to owner
expectations).

2020]

THE EAGLE THEORY

31

engages in deliberate expropriation to acquire property for a public
use. But everyone also agrees that no compensation is required when
the government uses its police power to eliminate nuisances or other
widespread social harms. These shared understandings create a
sharp discontinuity depending on which power the government is
asserting. The regulatory takings doctrine, on this theory, is the
rubric that courts use to prevent circumventions of the compensation requirement associated with takings of property for a public
use. The justification for the doctrine is the need to maintain good
faith observance of an acknowledged constitutional command.
I would note in this connection that the decision conventionally
identified as launching the regulatory takings doctrine (at least as a
matter of federal constitutional law) rests in significant part on the
anti-circumvention theory. As Justice Holmes wrote for eight Justices
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (only Justice Brandeis dissented):
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its
limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone.59

As he elaborated a few paragraphs later:
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall
not be taken for such use without just compensation. A similar
assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment. When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be
qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human
nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last
private property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in
this way under the Constitution of the United States.60

These are clear invocations of the anti-circumvention idea, although
not expressed in those terms. Although Penn Coal is frequently cited
for other propositions, the decision rests in significant part on the
59. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
60. Id. at 415 (citation omitted).
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idea that an express requirement of constitutional law cannot be
evaded by the expansive interpretation of another government power
that effectively nullifies it. The common-sense appeal of this proposition may explain why the decision was nearly unanimous, and why
it continues to be invoked (although not for its precise holding) today.
There is more. Another theme of Penn Coal is that the Pennsylvania anti-subsidence statute required the payment of compensation
vate property. Under Pennsylvania law, the right of surface support
could be waived as part of a conveyance of the subsurface mineral
estate. And a predecessor of the Mahons had executed just such a
waiver. The Kohler Act, which required that surface support be maintained for persons like the Mahons, thus had the effect of nullifying
a previous waiver of surface support. In arguing the case, the Coal
law, along with the right to the
surface and the right to the subsurface minerals.61 This made it
sound like a free-standing
transferred from the Coal Company to the Mahons by the legislature.
62
to destroy previously existing ri
On
this reading of Penn Coal, the decision not only justifies the regulatory
takings doctrine as an anti-circumvention measure, it implements
that rationale by asking whether

foundational regulatory takings decision rests on the Eagle theory.
III. PREDICTABILITY AND LITIGATION COSTS
A third basis for assessing the competing theories is whether they
are likely to reach relatively predictable outcomes and, relatedly,
how expensive they are to litigate.
well under this criterion, since every regulation that affects the value
of any incident of property is prima facie a taking. All the action occurs in asking whether the regulation is designed to rectify a previous
61. Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203, 214 n.50 (2004); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue
Is Still a Muddle, 57 CAL. L. REV. 561, 563 (1984).
62. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.

2020]

THE EAGLE THEORY

33

invasion of rights by the property owner, such as the commission of
a nuisance, or whether the property owner obtains implicit in-kind
compensation from having the regulation imposed on others. The
latter inquiry in particular would generate conflicting answers, but
at least attention would be focused on two discrete variables.
regulatory takings is notorious
for its complexity and unpredictability. It has been described by innumerable commentators as a muddle, a mess, convoluted, incoherent, and so forth. The recent decision in Murr v. Wisconsin requires
that courts use a balancing test to determine the scope of the parcel
subject to regulation, which is then factored into a determination of
diminution in value, which is in turn one of three factors to weigh
in deciding whether the regulation
applies for permanent occupations, complete deprivations in value,
or disproportionate exactions. As one commentator exclaimed, the
63
Court in Murr
The cost of litigation is magnified by the requirement that property owners exhaust their remedies with local regulators, at least to the point
where the regulation is deemed final.64 Regulatory takings litigation
drags on interminably, and the low success rate undoubtedly discourages potential claimants from persevering through multiple
rounds of litigation.
Whether the Eagle theory would generate predictable outcomes
depends critically on how one define
lished bundles of rights, like the fee simple, the life estate, the lease,
the trust, and so forth. Or it could refer to every incident associated
with property, like the right to exclude, the right to use, and the
right to transfer. Steven Eagle has suggested that property, for the
63. Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2017 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 131. See also Maureen Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors
of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2017);
Thomas W. Merrill, Choice of Law in Takings Cases, 8 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J. 45, 59
(2019) (describing Murr
64. See
(1985). A second exhaustion requirement imposed by Williamson County
Knick
v. Twp. of Scott
defenses to federal court litigation, such as abstention and state sovereign immunity, which
were not considered in Knick. See Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1630 (2015) (discussing the discretionary nature of declaratory relief and sovereign immunity barriers).
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purpose of a takings analysis, should be defined by what he calls the
65
As he writes:
as [introduced into commercial law] by the Uniform Commercial
such a unit of goods as by
commercial usage is a single whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its character or value on the marof a particular property interest, but would have the burden of
demonstrating that the interest asserted is one actually recognized
as traded in a market in the community in which it is located.
The commercial unit allows for the
ing the property owner the possibility to custom-tailor as the
requisite bundle of rights that constitutes the property exactly
what the government diminished. If an owner alleges that the
loss of the use of 50 acres out of 500 constitutes a taking, he might
have an easy time establishing that there is a ready market for
50 acres in the vicinity. If he alleges that a restriction destroys
the right to use 50 acres for the painting of landscape portraits,
he is entitled to establish that there is a market for such rights
in the area, which promises to be a more difficult endeavor.66

I think this is right. The way I have put it in previous writing is that
property in this context means a discrete asset, as to which the
owner has a general right to exclude others, which is exchangeable
on a stand-alone basis.67
The rationale for limiting private property for takings purposes to
follows directly from the theoretical foundation of the regulatory
takings doctrine as an anti-evasion or anti-circumvention measure.
What we are looking for is government action that requires the payment of just compensation, as all agree the Constitution requires
65. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at § 7-7(e)(5); Eagle, Property Tests,
supra note 14, at 941. See also Brief for Reason Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
66. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at § 7-7(e)(5); see also Eagle, Property
Tests, supra note 14, at 941.
Landscape, supra note 15.
67. DANA & MERRILL, supra
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eminent domain. The question then becomes, when does the government see fit to exercise the power of eminent domain? The answer,
which is abundantly clear from long experience, is that the government resorts to eminent domain when it needs to acquire a configuration of assets that is tradeable or exchangeable in the market, but
which for one reason or another cannot be acquired by the government at a price approaching what would ordinarily be its market
value.68 In other words, the government would ordinarily purchase
the configuration of assets but finds it cannot do so at what it regards
as a reasonable price. Typically, this will be because the property
has some monopoly power because of its location, which allows the
existing owner to hold out for a price in excess of what would otherwise be its market value. Less commonly, it might be because the
government has an urgent need for the property that precludes going
through the process of ordinary negotiation of a sale (St. George
69
In short, eminent domain is used to acquire assets that are tradeable in the local market, or exchangeable on a stand-alone basis.70 Since the regulatory
takings doctrine functions to prevent the government from characterizing what should be exercises in eminent domain as police
measures, regulatory takings should be limited to regulations in
which the government acquires a tradeable or exchangeable asset.
The tradeable or exchangeable asset definition of private property
adopting state law as the source for identifying the property protected by the Takings Clause.71 The trap is created by the possibility
that state law defines all property as being qualified by the police
power, and the police power is so broadly defined that any conceivable regulation is automatically upheld as a legitimate qualification
of property.72 The Eagle theory avoids this trap because, without
regard to whether the regulation is justified by the police power, if
68. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
61 (1968) (presenting a survey of eminent domain decisions showing that nearly all involve
acquiring assets with some kind of holdout power).
69. See supra
70. See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333,
(1991)
intervention is readily seen as a
71. See generally Merrill, Landscape, supra
72. See Karkkainen, supra
teenth-century cases that presuppose the police power to be a general background principle qualifying all property rights).
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the regulation has the effect of transferring an asset that is traded
or exchanged on a stand-alone basis, the government must use the
power of eminent domain to compel a transfer of that asset or otherwise pay just compensation. Private property, at least for takings
purposes, is defined by the behavior of nongovernmental actors in
the market. State law and state law conceptions of the police power
will surely enter into the behavior of market actors. But these mysteries need not be plumbed in order to decide whether a regulatory
taking has occurred.
A final benefit of the tradeable or exchangeable asset definition
of private property is that it synchronizes the scope of the Takings
Clause with the established methods for determining just compensation. The measure of just compensation is market value, and market
value is obviously much more easy to determine when the government has taken an interest that is bought and sold in the market.
certain government regulations c
property for which there is no market, creating a conundrum for how
to determine just compensation.
One implication of this definition of private property, which is
is that the question whether the
government has taken private property is one of fact, as opposed to
a doctrinal analysis. In clear cases, the court can perhaps take
judicial notice of whether the particular bundle of rights acquired by
regulation is one that is tradeable or exchangeable on a stand-alone
basis. In contested cases, however, the court should entertain expert
testimony on this question. Accordingly, the answer might vary from
one time and place to another. Thus, the regulatory takings doctrine
would have an evolutionary quality but would evolve along with
changes in the relevant property market, not with changes in legal
doctrine or conceptual understanding.
A few examples may be helpful in clarifying how private property
would be identified under a market-based test. Consider, first, a
others who advocate an aggressive regulatory takings doctrine.
Individual tenants, of course, can and do negotiate for limits on future
rent increases. But they do so as part of a long-term lease. Restrictions on future rent increases are not bought and sold on a standalone basis independent of a package of lease provisions. Thus,
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government rent controls cannot be regarded as an attempt to use
the police power to procure a type of property that is traded or exchanged in the relevant market on a stand-alone basis. Under the
Eagle theory, rent controls are an easy case for no takings liability;
this conforms to the consistent pattern of results reached by the
Supreme Court over time.73
As another example, consider a typical exclusionary zoning regime,
such as one that imposes a large minimum acreage requirement on
clusionary zoning regime that limits lot sizes or mandates the construction of multi-unit housing. Developers of course are generally free
to specify the size of the lots they prefer to sell within a new development. But restrictions on lot sizes, large or small, are not transacted on a stand-alone basis. In an unregulated market for new
development, they appear as part of a package of land use provisions
adopted by developers in an effort to attract buyers. Under the Eagle
theory, exclusionary or inclusionary zoning does not give rise to
takings liability. This is again consistent with the outcomes generally reached by courts.74
The implications of the Eagle theory do not point uniformly to a
minimalist conception of the scope of the regulatory takings doctrine.
Consider another bête noire
regulations that forbid filling a wetland on real property, such as
under the dredge and fill regulations implementing the Clean Water
Act.75 At the time of the Founding and for many generations thereafter, such regulations would not be regarded as takings. Several
colonial-era governments mandated the filling of wetlands (called
swamps back then), and the federal government actively encouraged
such behavior through various Swamp Land Acts in the mid-nineteenth century.76 There was no indication that the right to fill or not
to fill was exchanged on a stand-alone basis independent of larger
transactions in undeveloped land. Flash forward to the present day
73. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.
519 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
74. See, e.g., Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct 1933 (2017); Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
75. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
76. Swamp Land Act of 1849, 9 Stat. 352; Swamp Land Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 519; Swamp
Land Act of 1860, 12 Stat. 3. The Acts conveyed unclaimed federal land to the states on condition that the lands be drained.
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and the answer may be different. Today, conservation easements have
been widely recognized in legislation, and are gifted or in some cases
purchased on a stand-alone basis as a type of easement in gross.77
In many communities, this may include easements designed to preserve wetlands. In other words, property law has evolved in many
places to include stand-alone transactions designed to prohibit the
filling of wetlands via the conveyance of an easement in gross. In such
a community, a regulation that prohibits the filling of wetlands should
be regarded as a forced exchange of private property without compensation. Alternatively, if the community does not recognize conservation easements, or if it does but they have never been used to preserve
wetlands, the regulation would not acquire property and hence would
not be a regulatory taking. Since conservation easements are a relatively new form of property in the longer historical scheme of things,
this approach also reveals that the property-based approach to
as the type of assets subject to exchange change.78
Whether the Eagle theory would result in more predictable regulatory takings decisions, and hence would reduce litigation costs, is
necessarily somewhat speculative. One reason to think it would is
that the Eagle theory usually generates results congruent with the
ones the courts have reached, despite the fact that the courts currently rely on a more convoluted analysis. Under the Eagle theory,
rent controls and zoning restrictions would be easily excluded from
much litigation. Wetland regulations have had a mixed reception in
the courts, and their status for takings purposes has not been conclusively resolved by the Supreme Court.79 The need to call on
77. See generally Symposium, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century, 2013
UTAH L. REV. 1.
78. As this example suggests, the historic preservation order at issue in Penn Central
might be deemed a taking under the Eagle theory if historic preservation easements have
been recognized and are traded or exchanged in the market on a stand-alone basis.
79. In a recent decision, the Court implicitly assumed that a government demand for a
conservation easement would be a taking. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,
133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013). The conservation district in that case initially demanded that
Koontz create a conservation easement on a portion of his land as a condition of receiving a
permit to develop. The Court concluded that this triggered the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, id., which in turn presupposes that a stand-alone requirement to create a conservation
easement would be a categorical taking. (The Court went on to conclude that when the district,
in the alternative, demanded that Koontz turn over money to enhance other government
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expert witnesses in close cases would add a cost not required under
current doctrine. But if expert testimony on the nature of property
markets were substituted for legal briefing on the proper interpretation of Penn Central and its qualifications, the result might be a net
savings. In any event, expert testimony is routinely called upon in
eminent domain cases on the measure of just compensation, so using
experts in regulatory takings cases would not be greatly alien or out
of place.
IV. OTHER ABUSES OF GOVERNMENT POWER
A final metric for assessing the three pathways is to ask which
provides the most effective basis for correcting a range of abuses of
government power that affect property owners. To this point, the
general pattern of analysis has been that the Eagle theory dominates both the Epstein and the Penn Central approaches. A significant reason for this is its modesty. It is basically designed to prevent
the government from evading its responsibility to compensate when
it seizes property in a manner that ordinarily would require use of
the power of eminent domain. This feature enhances its appeal when
assessed on originalist, contemporary acceptability, predictability,
and litigation expense grounds. But its very modesty also sharply
limits its coverage, certainly relative to the Epstein approach, but
also as compared to the Penn Central
can be used to attack virtually anything a property owner might
dislike, from progressive taxes to rent controls to restrictive zoning.
It promises omnibus protection for property owners. The Penn
Central approach, although unpredictable, expensive, and relatively
toothless in practice, is sufficiently ambiguous that it could conceivably be used to reign in particularly extreme government measures.
The Eagle theory, precisely because of its modesty, would provide
no redress for many types of government action that adversely affect
the value of particular items of property. Consider one example, taken
from some early nineteenth-century natural justice cases.80 Suppose,
as occasionally happened, that the government modifies a waterway
property, this too triggered the doctrine. As discussed below, this is tantamount to a rule of
substantive due process, because a demand for money, standing alone, would not be a taking.)
80. See Kobach, supra note 25, at 1250.
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or a highway in such a way that a landowner is deprived of all access
property, this cannot be characterized as a physical taking. But it unquestionably impairs the use of the land and therefore also its value.
Under the Epstein theory, or even under Penn Central, this might be
held to be a taking. But it is impossible to regard it as a regulatory
taking under the Eagle theory. Impairment of access is not traded or
this is an easement. But giving up access is not something that any
property owner would knowingly sell on a stand-alone basis. So embracing the Eagle theory would prevent courts from redressing this
kind of abuse under the regulatory takings doctrine.
As Steven Eagle has recognized, a more compact but theoretically
sound regulatory takings doctrine would therefore have to be supplemented by something like substantive due process in order to
provide effective protection for property in contexts where the regulatory takings doctrine would no longer apply.81 This, of course, runs
headlong into the shibboleth, propagated by the likes of Justice
Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook, that there is no such thing as
substantive due process.82 This selective commitment to constitutional purity has not stopped the Court from recognizing substantive due process limits in a variety of contexts, including, of course,
reproductive rights and rights of privacy more generally.83 Public
opinion will not allow the Court to retreat from these holdings. So,
some version of substantive due process is here to stay. It is also
worth noting that substantive due process has been invoked in some
contexts that involve the protection of property, such as setting
limits on punitive damage awards.84 So it is not inconceivable that
the Court, in some future incarnation, would embrace both halves
of the Eagle theory: a compressed but more easily justified and applied regulatory takings doctrine, combined with enhanced but still
restrained substantive due process protection for property against
81. See Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal,
51 ALA. L. REV. 977,
(2000); Eagle, Property Tests, supra
82. See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3,
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 125.
83. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
84. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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oppressive government action in contexts outside the domain of
regulatory takings.
The probability of this happening, admittedly, is not great. A key
decision here is Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., in which the Court discussed the difference between regulatory takings and substantive
due process.85 At issue was a bit of dicta in numerous Supreme Court
would be a taking requiring the

payment of compensation.86

was a distinct categorical test for identifying regulatory takings.
Lingle repudiated this notion, largely on the ground that failure to
substantially advance a legitimate interest looks to the rationality
of the means chosen by the government to achieve an end, which the
Court labeled a due process concept. Regulatory takings law, Justice
tional consequences of a government regulation, in particular whether
which government directly appropriates private property or ousts
87

One could imagine that the Lingle
that ordinarily require the exercise of eminent domain and that submight lead the Court to embrace something like the Eagle theory.
But other aspects of the decision indicate that this is unlikely. One
Penn Central as the foundational test
for identifying regulatory takings (subject to exceptions, etc.). This
was ironic, since one of Penn Central
This was lifted from substantive due process jurisprudence (namely,
88
If, as Lingle seemed to
suggest, all vestiges of substantive due process need to be rooted out
of regulatory takings law, then Penn Central needs to be rooted out
85.
86.
87.
88.

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
Id. at 531 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
Id. at 539.
Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right, supra note 15, at 432.
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never been applied as the ratio decidendi for a Supreme Court
Penn Central has been invoked on several occasions by
the Court as a framework for deciding a regulatory takings challenge and has been repeatedly char
It evidently has too much gravitational force to be overruled.
Another aspect of Lingle that makes it unlikely that it would lead
to the Eagle theory is that it provides little reason to think that the
Court would embrace substantive due process as a significant source
of restraint on regulations of property. The Court could have signaled some doubt about the merits of the rent control measure at
issue in Lingle, which was basically special interest legislation for
a narrow category of retail gasoline stations in Hawaii, but it studiously avoided doing so. Justice Kennedy penned a short concurring
opinion, emphasizing that due process review should be taken seriously as an alternative to regulatory takings.89 But no other Justice
joined him. Justices Scalia and Thomas, both on record as doubting
the legitimacy of substantive due process, remained silent. This suggests that they or like-minded successors are unlikely to join a future decision invalidating a regulation of property under substantive
due process.
A different path of future evolution is suggested by the more recent
decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District.90
This path is to expand some of the exceptions to Penn Central to the
point where they become indistinguishable from substantive due
process review. Koontz involved the constitutionality of a money
exaction imposed on a developer as a condition of permitting new
development. The Court in previous decisions had created an exception to Penn Central for exactions, based on the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.91 The idea was that if a local government demands that a developer turn over property (such as an easement) as
a condition for obtaining a development permit, and the property
could not otherwise be taken by the government without paying just
compensation, this is an unconstitutional condition unless the value
of the property demanded has an essential nexus and is roughly
89. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
90. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
91. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring rough proportionality
between the value of the property exacted and the social costs of the proposed development);
tween the exaction and the government objective in regulating).
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proportionate in value to the social costs associated with the development. Koontz extended the doctrine to exactions in the form of
cash when the dollar amount is disproportionate to the social costs
of the permitted development. Put aside the question of whether it
is analytically correct to say that a government demand for cash can
Koontz.92 The bottom line is that Koontz
establishes a form of substantive due process in all but name. After
Koontz, lower courts will be permitted to review under a kind of
intermediate standard of scrutiny whether the quantum of cash
demanded has a sufficient nexus and proportionality to the governng development. In other words,
courts can engage in a robust review of the rationality of the means
chosen to advance a stated govern
out for regulatory takings purposes in Lingle. The Court insisted its
decision was a natural extension of the unconstitutional conditions
theory, with the consequence that its mandate is limited to exactions.
The deeper significance is that the Court is eager to expand the
existing regulatory takings framework, with its foundation in Penn
Central, even to the point of replicating substantive due process, but
is allergic to expressly invoking substantive due process as a ground
for doing so.
CONCLUSION
The Eagle theory presents us with a trade-off. Adopt the theory, and
you get a more secure foundation for the regulatory takings doctrine.
Carping about the lack of an originalist foundation for the doctrine,
about the threat it poses to environmental and land use controls,
and about the complexity and unpredictability of the doctrine, would
significantly decline. But, the cost would be a significantly reduced
domain for the doctrine. Wetland regulations and historic preservation orders might be covered, but rent controls and restrictive zoning
would not be. For the friends of
property-based conception of the regulatory takings doctrine could
be achieved only at a significant cost. The cost would be mitigated only
92. Compare Koontz

with id.
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if the Court were willing to embrace a more robust version of substantive due process, keyed to the protection of reliance interests in
property. Whether such a double move on the part of the Court is possible, given the path-dependent nature of constitutional precedent, is
doubtful. The regulatory takings doctrine, like many other pockets of
constitutional law, is likely to remain a casualty of a constitutional
system based on precedent, which cannot be revised very often without calling into question the legitimacy of the very enterprise.93

93. See Merrill, Perils, supra note 15.
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I. INTRODUCTION
e law of regulatory takings are
legion. Not only is he the author of the definitive treatise on regulatory
takings,1 but he has delivered speeches and written articles on various
aspects of the subject for the past 20 years.2 A few years back I rashly
made a few random predictions about the future of regulatory takings
and repeated them 2 years ago at this conference.3 Eagle, has, of
course, written or spoken about all of them. What follows is a more
complete investigation of these predictions, what Steven Eagle has
(1) Land development conditions would continue to come under
even more scrutiny for nexus and proportionality. Then we had
the City of San Jose case from California, where the Court does
not seem to appreciate the diuse and rules that make landowners produce something. But we also have Koontz. So we certainly do have more scrutiny of land development conditions.
legislative and administrative/quasi-judicial exactions. The
of the last unresolved issues in the regulatory taking area.
(3) There will be more use of consensual tools like development
in a whole lot of other states. There are hundreds and hundreds
spect to communities getting together with commercial enterprises

1. See generally STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS (5th ed. 2012) [hereinafter
EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS].
2. See, e.g., works by Steven Eagle discussed in Part II, infra.
3. For the original predictions, see David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting
the Future in Land Use Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J.
Through a Glass Clearly]. For those predictions, updated and reiterated, see David L. Callies,
Opening Remarks: The Future of Land Use Regulation, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF.
The Future of Land Use Regulation].
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Tribe once observed, those of us that use crystal balls may have
to get used to eating ground glass.
(4) The Supreme Court continues to reexamine its decisions
with respect to Kelo
there would be at least one by now.
(5) The courts will continue to wrestle with exceptions to per se
government takings, and the public trust doctrine will be an
issue. The doctrine is increasingly raised as a background principle exception to Lucas, a safe haven for total takings.
(6) If a government is passing a regulation that is essentially
abating a nuisance or has got to do with the background principles of common law property, custom (and the public trust doctrine) seem to be safe havens for government when it enacts a
recently decided a case where it was alleged that the summit of
effective attempt to recognize how far the public trust doctrine
can be extended. The court side-stepped the public trust issue
while holding that some sort of trust applies.
(7) The Court will cut back the application of the ripeness rule.
circuits around the country, much
thanks to some of the work being done by the Pacific Legal Foundation. Now, of course, after Knick, the troublesome state-action
prong is gone, and with it the troublesome preclusion problem.
(8) Partial takings cases will be decided more on the merits but
cases, even though ripeness is, again, not as important as it used
to be, but after Knick this will almost certainly change.
(9) Finally, the Court needs to and will resolve the so-called
tial and total regulatory takings. We all know by now, with all
the webinars and conferences dealing with it, the Supreme Court
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has decided the Murr

nd they are very strange. In the
course of his opinion, Justice Kennedy managed to nearly drive
colleagues will be talking about that at some length.4
II. STEVEN EAGLE AND THE PREDICTIONS
A. Prediction No. 1: Land Development Conditions
Land development conditions would continue to come under
even more scrutiny for nexus and proportionality. Then we had
the City of San Jose case from California, where the Court does
not seem to appreciate the difference between regulation of land
use and rules that make landowners produce something. But we
also have Koontz. So we certainly do have more scrutiny of land
development conditions.5
1. City of Perris
for the Court
Following California Building Industry Association v. City of San
Jose,6 the Supreme Court of California held in City of Perris v.
Stamper
Nollan and Dolan were questions to be decided
by the court, not by a jury.7
The City argued that Defendants would have been required to dedicate the strip to the City,
without compensation, had they tried to put the property to its highest
8

4. Callies, The Future of Land Use Regulation, supra
dictions made in Callies, Through a Glass Clearly, supra note 3) (footnotes omitted). These
predictions have been updated and reworded slightly for this Article.
5. Id.
City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) and
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013)).
7. City of Perris v. Stamper, 376 P.3d 1221, 1225 (Cal. 2016).
8. Id. at 1221.
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and best use, such as light industrial development uses.9 Therefore,
the City offered to pay Defendants the undeveloped (agricultural)
value of the strip, relying upon City of Porterville v. Young.10
The trial court agreed that City of Porterville applied, found the
ent to be lawful under Nollan11 and Dolan,12
and held that Defendants were entitled to an agricultural value of
$44,000.00 for the taking.13 The Court of Appeals agreed with the
application of City of Porterville but held that the legality of the
Nollan and Dolan requirements should have been decided by a jury,
not a judge.14
First, the Supreme Court of California declared the Nollan/Dolan
requirements to be issues properly decided upon by a judge.15 In this
Nollan and Dolan issues present mixed questions of law and fact in
which legal issues predominate.16 Further, they are questions which
must be resolved before the City was entitled to argue that, as a
matter of fact, it would have actually imposed the disputed dedication requirement.17 The Supreme Court also found the application
of Porterville
tuations where it was probable at
the time the dedication requirement was put in place that the property designated for public use was to be included in the project for
which the property is being condemned.18
9. Id. at 1224.
10. Id. City of Porterville held that when a city takes a portion of undeveloped property,
which it would have lawfully required the owner to dedicate to the city as a condition of
developing the remainder of the property, the owner is entitled to compensation based on the
undeveloped state of the property rather than its highest and best use. City of Porterville v.
U.S. 825 (1987) (nexus requirement).
12. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (proportionality requirement).
13. City of Perris, 276 P.3d at 1224.
14. Id.
15. Id.
in a condemnation action, the constitutionality of a dedication requirement under Nollan and Dolan is a question to be decided
by a court, not by a jury. This question is analytically distinct from and prior to, the factual
determination of whether it is reasonably probable that the condemner would actually impose
16. Id. at 1231.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1225.
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2. Eagle: Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse
In Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, Steven Eagle discusses the difficulties in implementing Koontz, while drawing an
of the police station.19 Eagle then discusses the difficulty of enforcing prohibitions on unreasonable coercion that may take place in
informal bargaining processes between land development applicants
and local regulators.20 He concludes with a discussion on some of the
specific procedural and substantive problems and then proposes some
partial solutions.21
Eagle notes that one of the major issues regarding unconstitutional conditions and land development approvals left unanswered
by Koontz is whether the doctrine applies not only to adjudicative
decisions by administrators but also to legislative decisions.22 With
rds comprehensive land use ordinances, Eagle notes that if, in response to Koontz, zoning ordinances
become fine-grained and are directed at particular situations, the
amount of deference given to land use ordinances may become irrelevant.23 A number of courts have determined that such small-scale
tled to legislative deference.24 Hence,
landowners would be subject to the bargaining process and coercion
by local officials.25 A second question left unanswered by Koontz is
whether a monetary exaction is a taking of property when a landowner accedes to an improper exaction and is issued a permit.26
Following Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz, Eagle predicts that there
could be increased value for local cooperative developers because outof-area competitors may be unwelcome by local officials who fear that
exactions imposed on projects will give rise to litigation.27 Further,
19. Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW. 1,
(2014)
(discussing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013)).
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at 29.
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
Koontz agreed that when a landowner refuses to accede
to an improper exaction, there is no taking of property. when the owner does accede, and is
27. Id. at 14.
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interests often are overrepresented
28

However, some courts will take steps to prevent such exclusion.
For example, to counter the exclusion of non-local developers, the New
that a developer who judicially establishes a local need for affordable housing be granted a developm
29
proposed project is clearly con
As Eagle acknowledges, the fact that professional developers treat
the possibility of unjustified exactions as part of the cost of doing
business does not mean that extortionate exactions are victimless
wrongs.30
passed on to housing purchasers and their tenants. Notably, there
are many cases in the land use context involving extortionate behavior by government agents that never gets exposed because a large
number of these cases never reach the courts.31
Eagle provides a number of at least partial solutions that would
provide greater transparency in the process between developers and
demands for potentially unreasonable exactions. In the case of incentive fees or applicant-created infrastructure expenses of a routine nature, transparency could be improved by legislatively enacted
fee schedules.32 Administrative procedures incorporating standards
and guidelines for different types of development applications may
also prove to be useful.33 One scholar, Professor Mark Fenster, has
28. Id.
A Study of American Zoning Board
Composition and Public Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues, 40 URB. LAW
(discussing national study of composition of zoning boards, and noting, as an illustration, that
interest in the development process and none could be said to represent the point of view of
29. Id. at 15 (citing S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390,
not be denied solely
because the municipality prefers some other location for lower income housing, even if it is
30. Id.
31. Id.
n of published ordinances, however, are
the rare exception. The absence of information regarding the disposition of applications that
never reach the courts pinpoints the real problem in formal analyses; that low-visibility
messages to developers that if they want to get along, they have to go along never are re32. Id.
33. Id.
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noted that flexibility in evaluating land development applications
could enable developers and local regulators to reach mutually agreeable terms.34
Eagle states that:
Equal Justice
in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court established the requirement that, prior
to custodial interrogation, suspects be informed of their rights to
remain silent in Miranda v. Arizona. While it is unlikely that
being informed of their rights under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would affect decisions of professional developers,
home owners and small business owners might find that knowledge an incentive to seek legal assistance in bargaining with
planning commission staffs.35

Unfortunately, commentaries on the Miranda experience suggest
other lessons36
ant to curb coercive practices because criminal confessions are too useful. 37 According to
Eagle, this same conclusion might apply to unconstitutional exactions from land development applicants.38
Finally, with regard to potential remedies, Eagle proposes that the
Supreme Court provide for injunctive relief from demands for unreasonable exactions, like providing damages for the time the burden
was in force.39 Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that meaningful
reform or remedies will be adopted
officials, and entrenched local developers all have reasons to prefer
34. Id.
preparation of careful Nollan-Dolan analyses. This takes time and money. The basic fee for
35. Id. at 25 (citing Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 19 (A.E. Dick Howard ed.,
1965) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
36. Id.
suggest that Miranda has had essentially no effect on the percentage of defendants who
of suspects to decline to waive their rights at the outset of questioning, or to affirmatively
s regime has been greatly reduced by practices
that the Supreme Court has tolerated if not
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 31.
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Eagle concludes that without the Supreme

mentation progress will be halted.41
Exactions repository costs formerly borne by government through
broad-band taxes now fall primarily on newcomers and owners of
unimproved land.42 These are egregious examples of the police power
(not taxes). Eagle notes, but does not support, upholding exactions by
deference to the legislature if legislatively imposed, then summarizes
Nollan, and Dolan, are unintended by Lingle.
3. Church of the Divine Earth: Sufficient Nollan/Dolan Analysis
to Avoid Damages
In Church of the Divine Earth v. City of Tacoma, the church brought
an action against the city seeking damages for and based on the city
requiring an eight-foot right-of-way dedication for a permit to build
a parsonage and for violation of the Public Records Act.43 The lower
court determined that the right-of-way dedication condition placed
Nollan and Dolan
nexus and proportionality requirements.44
The Washington Court of Appeals emphasized the sufficient
Nollan/Dolan analysis that was conducted by the City.45 At trial,
there were several City employees who testified that nexus and proportionality were the primary considerations in discussing and deciding the requirement for the building permits. According to the Court,
this testimony established that a sufficient Nollan/Dolan analysis
was conducted.46 Therefore, the landowner failed to establish any
grounds for imposing liability and permitting damages.47 The Court
of Appeals of Washington entered judgment in favor of the City.48
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Church of the Divine Earth v. City of Tacoma, 426 P.3d 268 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018), rev.
granted in part, 435 P.3d 285 (2019),
, 449 P.3d 269 (2019).
44. Id. at 272.
45. Id. at 276.
46. Id. at 278, 280.
47. Under the relevant state statute, there were three grounds for imposing liability: (1) the
action was arbitrary or capricious, (2) the City knew or should have known that the act exceeded its lawful authority, or (3) the City knew or should have known that its act was unlawful. Id. at 278.
48. Id. at 281.
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4. Eagle: Property Rights After Horne
Consistent with this prediction, Steven Eagle, in his article Property Rights After Horne, explains how Horne reinforced the theme
of Nollan and Koontz and provides more security with respect to its
application of categorical takings treatment to appropriations of
personal property.49
Horne placed government
appropriation of personal property on par with government appropriation of real property.50 Further, Eagle predicts that the principle
effect of Horne, reinforcing Koontz, will be more intense judicial review
of exactions on real estate development in general, and regarding
51

The wariness about regulatory overreach characterizing both
Koontz and Horne
the rule of law that laws be determined and articulated in advance, provide stable guidance to citizens, and not be subject to
the whim of leaders. On the other hand, the Realist concept of
d contemporary legal thought.52

Finally, Horne reinforced the proposition that the normal, customary use of resources is to be protected by specifying that engaging in
milarly not a special governmen53
According to
Eagle, the Koontz
with a fresh way to approach taking cases, enabling it to avoid the
Horne and
Koontz point to a more robust demand that government show why
54
property owners should be deprived
49.
(2016).
50.
51.
52.
53.

Steven J. Eagle, Property Rights After Horne, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 669, 731
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id. at 727.
Id.

t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419,

015))

be described as
Koontz, the Court extended the thrust of Nollan to
the denial of development approvals through the unconstitutional conditions doctrine when
landowners fail to accede to
54. Id. at 732.
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B. Prediction No. 2: Legislative vs. Quasijudicial
by the difference between legislative and administrative/quasi-judicial exactions. The Supreme
last unresolved issues in the regulatory taking area.55
Following California Building Industry v. City of San Jose,56 courts
continue to be confused by the distinction between an exaction imposed administratively and one imposed legislatively. The Supreme
Court has yet to resolve this issue and so property owners and local
governments are left with uncertainty over what legal standards
govern legislative acts and whether cities can legislatively impose
exactions that would not pass muster if done administratively.57
dent with regard to this distinction.
1. American Furniture Warehouse Co.: Traffic Signal Fee Was
Generally Applicable Legislative Fee
In American Furniture Warehouse Co. v. Town of Gilbert, a commercial applicant for a church land development permit brought an
action against the city alleging that the traffic signal fee the city
charged it was an unconstitutional taking or exaction.58 The Court of
Appeals in Arizona was presented with questions of whether Dolan
59

Although Dolan did not deal with these questions, the court found
Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale.60
55. Callies, The Future of Land Use Regulation, supra note 3, at 13 (citing Callies,
Through a Glass Clearly, supra note 3, at 44).
56. 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
57. See id.
58. Am. Furniture Warehouse Co. v. Town of Gilbert, 425 P.3d 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
59. Id. at 1104.
60. Id.
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There, the Arizona Supreme Court held that
Dolan

legislative
adjudicative decision
to impose a condition tailored to the particular circumstances of
alternative holding or dicta, [the Arizona Supreme Court] found
legislative

Nollan/Dolan did not apply,
61

Applying City of Scottsdale, the Court of Appeals in American
Furniture Warehouse found the payment of the traffic signal to be a
generally applicable legislative fee, carrying with it a presumption of
validity.62 In other words, Nollan/Dolan did not apply. Further, the
cative dichotomy discussed in Dolan and City of Scottsdale [wa]s
63

Supreme Court in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District rejected the legislate/adjudicative dichotomy. 64 The court
found Koontz to be significant both for what it did and did not do:
Koontz held that, when applicable, Nollan/Dolan provides the
proper analysis when the government conditions issuance of a
permit either upon the payment of a fee or upon the transfer of
a property. What Koontz did not do was replace, negate or (given
the facts) even address Dolan
omy discussed in City of Scottsdale. As a result, Koontz did not
hold that Dolan applied to generally applicable legislative development fees like those imposed in the traffic signal SDF.65
61. Id.
Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997)).
62. Id. at 1105.
63. Id.
64. Am. Furniture Warehouse Co. v. Town of Gilbert, 425 P.3d 1099, 1106 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2018) (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013)).
65. Id. (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 614 n.2, 617
(2013)).
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Accordingly, the applicant could not show that the City effectuated an unconstitutional taking by applying the generally applicable
traffic signal to the development permit request.66
2. Eagle: Land Use Regulation and Good Intentions
Land Use Regulation and Good Intentions, in pertinent part, examines the pervasiveness of exactions in planning.67
Nollan,
Dolan, and Koontz, Eagle shares some of the concerns of other scholars. For instance, Professor Timothy Mulvaney has warned that
scholars favoring a progressive view of property should not be too
quick to defend the adjudicative-legislative distinction, since conceding
that legislative actions have greater legitimacy would have problematic effects:
heightened scrutiny is necessarily imbued with a tacit criticism
effects on the many eminent domain and regulatory takings situations that involve administrativ
pronounced shift in land use policy toward broad, unbending legislative measures to avoid . . .
trative regulation [that] would
political, and economic identities
affected by land use conflicts.68

Professor Gregory Stein is another scholar that lends support to
a broad view of exactions, but from an economic perspective.69 Stein
enhance the public fisc at the expense of developers and their buyers,
but rather to offset the negative externalities that the proposed devel70
However, according
66. Id.
67. Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 87, 111 (2017).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 112.
70. Id. (citing Gregory M. Stein, Reverse Exactions, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3
(2017)).
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to Eagle, in some cases restrictions are imposed to create positive
externalities when bestowed on recipients favored by local officials
as opposed to eliminating negative externalities imposed by the
landowners.71
om one-time applications that
ensure compliance by local developers who are repeat players.72 He warns that unless used as a way to
closely offset negative externalities that are in fact generated by the
project, such exactions operate in the residential context as a tax on
homebuilders, which is then largely passed on to homebuyers.73 Ironi74

C. Prediction No. 3: Consensual Tools
There will be more use of consensual tools like development
in a whole lot of other states. There are hundreds and hundreds
to communities getting together with commercial enterprises and

Tribe once observed, those of us that use crystal balls may have
to get used to eating ground glass.75
71. Id. Eagle then acknowledges that
[u]ndoubtedly, exactions do often offset negative externalities, a point readily
acknowledged in Koontz by Justice Alito. However,
as the building permit is more valuable than any just compensation the owner
could hope to receive for the [property right taken], the owner is likely to accede
Id.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 113.
75. Callies, The Future of Land Use Regulation, supra
Through a Glass Clearly, supra note 3, at 45; Tribe: As U.S. Drifts, Courts No Guiding Light,
65 A.B.A.J. 1468, 1468 (1979)).
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For example, we see this in 2910 Georgia Avenue LLC v. District
of Columbia, where the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia considered a property
tutional taking.76
opinion in City of San Jose persuasive, the court held that the IZ Program constituted a generally applicable regulation.77 Accordingly,
Nollan/Dolan was not applicable.78
This was also the outcome in American Furniture Warehouse,
discussed above.79 In a number of other cases, we see courts reviewing challenges to development ordinances or development rights
outside of the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz context and are beginning to see
use of such consensual tools in more states than just California.80
ingly recognizes that local govern
might not survive scrutiny.81 Nollan-Dolan-Koontz analyzes such
consensual tools providing statistics that local governments can
but even these concessions require proportionality as to what the
government is attempting to restrict or grant.82
76. See 2910 Ga. Ave. LLC v. District of Columbia, 234 F.Supp.3d 281 (D.C. 2017).
77. Id.
to the same degree as any other developer, to use a certain portion of the units in its new
development in a certain manner by regulating the price at which it could sell those units. It
did not require that Plaintiff dedicate any portion of its property to the public in return for
granting Plaintiff a building permit. The unconstitutional exaction framework accordingly
78. Id.
79. See Am. Furniture Warehouse Co. v. Town of Gilbert, 425 P.3d 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2018).
80. See, e.g., Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwater Linganor, Inc., 173 A.3d 549 (Md.
2017) (Court of Appeals of Maryland reverses and holds that any development agreement is
not required to confer enhanced benefits to the local governing body. Instead, to be valid, the
development agreement must be supported by sufficient consideration); see also CHW-Lattas
Creek, L.P. v. City of Alice, 565 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App. 2018) (Court of Appeals of Texas holds
that city did not waive its sovereign immunity under the terms of the development agreement
and was not estopped from asserting its sovereign immunity); City of Union Gap v. Printing
Press Props., L.L.C., 409 P.3d 239 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (Court of Appeals of Washington grants
declaratory judgment, stating that owner would violate development agreement with city by cutting curb along a boulevard to gain direct access from its land without a city-issued permit).
81. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 1, § 3-4(c).
82. Id.
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D. Prediction No. 4: Kelo and Public Use
The Supreme Court continues to reexamine its decisions with
respect to Kelo
taken up a recent eminent domain case, and I thought there
would be at least one by now.83
The Supreme Court has yet to reexamine its decisions with respect
to Kelo.
1. Eagle: Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition: Private and
Public Benefit in an Era of Agglomeration
The development of eminent domain law is thoroughly analyzed
Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition: Private and
Public Benefit in an Era of Agglomeration.84 Specifically, Eagle focuses
85

Eagle

incomplete. In particular, he discusses the New York Court of ApGoldstein86 and Kaur,87 which displayed uncritical
support for the development of economic agglomeration.88 By doing
so, Eagle concludes that the Court of Appeals abrogated its duty to
meaningfully examine the possibility of eminent domain being used
not for public use.89
Eagle also discusses the public policy implications that follow from
condemnation for transfer for private development, as hastened by
the government effort to stimulate agglomeration.90 Among the
implications mentioned are a lack of transparency, secondary rent
83. Callies, The Future of Land Use Regulation, supra note 3, at 14 (citing Callies, Through
a Glass Clearly, supra note 3, at 45).
84. Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition: Private and Public Benefit in
an Era of Agglomeration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023 (2011) [hereinafter Eagle, Public Use
in the Dirigiste Tradition].
85. Id.
86. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 1643 (N.Y. 2009).
87. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010).
88. See generally Eagle, Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition, supra note 84.
89. See id.
90. Id.
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seeking, potential corruption resu

91

2. Eagle: Supreme Court Economic Review Symposium on PostKelo Reform: Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial
Policy
In the Supreme Court Economic Review Symposium on Post-Kelo
Reform: Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial Policy, Eagle
discusses how Kelo has intensified trends towards increased local
government land use regulation to spur economic development and
partnering with private redevelopers.92 He discusses two problematic and related developments in the relationship between the state
and owners of property in land.93
increased intervention in land use, with its regulatory focus shifting
from sanctioning nuisance to sanctioning owners who do not use
their lands to further government economic objectives. 94 The second
problem is increased governmental alliances with private developers.
According to Eagle, this latter development has substantial merit,
but it also increases the possibility that private property rights will
be impaired by overreaching private actors and by the state.95
According to Eagle, the use of condemnation for retransfer to private redevelopment is only one tool that local governments use to addomain in the process of economic fine-tuning.96 Other tools used by
the government to direct and subsidize growth include land use controls such as impact and linkage fees, direct government expendiindividual property into regulatory property.97
Kelo facilitates government efforts to suppress primary rent seeking by landowners, but provides only conceptually incoherent and practically unenforceable protections against secondary
91. Id. at 1023, 1034, 1076.
92. Steven J. Eagle, Supreme Court Economic Review Symposium on Post-Kelo Reform:
Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 63 (2009).
93. Id. at 64.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 63, 64.
97. Id. at 64.
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Accordingly,
Eagle states that from an economic perspective, the dangers of secondary rent seeking, combined with the information problems inherent
Kelo
98

99

powerful and more devolved upon its private partners, its aims in
100
In the past
s grown from the alleviation of
public nuisance through the police power, to the prevention of public
nuisance through zoning, to the affirmative reshaping of land uses
101
Although Kelo expressed confidence in
ment takings primarily for public benefit from impermissible takings
primarily for private benefit, Eagle contends that any such distinction
is illusory.102 He suggests that government intervention in municipal growth comes with numerous problems and inefficiencies, many
of which have little hope of resolution under the current state.103
Eagle then explores how public choice considerations augur in favor
of unnecessary and inefficient condemnations.104 He suggests some
alternatives that would better effectuate urban redevelopment in ways
that avoid the unfair and inefficient exercises of eminent domain.
These alternatives include greater recognition of fractional property
interests, facilitating owner participation in post-condemnation
redevelopment, localizing neighborhood development control, and
making blight redevelopment open and transparent by replacing
condemnation with abatement and foreclosure.105
E. Prediction No. 5: Lucas Exceptions
The courts will continue to wrestle with exceptions to per se government takings, and the public trust doctrine will be an issue.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 64.
Id.
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The doctrine is increasingly raised as a background principle
exception to Lucas, a safe haven for total takings,106
Prediction No. 6: Lucas Exceptions
If a government is passing a regulation that is essentially abating a nuisance or has got to do with the background principles
of common law property, custom (and the public trust doctrine)
seem to be safe havens for government when it enacts a totalcently decided a case where it was alleged that the summit of a
tive attempt to recognize how far the public trust doctrine can be
extended. The court side-stepped the public trust issue while
holding that some sort of trust applies.107
1. In re Conservation District Use Application: Public Trust
Doctrine Is Applied to a Mountain Summit
The farthest stretch to apply the public trust doctrine has come with
the recent Supreme Court of Hawaii decision in In re Conservation
District Use Application HA-3568 surrounding the development of
a 30-meter telescope observatory near a sacred mountain summit
(Mauna Kea) in Hawaii, Hawaii.108 The case concerns issues with regard to Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights, and the
public trust doctrine.
Some Native Hawaiians consider the Mauna Kea Summit to be an
ancestor, a living family member and progenitor of Hawaiians, and
a way in which to connect with ancestors.109 Before Western contact,
the summit area was for a time considered taboo to all but the highest
chiefs and priests, unavailable to the general public, although a multiacre edge quarry suggests an extractive use akin to modern mining or
quarrying. After statehood, the Board of Land and Natural Resources

106. Callies, The Future of Land Use Regulation, supra note 3, at 14 (citing Callies, Through
a Glass Clearly, supra note 3, at 45; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
107. Id. (citing Callies, Through a Glass Clearly, supra note 3, at 45. See also DAVID CALLIES,
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER KNICK (ABA Press, 2020).
108. See In re Conservation District Use Application HA-3568, 431 P.3d 752 (Haw. 2018).
109. Id.
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The
MKSR totals 11,288 acres and includes most all of the land on Mauna
Kea Ice Age Natural Area Reserve.111 Thereafter, over a dozen astronomical observatories became operational in the summit region of
the MKSR.112
In 2003, a California public-benefit non-profit corporation, TMT
Corporation, was formed for the purposes of fostering astronomy
through building the 30-meter telescope.113 On direct appeal, the
Hawaii Supreme Court considered, in relevant part, whether the TMT
110

the public trust principles.
district lands owned by the State, such as the lands in the summit
area of Mauna Kea, are public resources held in trust for the benefit
114
Further, the Court
public trust principles.115
of fact and conclusions of law and found significant that there was
no actual evidence of use of Native Hawaiian cultural resources, including traditional and customary practices, within the TMT Observatory site and Access Way area by Native Hawaiian practitioners.
After extensive surveying, no archeological or historic sites or burials were found in the TMT Observatory site or Access Way areas.116
Additionally, the Court added that
that the TMT Project would not curtail or restrict Native Hawaiian
uses.117 Finally, the Court found that the TMT Project would result
in substantial community benefits and other direct benefits in which
Native Hawaiians would be included.118
110. Id. at 758.
111. Id.
112. Id. These include: the University 2.2-meter Telescope (1970); the United Kingdom
1979) (owned by the University now), the NASA Infrared Telescope Facility (operated by the University) (
and more. Id.
113. Id. at 759.
114. In re Conservation Dist. Use Application HA-3568, 431 P.3d at 773.
115. Id. at 775.
116. Id. at 769.
117. Id. at 775.
118. Id.
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2. Town of Nags Head: An Attempt to Avoid Compensation
In Town of Nags Head v. Richardson, the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina considered whether a municipality that takes an easement
on privately owned oceanfront property to replenish the beach can
avoid compensating the private property owner by asserting public
trust rights vested in the state.119 This condemnation action was
erty owners seeking easement rights
sand beach property.120 At trial, the jury awarded the Richardsons
$60,000 (the fair market value of the easement).121 However, eight
months later, following a hearing and additional briefing, the lower
court entered judgment notwithst
the owner $0 in damages on public trust grounds, which were not
asserted by the Town in their motions for directed verdict, and despite other relevant evidence to support the jury verdict.122
On appeal, the court acknowledged
public trust rights.123 However, the Town never argued at trial that
the public trust doctrine rendered the taking non-compensable or
that the Town already possessed easement rights.124 Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding on
JNOV that the Town already possessed the easement rights and
that the public trust doctrine rendered the taking non-compensable;
neither argument was raised by the Town at trial.125 The judgment
was reversed and remanded.126
3. In re New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 3: Attempt to Avoid
Compensation by Asserting Wetland Regulations Are State
Background Principles
In re New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 3,127 the Supreme Court Appellate
Division of New York held as a matter of first impression that the
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Town of Nags Head v. Richardson, 817 S.E.2d 874, 878 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 884.
Town of Nags Head v. Richardson, 817 S.E.2d at 892.
Id.
In re New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 3, 65 N.Y.S.3d 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
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may be applied
in valuing regulated wetland properties taken in condemnation.129
Further, the court held that there was a reasonable probability that
128

have been found to constitute a regulatory taking.130
In this case, the claimant owned two contiguous unimproved lots,
totaling more than 7,000 square feet, near the shore of Staten Island.131 The claimant acquired title in the early 1970s, and later the
majority of the property was designated as wetlands. In 2006, the
city acquired the property from the claimant as part of a multiphase
project to manage stormwater along the New Creek Bluebelt.132
Shortly after, the claimant commenced a proceeding seeking compensation for the taking. The issues on appeal included the valuation of the taken property.
The city argued that it would not be inconsistent with Palazzolo133
to find that Gazza134 and its companion cases bar a post-enactment
cases articulate certain state property law principles that Palazzolo
According to the city, wetland regulations constitute background principles of state law that inhere in
the title of a post-enactment purchaser.136
135

use of the property would have been available by reason of a legislative rezoning or a judicial
Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). In such
a case, if the claimant can prove that there is
laration of invalidity, the value of the property as zoned or restricted on the day of [the] taking
will be augmented by an incre
m a knowledgeable buyer would
be willing to pay for a potential
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
129. Id. at 552.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 554.
132. Id.
133. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (
though his acquisition of the property postdated the regulation).
nversation, 89 N.Y.2d 603 (N.Y. 1997) (rejecting
wetlands is a taking despite the fact that the legislation was fully enacted and in force when
135. In re New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 3, 156 A.D.3d at 559.
136. Id.
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The Court rejected this argument.137 Instead, the Court held that
a subsequent buyer of property would not be precluded from bringing a successful regulatory taking
regulated wetland properties taken in condemnation.138 The Court
went further to clarify that when the regulation is shown to be a backBut where, as in this case, no
showing was made, the rule could be applied in valuing regulated
wetland properties taken in condemnation.140
139

4. Leone: Land Use Regulations Were Not a Taking Because Lot
With regard to regulatory takings under Lucas, in Leone v. County
of Maui, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that investment use is a
relevant consideration in a takings analysis and accordingly, that
that the property [at issue] retained a reasonable, economically viable use, specifically in the form
141
Further, the Court held that the question of
whether the land retained some economically beneficial use was for
the jury.142
In this case, the plaintiffs had bought a beachfront lot in Maui with
the expressed intention to build a family home on it. Seventeen years
later, the home still had not been built. The plaintiffs argued that
prevented them from doing so. In 2007, the plaintiffs sued the County,
s constituted a regulatory taking
for which the plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation. 143
137. Id.
is that wetland regulations are background principles of State law simply because they have
Palazzolo
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

become a background principle for subsequent
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630).

Id.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Leone v. County of Maui, 404 P.3d 1257, 1277 (Haw. 2017).
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1259.

2020]

THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS

69

land use regulations constituted a regulatory taking. The plaintiffs
argued that the lower court abused its discretion by allowing testiother jurisdictions and held that while the property value should not
be the sole focus in an economically viable use inquiry, it was still
a relevant factor.144
The parties had offered conflicting testimony on whether the plain145

The Court found the fact that the plaintiffs had purchased the property and less than a year later, attempted to sell it at price $4 million
higher than the price they had paid for it, to support the testimony
146
Although the plaintiffs could not
build a home on the property, there was evidence presented showing
that the property could potentially be used in the commercial context. The plaintiffs could hold on to the property, wait until it increased in value, and sell it for a profit.147 Accordingly, the Supreme
nation that the plaintiffs had not
been deprived of all economically beneficial use of their property.148
5. Surfrider Foundation: Not All Temporary Physical Invasions
Are Per Se Takings
In Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach, the Court of Appeals
of California held that not all temporary physical invasions are per
se takings that require compensation under the California Constitution.149 This case was brought by a non-profit organization dedicated
to preserving recreational access to beaches, against some coastal

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
2017).

Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1277.
Id.
Leone, 404 P.3d at 1272.
Id.
Surfrider Found. v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 413 (Cal. Ct. App.
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Act, requiring a coastal developm
junction requiring the landowners to allow public coastal access.150
The landowners appealed.
a per se physical taking that was exempt from the Penn Central
analysis because it stripped them of their rights to exclude the public
nent because it only lasted until there was a decision on a CDP.151
The court agreed that the temporary nature of the injunction meant
that it could not be treated as a per se taking:
It may be that certain types of temporary physical invasions are
frequently and easily characterized as takings. But [the landowners] cite no case supporting the proposition that courts have created a category of per se takings covering temporary physical
invasions, such that the invasi
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit
152

The court concluded that although
a physical invasion similar to an easement, the temporary nature of
the injunction meant it could not be treated as a per se taking.153
6. Hill
In Hill v. State, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources
water permits for natural flow and storage in the Republic River Basin
154
Four appropriators, representing themselves and a class
verse condemnation action against the DNR alleging regulatory
150. Id. at 388.
151. Id. at 407.
152. Id. at 413 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
see also
red by the recognized categorical rules are considered under
a multifactor test, such as the Penn Central
153. Id. at 405. Because the landowners did not attempt to show that the injunction affected
a taking under the Penn Central test, the Court did not consider whether the injunction constituted a regulatory taking and affirmed. Id.
154. Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 2017).
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taking claims against the State of Nebraska and the DNR. The district court consolidated the claims and dismissed both.155 The appropriators appealed.
amounted to a permanent physical invasion of their property and
that such regulation deprived them of all economically beneficial use
of that property.156 The Supreme Court of Nebraska rejected this
claim, finding that no facts had been alleged which, if established,
could support either a physical taking or a regulatory taking (that
they had been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the prop157

water to grow a corn crop does not amount to be deprived of all eco158
Additional data indicated
that there was still production on the land despite lower product
numbers during the 2013 and 2014 growing seasons.159 Thus, the
did not constitute a physical or
160
regulatory taking.
to Lucas should take precedence, particularly focusing on state and
federal cases which find no compensation despite a finding of total
161

F. Prediction No. 7: Ripeness
been happening in many circuits around the country, much
thanks to some of the work being done by the Pacific Legal Foundation. Now, of course, after Knick, the troublesome state-action
prong is gone, and with it the troublesome preclusion problem.162
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 211.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 219 (internal quotation omitted).
Id.
Id.

161. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 1, § 7-3(b)(4).
162. Callies, The Future of Land Use Regulation, supra
v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019)) (footnote omitted).
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Knick: Takings Claims Are Ripe at the Time of the Taking
The Supreme Court has indeed cut back its application of the
ripeness rule and particularly the
Knick v. Township of Scott, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that a property owner has a claim for a violation of the Takings
Clause as soon as a government takes his property for public use
without paying for it and therefore may bring his claim in federal
court under Section 1983 at that time.163 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Roberts expressly overruled Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,164
where the Court held that a property owner whose property has been
taken by a local government has not suffered a violation of his Fifth
compensation under state law.165
According to Williamson County, a property owner did not have a
ral court until that property owner
had failed to secure just compensation under state law in state
court.166 However, some of the unanticipated consequences of Williamson County
San
167
Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, when the
lution of a claim for just compensation under state law generally has preclusive effect in any sub168
In other words, plaintiffs bringing taking
claims would find themselves in a Catch-22: they could go to federal
court without first going to state court, but if they did go to state
court and lose, their claim was barred in federal court.169
In Knick, the Court described the state-litigation requirement as
the provisions of the Bill of Rights.170 The Supreme Court declared
163. Knick
165. See Knick
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
litigation requirement of Williamson County

See id. at 2167.
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
Id.
Id. at 2169 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994)).
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171

taking without compensation violates the self-executing Fifth Amendment at the time of the taking, a property owner can bring a federal
172

is that plaintiffs may bring constitutional claims under [Section] 1983
state lawsuit, even when state

173

The Court also made clear that the availability of other particular
compensation remedies, like an inverse condemnation claim under
state law, does not infringe or re
constitutional claim.174 Simply because the state provides a property
owner with a procedure, which may later result in just compensation,
does not mean it can deprive the owner of his Fifth Amendment right
to compensation under the Constitution, leaving only the state law
right.175 The Court considered this to be
tence of the Fifth Amendment right that allows the owner to proceed
176
directly to federal cou
Therefore, because
177

Eagle observes that the impact cases were undecided on the merits
prong means the merits of the first litigated takings claim in state
court.178
San
Remo, the difficulty in receiving federal claims on the four-Justice call
to revisit Williamson County, and the fact that the Supreme Court
179

171. Id. at 2178.
172. Id. at 2172.
173. Id.
174. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2171.
175. Id.
176. Id. Williamson County had a different view of how the Takings Clause works.
According to Williamson County, a taking does not give rise to a federal constitutional right
to just compensation at that time, but instead gives a right to a state law procedure that will
177. Id. at 2177.
178. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 1, § 8-3.
179. See id.; Webinar: Knick Overrules Williamson County: What Does it Mean for Eminent
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G. Prediction No. 8: Partial Takings
Partial takings cases will be decided more on the merits but with
though ripeness is, again, not as important as it used to be, but
after Knick this will almost certainly change.180
The recent partial taking cases being considered are being decided
on the merits and are showing pretty mixed results.
1. Moreau: Partial Taking Completely Eliminated Intended Use
of the Property
State Department of Transportation and Development v. Moreau
is an expropriation case instituted by the state, through the Departpand the state highway.181 The landowner owned 1.65 acres located
on a state highway.182 After purchasing the property in 1992, the
landowner constructed a convenience store with gas pumps. Behind
the convenience store, the landowner put up 84 to 86 mini storage
units to maximize the use of his property.183 In fall of 2011, pursuant to the plan to expand the state highway, DODT proposed to
184
The negotiation
failed because the landowner demanded additional compensation of
$805,278.00 for the partial taking because the taking forced elimination of fueling operations from his property, rendering the property unfit for its intended use.185
In conjunction with the filing of the petition, DOTD deposited what
it considered to be just compensation into the registry of the court.186
Domain? (A.B.A. Section of State and Local Government, Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/events-cle/ecd/ondemand/379110323/.
180. Callies, The Future of Land Use Regulation, supra note 3, at 15 (citing Callies, Through
a Glass Clearly, supra note 3, at 45).
au, 255 So. 3d 618, 621 (La. Ct. App. 2018).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 622.
186. Id.
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On the morning of the trial, the landowner submitted a new proposed
jury instruction regarding relocation or relocation damages.187 Over
188

While the matter was pending, in an effort to mitigate his damages,
the landowner was forced to convert his convenience store into a package liquor store. At trial, the l
that a package liquor store was a much less desirable business and
was less marketable to outside purchasers.189 Additionally, the landhat the total replacement cost to
reports, would be $1,097,090.00.190
After the conclusion of trial, the landowner was awarded more
than the amount deposited by the state.191 The state appealed the
192
On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered a number of issues for review, including, first, whether a claim for relocation damages may be presented to the jury when the claim was not
properly plead or asserted and second, whether the landowner is
entitled to increased just compensation when he fails to meet his
burden of proof by failing to present any competent evidence or expert
testimony to establish the value of the land taken or severance damages to the land remaining in excess of the amount deposited.193
As to the first issue, the court held that the trial court abused its
discretion to modify the pretrial order to provide for an alternative
expert to rebut that testimony. 194
relocation damages.195 On the second issue, the court noted that the
jury considered several different appraisal reports submitted by the
DOTD, which contained vastly dive
as well as some of the coercive measures practiced by the DOTD in
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 623.
Id.

, 255 So. 3d at 622.

, 255 So. 3d at 622.
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the early negotiation before litigation.196 The jury also considered
ness, took his fuel pumps, and diminished his livelihood and business endeavor that he worked for almost forty years to attain.197
In making its determination that the landowner was entitled to
osed reconstruction plan to reestablish fueling operations on the property would not be approved
due to a local airport zoning ordinance and that, therefore, the landowner would never be able to reestablish fueling operations on the
property to the extent that he enjoyed prior to the taking.198 The court
then found the amount the jury awarded to be reasonably supported
by the evidence in the record, and
therefore, was properly denied.199
2. SMP Properties: Genuine Issue of Material Fact Existed
In City of Albuquerque v. SMP Properties, LLC, the City of Albuion action to acquire a thirtyfoot-wide strip of land to build a road on property operated as a
freight truck terminal by tenants.200 The property in question is referred to as the Hawkins Property; it houses a sixty-five door freight
truck terminal on approximately 9.859 acres of land in Albuquerque,
New Mexico.201
ine doors to SAIA Motor Freight
UPS.202
2003.203 The lease contained two three-year options to renew, and
SAIA exercised both options.204
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.

, 255 So. 3d at 625.
City of Albuquerque v. SMP Props., LLC, 433 P.3d 336, 338 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Sometime in 2009, SAIA secured permission for, and began installation of, a fuel tank on the facility.205 Installation was completed
in August 2010, during the last lease renewal period and at a cost of
$180,000.206 SAIA spent this much because SAIA had every intention
of staying on the property.207 In early December 2011, SMP and
SAIA agreed to renew the lease for another three-year term.208 Instead of sending a letter to memorialize the new lease, SAIA, suddenly and without notice, sent SMP a letter in March 2012, terminating its lease and immediately started looking for a new location
to operate.209
from City planning or zoning had re
to cut a road through part of the Hawkins Property.210 SAIA remained
at the Hawkins Property until it found a new site and vacated the
211

The City filed its complaint for condemnation in July 2013, to
acquire the thirty-foot strip of land and a construction easement
along the northern boundary line of the Hawkins Property to construct a road.212 After the City deposited $143,850 with the clerk of
the district court, which it asserted was just compensation for the
213

that $143,850 was just compensation, and asserted, in part, that the
ately caused SAIA not to renew
its lease with SMP, resulting in an inverse condemnation and
consequential damage in a sum to be proven at trial.
The City filed for summary judgment on two grounds and the district court granted both motions.214 The defendants appealed. The
Court of Appeals of New Mexico considered first whether the lease
payments from a tenant may be considered in computing just com-

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
City of Albuquerque, 433 P.3d at 338.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
City of Albuquerque, 433 P.3d at 339.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id.

78

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:045

not to renew its lease with the property owner and the lease term
ended when the condemnation action was filed and second, whether
those same actions by the City may give rise to a claim for inverse
condemnation and damages.215
The Defendants argued that the district court erred in ruling that
relevant state statute, and theresummary judgment on the claim for

damages.216

SMP property] immediately before
lease between SAIA and SMP when the thirty-foot-wide strip was
217
The Court of Appeals took issue with the
caused SAIA not to renew its lease with SMP, causing damages to
218

The court looked to Alaska and Washington case law for guidance,
which also recognized that when
effectively deprive the owner of the economic advantages of ownerof condemned unimproved property is constitutionally required if a
four-part test if satisfied and found this to be consistent with New
219

erty owner is constitutionally entitl

et value that occurs before the

when (1) prior to instituting formal condemnation proceedings, the
nced an unequivocal intention to

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 342 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A-1-26 (1981)).
218. City of Albuquerque, 433 P.3d at 342.
219. Id. at 343 (citing Lange v. State, 547 P.2d
be substantially impaired and the condemning authority must have evidenced an unequivocal
intention to take the specific parcel of land. The special use of the land by the owner must be
acquiring and holding the property for subsequent development and sale. Further, the owner
& Pub. Facilities, 797 P.2d 629, 635 (Alaska 1990) (same).
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communication of its intention to third parties or the public in gen220

The Court reversed the lower cou
the loss of the SAIA lease.221 Moreover, there were disputed issues
of material fact as to whether the City engaged in precondemnation
conduct that would allow loss of the SAIS lease to be included in the
calculation of loss in market value to the Hawkins Property. The
and agreed with the Defendants that these issues of material fact
constitute substantial interference with their property rights in the
Hawkins Property.222
3. Burney: Landowners Successfully Claimed Partial Takings
In San Jacinto River Authority v. Burney, the landowners were able
to successfully claim a partial taking of their properties.223 During
Hurricane Harvey, the San Jacinto
River.224 The owners of homes that flooded sued the River Authority
seeking compensation for their inverse-condemnation and statutory
takings claim.225
The Court of Appeals considered whether the homeowners alleged
sufficient facts to establish the elements of a takings claim and thereby demonstrate a waiver of immunity.226 The homeowners alleged
that the River Authority intentionally, knowingly, affirmatively,
and consciously decided to release water from the Lake.227 They furn addition to being constitutional
requiring compensation.228 As a result, the
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

City of Albuquerque, 433 P.3d at 343.
Id. at 344.
Id.
San Jacinto River Authority v. Burney, 570 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App. 2018).
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 832.
Id. (citation omitted).
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homeowners were unable to return and were therefore deprived of
the use, occupancy, and enjoyment of their homes, thereby causing
damage to homes, requiring repairs costing hundreds of dollars, and
In a motion to dismiss, the River Authority argued that the homeowners did not plead a taking sufficient under the Texas Constitution so as to demonstrate a waiver of governmental immunity and
that the homeowners did not sufficiently plead that their properties
were intentionally flooded by the River Authority for a public purpose.229 Relying on two Supreme Court of Texas decisions,230 the River
Authority argued that the homeowners were required (but failed) to
allege that the River Authority knew its actions would result in the
231

The Court of Appeals of Texas was not persuaded by the River
tention that for it to have committed a taking, it had to have inproperties would be the substantially certain result of its release of
water, the Court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court considers this to be an open question under federal takings law.232 Instead,
burden, the homeowners had satisfied it for purposes of surviving
a motion to dismiss.233 The Court also found that the homeowners
had sufficiently pleaded the public-use element of their constituation, flood, flowage or drainage
234
easement over their proper
235

229. San Jacinto River Authority, 570 S.W.3d
pleads the necessary
intent for a constitutional takings claim by alleging that the governmental entity know that
a specific act would cause the resulting identifiable property damage or know that the specific
property damage was substantially certain
230. Id. at 833 (citing Harris County Flood Control District v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793 (Tex.
2016); City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2004)).
231. Id. at 834.
232. Id. The United States Supreme Court expressly declined to address this question in
v. United States,
233. Id.
234. Id. at 838.
235. San Jacinto River Authority, 570 S.W.3d at 839.
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4. Riddle
In Department of Transportation v. Riddle, the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina addressed the merits of a condemnation action
brought by the Department of Trans
owners for the partial taking of l
used for re-routing a section of a highway.236 The lower court had
entered an order that the jury could consider the effect of the portion
of lots taken, and the landowners appealed. The Court of Appeals
initially remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether
the other five lots should be unified to determine just compensation.
On remand, the trial court ordered one of the lots to be unified with
the two lots that were the subject of the taking for purposes of determining just compensation.237 The landowners appealed, arguing
that the effect of the taking on the other four lots should also be
considered by the jury. DOT cross-appealed, contending that the
trial on damages should not have included the first lot and should
be limited to the effect the taking had on the two lots. 238 According
to the court:
This appeal is not about any determination regarding the land
actually taken by DOT. There is not disagreement in this regard.
DOT has physically taken slivers from Lots 2 and 7 along Maxwell
Road, and nothing else. Rather, this appeal is about the trial
affected by the taking;
....
There is no single rule or principle established for determining
the unity of lands[.] The factors most generally emphasized are
[1] unity of ownership, [2] physical unity, and [3] unity of use. . . .
The respective importance of these factors depends upon the factual situations in individual cases. Usually unity of use is given
the greatest emphasis.239
237. Id. at 451.
238. Id. at 451.
239. Id.
(N.C. 1959)).
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The appeals court found both unity of ownership and physical
unity existed.240 However, it held that the factor which controlled in
this case was unity of use.241 The North Carolina Supreme Court had
There must be such a connection, or relation of adaptation, convenience, and actual permanent use between them, as to make
the enjoyment of the parcel taken, reasonably and substantially
necessary to the enjoyment of the parcel left, in the most advantageous and profitable manner in the business for which. It is
used. . . . The unifying use must be a present use.242

In this case, the re-routing of the state highway had impacted all
of the lots. The value of some lots were impacted by the fact that
they would no longer be fronting a well-traveled highway. However,
the state supreme court had held that any damages caused by the
re-routing of traffic patterns is generally not compensable where reasonable access to a public road is provided and, further, that such
noncompensable injuries do not become compensable simply because
some land was coincidentally taken in connection that project.243
Therefore, in determining unity of use the Court did not consider
the impact that re-routing the highway had on the other lots. The
Court considered only whether the portions of Lots 2 and 7 taken by
ially necessary to the enjoyment
244
Ultimately, the Court concluded as a matter
of law that the portions of Lots 1 and Lots 7 taken by DOT were not
use and enjoy any of the other lots.245
246

240. Id. at 454.
241. Id.

an adjacent lot to be incorporated based

that the enjoyment of the [lot] taken is reasonably and substantially necessary to the enjoy242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

, 813 S.E.2d at 454 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 455.
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5. Fulton: No Partial Regulatory Taking
In State ex rel. OC Lorain Fulton, L.P. v. City of Cleveland, a former
denied the owner a conditional-use approval for building a fast food
restaurant located in a local retail business district zone filed a writ
of mandamus alleging that the city had effectuated a taking of the
247
In 2012,
Fulton purchased a parcel of property located in a Local Retail Business District. In 2013, Fulton leased the property to a fast food resthat placed key obligations such
as maintenance and taxes on the tenant rather than the landlord.248
The restaurant planned to have an 86-foot frontage and drive-through
on the parcel.249
The record revealed that the proposed plan satisfied ninety-five
out of ninety-six zoning conditions and did not require a variance,
itation; Fulton therefore required conditional-use approval from the
planning commission.250 In 2012, Fulton submitted an application
for conditional-use approval.251
traffic impact study conducted which ultimately determined that
the proposed development would not generate a negative traffic imalso agreed.252 Nonetheless, the planning commission denied the
conditional-use approval request and the Board of Zoning Appeals
253

On appeal, the court of common pleas reversed. The trial court
capable of rational application and bears no rational basis to the
254

The city appealed this ruling and while the appeal

247. State ex rel. OC Lorain Fulton, L.P. v. City of Cleveland, 129 N.E.3d 532 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2019).
248. Id. at 534.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. State ex rel. OC Lorain Fulton, L.P., 129 N.E.3d at 534.
254. Id.
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was pending, Fulton sold the property. The court subsequently dismissed the appeal, having determined that the sale had rendered
the controversy moot.255
After that ruling, Fulton filed a mandamus action against the city
to compel it to begin appropriation proceedings, alleged that the
256
The
parties submitted extensive briefs, stipulations, and testimony.257
Fulton testified that after the city appealed the reversal of the BZA
decision, the fast food restaurant terminated its lease with Fulton.258
Fulton later sold the property to another corporation for $1,175,000
but testified that they anticipated selling the parcel for $1,500,000
upon obtaining the requested conditional-use approval, therefore
having suffered a deficit of $325,000 due to the lower sale price.259
On appeal, the Court found that
small diminution from their expected profit, and realized a signifi260
There were numerous other
uses for the property despite Fulton being denied the conditionaluse approval for the 86-foot frontage.261 Accordingly, the Court held
Penn Cent. taking does not arise merely because a regulatory action
deprives the property owners of one proposed use, even if it is the
262
The Court affirmed the lower
regulatory taking had occurred.263
We do see the appearance of conservation easements, which have
been established in order to preserve private property for public
enjoyment. Within those cases, the courts have dealt with a variety
of issues.
6. Lions Club of Albany
Hill Was Not a Taking and Cross Was Not a Nuisance
In Lions Club of Albany v. City of Albany, a non-profit corporation
brought suit in California District Court against the city and city
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 535.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State ex rel. OC Lorain Fulton, L.P., 129 N.E.3d at 535.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
Id.
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officials alleging various claims arising from the shutdown of power
to a religious symbol.264 This case concerned a 20-foot electrically illuminated steel and plexiglass Latin cross that stood atop a hill, near
a highway intersection. At the time of its erection, the 1.1 acres it sat
265
on belonged to private l
The landnia non-profit corporation, to place the cross on their property and
illuminate it, and they proceeded to do so every Easter and Christmas
season after.266 Then, in a multiparty real estate deal, defendant The
parcels in exchange for approving a high-rise project nearby.267
high-rise condominiums on its real property located along the western
slope and base of the hill.268 In 1972, IGC asked the City for permission to develop and the City took the opportunity to request an
269
The following month, the City Council
passed an ordinance requiring a council-issued permit before any
building or structure could proceed on the hill.270
271

IGC applied to the council for a use permit. The City proposed
conditions for issuing the requested use permits, including requiring
IGC to deed the City two hilltop acres for parkland use.272 After a
series of negotiations, an agreement was made whereby IGC offered
to purchase additional private pr
and convey it to the City to be used as a park.273 IGC and Call also
reached an agreement whereby Call would deed the parcel to IGC
and execute another deed, conveying an easement for ingress and
egress to Lions Club.274 Before closing escrow, Call insisted that he
would sell only on the condition that the cross remained with the
264. Lions Club of Albany v. City of Albany, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2018),

,

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lions Club of Albany v. City of Albany, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2018),

,

271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1108.
Id.
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easement for access.275 The developer agreed and although the deed
did not indicate that the parcel was burdened by the easement, the
easement was still effective.276
In relevant part, the California District Court rejected the claimty for disconnecting the electricity
to the cross:
[The California Takings Clause] provision never was intended,
and never has been interpreted, to impose a constitutional obligation upon the government to
ever a governmental employee commits an act that causes loss
the California Constitution.277

tled to just compensation under

Therefore, the City did not violate the California Takings Clause
by disconnecting power to the cross.278
private nuisance claim, which
The
tion runs against governmental
entities, not private parties, and that the City, not the Lions Club,
280
The Court
explained that in order to remedy
violation, the City had two option
the cross to a private party or condemn the easement through its
power of eminent domain and pay the Lions Club just compensation,
as determined by fair market value by a jury.281 A third possible option would be for be for the City to adopt a zoning ordinance banning
all religious symbols from its public places.282
279

275. Id.
276. Lions Club of Albany v. City of Albany, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2018),
ed that it was not actually aware of the
easement but that it was on at least constructive notice. Id.
277. Id. at 1117 (quotations and citations omitted).
278. See id.
279. Id. at 1118.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1117.
282. Lions Club of Albany v. City of Albany, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2018),
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H. Prediction No. 9: Relevant Parcel
Finally, the Court needs to a
and total regulatory takings. We all know by now, with all the
webinars and conferences dealing with it, the Supreme Court
has decided the Murr
nd they are very strange. In the
course of his opinion, Justice Kennedy managed to nearly drive
colleagues will be talking about that at some length.283
1. Murr: SCOTUS Announces Factors to Be Considered in
In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court of the United States adissue with respect to regulatory
unit in assessing the effect of the
challenged governmental action.284
Lots E and F separately in the 1960s and maintained them under
separate ownership until transferring Lot F to petitioners in 1994 and
Lot E to petitioners in 1995.285 Both lots were over one acre in size,
but because of their topography they each had less than one acre
suitable for development.286 However, the unification of the lots under
common ownership implicated the state and local rules and therefore
barred their separate sale or development. A decade later, petitioners
became interested in moving their cabin on Lot F and selling Lot E
to fund the project.287
Petitioners sought variances from the county.288 The board denied
their requests. The state courts affirmed in relevant part.289 Petitioners alleged that the state and county regulations worked a reg283. Callies, The Future of Land Use Regulation, supra note 3, at 15 (citing Callies, Through
a Glass Clearly, supra
284. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1937 (2017).
285. Id. at 1936.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1941.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate
290

terpretation that the local ordinanc

291

According to the majority, written by Justice Kennedy, the case
presented a question that was linked to the ultimate determination
of whether a regulatory taking occurred:
What is the proper unit of property against which to assess the
effect of the challenged governmental action? Put another way,
taking requires us to compare
the value that has been taken from the property with the value
that remains in the property, one of the critical questions is
292

The Court noted (as commentators have) that the outcome to this
question may be outcome determinative.293 However, the court that
defines the property at the outset should not necessarily determine
the outcome of every case.294
of specific guidance on how to identify the relevant parcel for the
regulatory taking inquiry, the Court identified two concepts that it
295
First, the Court has refused to limit the parcel in an artificial manner to the portion of
property targeted by the challenged regulation.296 Second, the Court
290. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.
291. Id. (quoting Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 796 N.W.2d 837, 844 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2011)).
292. Id.
293. Id.
the question is important to the reguportion of the property is taken, that portion
is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the property taken
294. Id.
outcome in every case. In some, though not all, cases the effect of the challenged regulation must
be assessed and understood by the effect on the entire property held by the owner, rather than
295. Id.
296. Murr
Penn Central, for example, the Court rejected a challenge
to the denial of a permit to build an office tower above Grand Central Terminal. The Court
refused to measure the effect of the denial only against the air rights above the terminal,
and attempt to determine whether rights in a pa
(internal quotations omitted)).
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has expressed caution towards the view that property rights under
the Takings Clause should be coextensive with those under state
law.297 Accordingly, the Court explaine
298

Instead, courts are to consider a number of factors which include:
characteristics of the land; and the prospective value of the regu299
According to the Court, this
whether reasonable expectations about property ownership would
lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as
300

is objective and the reasonable expectations at issue derive from back301

First, the Court instructed that substantial weight should be given
to the treatment of the land, and in particular, how it is bounded or
divided, under state and local law.302 However, a valid takings claim
e a purchaser took title after the
law was enacted.303 Similarly, a use restriction which is triggered only
assessment of reasonable private expectations. Second, the Court
explained that courts must look to the physical characteristics of the
304
Third, courts should assess the value of the
property under the challenged regulation, with special attention to
the effect of the burdened land on the value of other holdings.305
297. Id.
rights and reasonable investment

hape and define property
g landowners without recourse
lazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001)).

298. Id. at 1945.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Murr
onable expectations of an acquirer of land must
acknowledge legitimate restrictions affecting his or her subsequent use and dispensation of
303. Id.
304. See id.

relationship of any distinguishable

particular, it may be relevant that the property is located in an area that is subject to, or
305. Id.
crease the market value of the property,
the effect may be tempered if the regulated land adds value to the remaining property, such as
by increasing privacy, expanding recreational sp
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law described in Lucas 306 The test takes into consideration state
law but in addition weighs whether the state enactments at issue
accord with other indicia of reasonable expectations about property. 307
Following this multifactor standard, the Court found that for purposes
of determining whether a regulatory
property should be evaluated as a single parcel consisting of Lots E
and F together.308 Although petitioners were prohibited from selling
Lots E and F separately or from building separate residential structures on each, the Court found this was offset by the benefits that
were gained by using the property as an integrated whole: increased
privacy and recreational space, and an optimal location for any residential improvements.309
erty could be used for residential purposes and had decreased in
value by less than 10 percent.310
cision and concluded that no regulatory taking had occurred.311
In a lengthy dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices
Thomas and Alito, criticized the majority for going astray with the
312
:
[T]he answer is far more straightforward: State laws define the
boundaries of distinct units of land, and those boundaries should,
in all but the most exceptional circumstances, determine the parcel
at issue.
....
State law defines all of the interests that come along with owning
a particular parcel, and both property owners and the government must take those rights as they find them. 313
306. Id.
307. Id.
lot lines define the relevant parcel in every instance, making Lot E the necessary denominator.
Id. at 1947.
308. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1949.
311. Id. at 1950.
312. Id.
clared that the Takings Clause protects
313. Id. at 1953.
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The dissent would have asked whether, under general state law
principles, Lots E and F are legally distinct parcels of land.314 Instead, according to Chief Justice Ro
loose from its foundation on stable
state law rules and thr[e]w it into the maelstrom of multiple factors
315

2. Adams Outdoor Advertising: Wisconsin Supreme Court

In Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership v. City of
Madison, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered an outdoor ada city, alleging that the construction of a pedestrian bridge, which
blocked visibility of their billboard sign, constituted a taking without compensation.316
sibility of private property from a
public road is not a cognizable right giving rise to a protected prop317
Therefore, because Adams had failed to establish
that a property interest existed, the majority found it unnecessary
to address whether a property interest was taken.318
The dissent criticized the majority for not applying the Murr factors
319
For the dissent,
presented the threshold issue for the court to resolve.320 This case
involved several distinct property interests: (1) a half-acre of land;
(2) a permit for a west-facing billboard; (3) a permit for the eastfacing billboard; and (4) the billboard structure itself.321 By ignoring
The majority avoids selecting any of these as the denominator; instead, it defines the property inte
314. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1956.
315. Id.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id.

City of Madison, 914 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 2018).
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In so doing, the majority ignores the essential fact that the westfacing billboard permit itself constitutes individual real property
and the correct denominator in the takings analysis. Consequently, the majority reaches a legally erroneous outcome.322

3. City of Crowley: Court of Appeals of Texas Applies Murr
In City of Crowley v. Ray
an action alleging that the city prohibited him from developing his
323
property in accordance with the
In 1999, Ray purchased two 2 acre tracts to develop a multifamily
residential subdivision324 In 2001, Ray submitted a preliminary plat
of seventeen lots and sixteen buildings.325 The city requested information about the 100-year floodplain based on a fully developed
watershed.326 Ray responded with a 1999 FEMA-issued Letter of
327
At some
point, Ray decided to
and so he submitted a proposed final plat for the northernmost 1.3
328

Around December 2006, Ray began to develop the southern 2.7
329
As with Phase I, when Ray submitted the preliminary plat for Phase II, the City requested information about the 100-year floodplain, and Ray responded that he was
relying upon the figures from the 1999 LOMRs.330 The following
month, Ray submitted a proposed final plat for Phase II, but the City
informed Ray that he was required to have a new floodplain study
performed.331 Ray complied and submitted a new flood study.332
However, the study for Phase 2 did not reach the same conclusion
as the study for Phase I had about the 100-year flood elevation for
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

, 914 N.W.2d at 672.
City of Crowley v. Ray, 558 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Tex. App. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
City of Crowley, 558 S.W.3d at 340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the area where Phase II was located.333
feet, Ray testified that the City [was] requiring that the finished floors
334

To elevate the property 10 feet,

Ray estimated that it would require
of dirt, build[ing] retaining walls, [and] pour[ing] more footings on
to develop the property and that it ha[d] no potential use without
335

not ripe for judicial review.336 Having found that the dispute stemmed

337
338

Thus, the Court
Lucas

develop, rent, and sell to investors for a profit, thereby eliminating
339
The Court used
Murr to identify the relevant parcel for purposes of determining
whether a regulatory taking had
340

The Court of Appeals disagreed that Phase I had any relevance
341
Although Ray purchased the
fail to see how the timing of the
purchase alone could effectively override the separate legal identity
342
Moreover, the City did not identify any local or
state law that required the tracts to be treated as one. After considering the remaining Murr factors and other relevant considerations,
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id. at 341.
Id.
City of Crowley, 558 S.W.3d at 341.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 347 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
City of Crowley, 558 S.W.3d at 348.
Id.
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the Court overruled the City and held that Phase I and Phase II
should not be treated as a single unit, for purposes of making an
economic-value determination.343
4. Minnesota Sands: Court of Appeals of Minnesota Applies Murr
In Minnesota Sands, LLC v. County of Winona,344 the relevant
parcel analysis is in the context of mining. In this case, a mining comordinance amendment which banned the mining of industrial minerals violated the Minnesota Constitution and U.S. Constitution.345
Sometime around 2011, Minnesota Sands entered into various leases
with several landowners in the county to use the properties to mine
silica sand to be processed and used for fracking.346 At this time, this
type of industrial mine was a conditional use, requiring a conditional
347
However, in 2016, the county began discussing
After an eight-month process, the county board adopted an amendment to the zoning ordinance which prohibited all industrial mineral operations within the county.348
In 2017, Southeast Minnesota Property Owners sued the county,
alleging that the ordinance was in violation of the state and federal
takings clauses; Minnesota Sands sued and alleged the same.349 With
tory taking claim, the Court of
Appeals majority held that Minnesota Sands did not have a compensable property interest for which it was owed compensation.350
Minnesota Sands entered into six leases, four of which were conditioned upon Minnesota Sands obtaining any required zoning or governmental approvals on or before the commencement date of each
agreement.351 However, Minnesota Sands never applied for a CUP
352
In other
343. Id.
344. Minn. Sands, LLC v. County of Winona, 917 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
345. Id. at 778.
346. Id. at 777.
347. Id.
348. Id
349. Id. at 778. The district court consolidated the actions, and both filed a motion for
summary judgment on all claims against the county. Id.
350. Minn. Sands, LLC, 917 N.W.2d at 784.
351. Id.
352. Id.
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words, Minnesota Sands failed to fulfill a condition precedent before
its leasehold interest accrued and therefore lost its leasehold interests.353 The Court held that Minnesota Sands is not entitled to just
compensation because the mineral interest in real property, created
by the leases, required the acquisition of a CUP prior to the accrual
of a compensable property interest.354
One judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part, took issue
compensable property interest simply because it did not have a
CUP, finding such reasoning to be at odds with Palazzolo.355 In his
view, Minnesota Sands had a compensable property interest and the
court was tasked first with determining the relevant parcel to which
356

:

[T]he relevant parcels for purpos
tory takings claim are the entireties of the six properties in which
Minnesota Sands has leased mineral interests. Given that definition of the relevant parcels, Minnesota Sands cannot establish
a total regulatory takings claim because it cannot prove that the
357

Moreover, Minnesota Sands had not made an attempt to prove
that any of the six properties, when considered as a whole, had no
358
economic value because of
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 795. In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), a state agency made a
interest narrowly and a

he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
356. Minn. Sands, LLC
Penn Central, the Supreme Court set forth
determining the relevant parcels of property in a takings claim:
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has affected a taking, this Court focuses rather
both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole
. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104,
357. Id. at 797.
358. Id.
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5. South Richmond Bluebelt: New York Supreme Court Applies
Murr
Finally, In re City of New York (South Richmond Bluebelt, Phase 3),
Supreme Court of New York considered whether the subject property
should be considered together with an adjoining parcel to determine
trictions constituted a taking.359 The
property was a vacant lot, approximately 35,106 square feet, with a
large pond on the lot; just under half of the lot was designated wetlands.360 Other adjacent lots were owned by a corporation controlled
by the principals of the Claimant.361
The two subject parcels were purchased separately, although on
the same date from the same sellers. 362 The parcels were purchased
by separate corporations, although both corporations were owned by
the same two individuals.363 The city argued that because the corporations are owned by the same persons, and the subject properties
were purchased on the same date from the same owners, the properties should be considered together in measuring the diminution of
value caused by the wetland regulations.364 The court agreed and
just compensation must reflect an
increment above the regulated value, to reflect the probability that
tuted a regulatory taking.365
The New York Supreme Court used the Murr factors for guidance.366 First, under New York, law property owners are given flexibility in defining and changing the boundaries of their lots.367 The
second Murr factor, the physical characteristics of the properties,
was relevant to the extent that some portion of one of the lots was
359. In re City of New York (S. Richmond Bluebelt, Phase 3
App. Div. 2018).
360. Id. at 833.
361. Id. at 834.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 835.
364. Id.
365. S. Richmond Bluebelt, Phase 3
366. Id.
Murr differ, and therefore its determination that the
parcels there be treated as one is not determinative in this present case, the three factors test
for determining what constitutes the relevant parcel is
367. Id. at 837.
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wetland, while others contained only wetland-adjacent area and uplands.368 Under the third Murr factor, the effect on the burdened land,
the Claimant had agreed to restrictions on development of its lot in
return for obtaining permission from the Department of Environ369

Therefore:
Generally, the fact that the parcels were owned by separate corporations would preclude their being treated as one parcel, even
though the corporations were owned by the same two individuals. However, it is also true that a corporation does not generally
restrict development on its land to benefit another corporation
absent sufficient consideration. The restrictions that Claimant
agreed to place on its parcel directly and materially benefited
agreed to restrict development of its land to allow another corporation to obtain a permit to develop its adjacent lots demonstrates that both corporations were using the two parcels as one
economic unit.370

When considered as one parcel, the fact that half of the combined
parcels could be developed and had contained six family houses
demonstrated that the wetland regulations did not prohibit all viable economic use of the parcel.371 This meant that the claimant
failed to show that there was a reasonable probability of a successful
challenge to the regulations as a taking, and the property was
therefore to be valued as restricted by the wetland regulations.372
6. Eagle: The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test
The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings
Test, in pertinent part, considers the Penn Central factors and concludes that a four-factor approach would better capture the dynamics of the Penn Central analysis.373
368. Id. at 838.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 839.
371. S. Richmond Bluebelt, Phase 3, 75 N.Y.S.3d at 839.
372. See id.
373. See Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN
ST. L. REV. 601, 601 (2014) [hereinafter Eagle, Penn Central Four Factors].

98

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:045

has been regarded as delimiting the relevant parcel for the Penn
Central inquiry but in fact interacts with the three conventional Penn
Central
374

complex and difficult for the courts to administer in practice.375 The
relevant parcel problem has been referred to as the denominator
problem because when determining the value that has been taken
questions is determining how to define the unit of property whose
376
The fact that
both the claimant and the government have strong incentives to
manipulate the relevant parcel makes the task even more difficult.377
possible.378 However, if the relevant parcel is too broadly defined, the
effect of the taking can be easily disguised.
parcel analysis in Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States,379 the relevant parcel concept remained filled with conceptual problems.380
These problems included applying the doctrine to cases involving
temporary investments and unproven assertions by government officials that separately deeded parcels are under unified ownership.381
According to Eagle, these prob
n and is so substantive that there
is a certain circularity between a
expectations and expectations concerning the real estate included
property.382
Penn Central factors to deny compensation in temporary takings
374. Id.
375. Id. at 623.
376. Id. (citing Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1380 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 2000)).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States
tered landholdings should not have been included in relevant parcel),
, 707 F.3d 1286
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
380. Eagle, Penn Central Four Factors, supra note 373, at 623.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 624.
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cases.383
Eagle describes Penn Central

99

Penn Central factor.384

Under this paradigm,
a court would simply examine whether the property owner had severed a portion of the parcel and then incorrectly asserted that the
economic impact of the regulation should be considered only with
reference to that severed portion.386 But Eagle recognizes that there
are situations where the relevant parcel should be determined to
include or exclude land that was bought or sold at different times or,
in effect, impressed with an equitable servitude in favor of other
parcels owned by the property owner.387
385

help shape the relevant parcel . . . it is difficult to conceptualize
388
Although
the economic impact and expectations test refers to the claimant,
Eagle regards them as being unresponsive to the practical concerns
of property owners.389
it has nonetheless been the basis for the decision in a number of
cases390:
383. Id.
384. Id.

doctrine is a prime example of Penn Central

the doctrine strives for a realistic understanding of what ownership means to the individual
claimant. On the other hand, the artificial distinction between physical and regulatory
retation of temporary takings, augurs against
385. Id. at 632.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
ners of undeveloped property both change
and sharpen expectations about eventual development over time, and that economically
the owner incurred. They also disregard the fact that some owners have structured their
390. Id.

has defended the forced renewal of leases

whose term had expired. Through the alchemy of implicit use of the freehold as the relevant
parcel instead of the leasehold, which is bounded by duration, the Court avoids the conflict
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the basic problem raised by this Article: the Penn Central factors
are not only internally vague, but each factor also derives its
meaning and content through its interaction with the other factors.
considered as an additional factor in Penn Central analysis.391

Eagle criticizes the Court for not providing even general guidance
on how to weigh the various factors.392
Court has done little to clarify its ad hoc, multifactor approach since
Penn Central and certainly has not furnished judges, litigants, or
scholars with guides to application that are neither mechanical
393
The parcel as a whole factor
has led to strategic gamesmanship on behalf of claimants and government actors, and instead of hinging on traditional rules of partPenn Central
way as to layer the doctrine
in complexity, redundancy, and incoherence.394
7. Eagle: The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and
the Parcel as a Whole
In The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel
as a Whole
rts that the proper foundation
395
He then
development by separate owners of contiguous parcels.396 Eagle criticizes the unity of ownership theory because it evades rules for determination of ownerships that have been clearly established under
391. Id.
to that of a soccer field that changes in size according to the strategy of the players, and where
referees apply flexible rules that contract or expand the field, depending on the factual
392. Id.at 644.
393. Id.
394. Id.

l dimensions, the interaction of the SuPenn Central factors has exacerbated the

395. See Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel
as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV.
396. See id.
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real property, partnership, and business law. Accordingly, Eagle ar397

Eagle further argues that the appropriate framework for analyzdoctrine.398 He criticizes the Federal Circu
multifactor tests, and similar exercises are not only difficult to apply
in the takings context but also suggest a lack of judicial transpar399

of land comprised of legally separate parcels, not owned by the same
person, entity, or group of substantially identical persons or entities,
but with coordination of land use, resulting in the parcels being more
valuable to their respective owners.400 Instead, Eagle asserts that
there is one correct per se rule, which is that relevant parcels should
not include separate parcels without clear and convincing evidence
of overlap of ownership.401
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, courts continue to s
Perris,

development conditions. In City of

ment are questions properly decided by a judge, not by a jury.402 And although Koontz has provided
more security about land development conditions, it has also left some
questions unanswered: Does Koontz apply to adjudicative decisions
by administrators and legislative decisions? Is a monetary exaction
a taking of property if the landowner accedes to an improper exaction and is then issued a permit? The Supreme Court still has not
resolved these questions.403
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 552.
See Section II.A, supra.
See
supra.
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After Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz, Eagle predicts out-of-area competitors may be unwelcomed by local officials, resulting in increased
value for local developers. However, some courts have taken steps
to prevent such exclusion. For example, the New Jersey Supreme
possibility of unjustified exactions as part of the cost of doing busiactions fall on housing purchasers and their tenants. With Horne,
reinforcing Koontz, Eagle predicts that there will be more intense
judicial review of actions on real estate development in general and
404

Without any further guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, lower
courts continue to struggle with the distinction between exactions
that are imposed administratively and ones imposed legislatively in
the application of Nollan-Dolan-Koontz. However, a number of courts
are following California with regard to this distinction. As a result,
we are seeing more use of consensual tools like development agreements, which takes the issue outside of the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz context, thereby resolving the exaction issue. We saw this in American
Furniture Warehouse Co.
signal fee was a generally applicable regulation. And then in 2910
Georgia Avenue LLC
gram was a generally applicable zoning regulation. Accordingly, in
both cases, Nollan/Dolan did not apply. 405
The Supreme Court has not reexamined its decisions with respect
to Kelo, or even taken up a recent eminent domain case. Since Kelo,
there has been a trend toward increased local government land use
regulation to spur economic development. Related to this intensified
trend, Eagle notes two problematic developments: increased government intervention and increased governmental alliances with private redevelopers. The latter development increases the possibility
that private property rights will be impaired by overreaching private and state actors. He predicts that the dangers of secondary rent
seeking and information problems inherent in centralized planning
make it likely that the effect of Kelo will be a reduction in social
welfare. However, Eagle suggests a number of alternatives to better
404. See Section II.B, supra.
405. See Section II.C, supra.
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effectuate urban redevelopment and avoid the unfair and inefficient
exercises of eminent domain.406
Courts continue to wrestle with exceptions to per se government
takings. The public trust doctrine, which is increasingly raised as an
exception to per se government takings, saw its furthest stretch in
a recent Hawaii Supreme Court decision when it was applied to a
mountain summit. And in Leon
r in determining whether the land
use regulations constituted a taking. Then in Surfrider Foundation,
the California Court of Appeals held an injunction, temporary in
nature, could not be treated as a per se taking.407
As predicted, the Court has cut back its application of the ripemore recent partial takings cases being decided on the merits. We
are seeing this happen in many circuits around the country, and it
has resulted in at least some use of conservation easements to
preserve private property for public enjoyment. Despite lowering of
the ripeness barrier, we have not been getting a lot of partial taking
cases. These cases show mixed results for landowners, and establishing a successful partial takings claim has proved difficult.408
In those cases where landowners successfully establish a partial
409
being essentially deprived entirely
We saw this in Moreau
state highway would force the landowner of a convenient store and
gas pumps to stop operation from his property, rendering it entirely
unfit for its intended use. And in Burney, landowners successfully
established a partial takings claim where they were unable to return
to their homes after the local government released water from a
lake into a river that ultimately flooded their homes. After Knick,
we can almost certainly expect to see more partial takings cases.410
Finally, in Murr
ry takings. In doing so, the Court
announced factors to be considered

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

See Section II.D, supra.
See Section II.E, supra.
See Section II.E, supra.
See Section II.G, supra.
See Section II.F, supra.
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regulatory inquiry. These factors
include the treatment of the land under state and local law, the
physical characteristics of the land, and the prospective value of the
regulated land. Some states have begun applying these factors for
analysis. However, by redefining
the property interest at issue, at least one court has avoided applica411
tion of Murr

411. See Section II.H, supra.

IS THE DOCTRINE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
CONSTITUTIONAL? A REVIEW OF THE ACADEMIC
DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM AND TAKINGS

JAMES S. BURLING*
INTRODUCTION
Not everyone is a fan of the doctrine of regulatory takings. After all,
when government seeks to advance the public good by limiting what
owners can do with their property, everyone is supposed to benefit,
albeit some more than others. But if government must pay property
owners for the impacts that regulations have on private property,
then regulation can become expensive and even unaffordable. That
is one reason why government regulators resist landowner demands
for compensation. When the cost of land-use regulation is borne not
by those property owners whose land is regulated, but instead by
the regulating community, then there will be less regulation. Thus,
the pushback from the advocates of regulation.
Many arguments have been raised against the doctrine of regulatory takings employing policy and utilitarian rationales along the
doctrine is unmoored from the Constitution. Those who most disagree
with the doctrine of regulatory takings on policy grounds may not
be thought of as prime candidates for advocating originalist methods
of constitutional interpretation. But when full-throated originalism
might cast doubts upon the legitimacy of the regulatory takings
doctrine, then the critics of the doctrine are more than happy to
throw originalist arguments back in the face of those who call for
compensation to property owners who must otherwise bear the costs
of regulation.
Little by little, the unrelenting criticism of the doctrine of regulahis dissent in Murr v. Wisconsin
* Vice President for Legal Affairs, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California. An
earlier version of this Paper appeared as an ALI-CLE program outline: Is the Doctrine of
Regulatory Takings Constitutional? The Debate Over History and Originalism, in 35 A.L.I.
Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litig. 1409 (2018).
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Court . . . has never purported to ground those precedents in the
1
As will be shown, there
is more where that came from.
While Justice Thomas may be correct that the Court has never
justified the doctrine of regulatory takings on originalist grounds,
deed, there is some rather spirited debate in academia over whether the Constitution requires the
payment of compensation when the use and value of land are diminished by regulation.
This Article will catalog and summarize that debate. It does not
purport to plow any new ground, embark on original research, or unearth any heretofore undiscovered pronouncements from the Founding
Fathers. The purpose of this Article is to summarize the scholarship,
not to engage in detailed criticism. What the author hopes to accomplish is to provide a flavor for the debate that leads the reader to
explore these sources independently. If read in detail, such an exploration of these sources may lead to the conclusion that a legal regime
that compensates for regulatory damage to property is not only
allowed by the Constitution, but it may indeed be mandated by it.
I. WHO CARES ABOUT ORIGINALISM?
Before embarking on any discussion about whether a particular
legal doctrine is consistent with an originalist view of the Constitution, it must be asked, why does it matter? And why should anyone
care today, some 229 years after the Constitution was ratified and
150 years since the last series of great amendments, what the Constitution meant so many generations ago? Put bluntly, why should
we care about the musings on liberty and property from a group of
dead, white, mostly rich, and often slave-owning males? How can we
take seriously pronouncements on liberty and property from those
who considered human beings to be property or at least allowed that
state of affairs to persist?
Much has been written on the merits and demerits of originalism in
all its variants, and that debate is well beyond the scope of this Paper.
But since the purpose of this Paper is to summarize and synthesize
the arguments over whether the doctrine of regulatory takings is
consistent with originalism, a few words of explanation are in order.
1. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1957 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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First, one must decide on what the purpose of government is. As
we look around the world, we see various theories of government in
action. In some nations, the purpose of government seems to be for
the enrichment and maintenance of the power of the ruling elite. In
others, it is to provide physical security or economic well-being, or
both, for its people. In some, such security or pursuit of wealth may
mean the total or partial annihilation of the autonomy of its citizens. To others, the purpose of government is to preserve the freedom
and independence of its people through a combination of economic
and military policies that are designed to maximize the autonomy
of its citizens. Every government, even ours, acts in accord with a combination of these purposes. Every government also exhibits a certain
degree of a personality disorder, hoping to be one thing, claiming to
be another, and acting in yet another manner.
Those adopting a classical liberal worldview, including originalists,
believe something in the order of the last stated purpose described
above: government should be liberty-maximizing. In fact, most people
in the United States, originalists or not, will agree that government
should maximize liberty. The question that follows is what about
everything else, primarily physical security and economic wellbeing? Government attempts to provide security and fulfill material
needs can lead to less liberty. A state that provides physical security
can do so more easily if it knows where its citizens are, what they are
doing, and what they are thinking. A state that seeks to minimize
or erase income inequality can do so more easily if it prescribes what
people earn, what the terms of their contractual (especially labor)
relationships are, and what people can do with their wealth. In both
cases, liberty suffers. But liberty will also inevitably suffer if the state
cannot keep its people secure and fed because that state will ultimately fail. People afraid to go out at night may gladly trade liberty
for security. People threatened by invasion will gladly conscript its
youth to counter the threat. People threatened with hunger will gladly
take from those who are better off. So, a balance must be struck.
Classical liberals understand that it is better to be a little less
secure and a little less egalitarian if that means more freedom. On
both counts, the twentieth century provides object lessons for the
destruction of liberty that follows from attempts to maximize security
1984 is the classic rendition of
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the former.2
The Road to Serfdom provides a compelling refutation of state-sponsored socialism.3 Inevitably, in the view
of these and countless other classical liberals, freedom will wither if
liberty is not cherished over security and equality of wealth. A government designed to maximize security or income equality will inexorably transform itself into a state that no longer serves the people who
created it. Instead, its people will exist only to serve the state.4
Fundamentally, originalists believe that an appropriate balancing
of liberty, security, and equality is best achieved by confining government to the constitutional framework established in 1791, as
ments. But why should we follow that document, as opposed to some
more modern views of the relationship between government and its
Executive branch to determine what works best in modern times?
There have been various justifications for abiding by a centuriesplausible for those who were around when the document was first
drafted rather than the present generations.5 There is a variation
of this theory wherein we ratify the Constitution every time we vote,
or least when we decide not to vote with our feet by moving elsewhere.
This too seems more grounded in rhetoric than reality.6 Perhaps the
most coherent justification for abiding by constitutional principles
is that it seems to work. By taking seriously the concerns for liberty
contained within the Constitution, we also may be less likely to govern
by passion and focus more on long-term stability and freedom.
And it seems to work best if the Constitution is not treated as a
constantly mutating living virus, but as a document with stable
principles, ideals, and guidelines. When jurists insert their own
philosophical DNA into the virus of living constitutionalism we can,
and have, ended up with abominations like Korematsu v. United
2. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
3. See FREDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
government was a necessary evil because it protected private property, now private property
San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 120 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting).
5. For a robust discussion of the various theories of constitutional justification see RANDY
E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2003).
6. See id.
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States,7 Buck v. Bell,8 Plessy v. Ferguson,9 and Dred Scott v. Sanford,10
among others. A fidelity to the original understanding of the Constitution should help avoid such excursions from liberty because the
ory that in the natural order of things men possess liberty as a gift
from their creator, not the result of government largesse. Government is formed precisely to protect the liberties we already possess:
[man] seeks out, and is willing
to joyn in Society with others who are already united, or have a
mind to unite for others who are already united, or have a mind
to unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.11

In addition to the view that the founding generation were followers
of Lockean classical liberalism, there are arguments, discussed later
in this Article, that civic republicanism was as or even more important than the classical liberal framework.12 That is a debatable proposition. But if it is accurate, it does not substantially detract from the
understanding that we should adhere to the original meaning of the
Constitution for guidance today, though it might affect the results
of an originalist inquiry.
The most faithful way to capture the essence of the Constitution
and its promotion of individual liberty is to understand and adhere
to the words of the Constitution as those words were understood
7. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding detention camps for
Americans with Japanese ancestry).
8. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding forced and involuntary sterilization
9. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (u
10. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 427 (1857) (upholding application of Fugitive Slave Act, Act
of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462 (1850), repealed June 28, 1864), ch. 166, 13 Stat. 200 (1864)).
11. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 123 (Peter Laslett ed., Student Ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689). This is in marked contrast to the Hobbesian view that
liberties are granted by governme
ereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules whereby every man may know what goods
he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow subjects:
HOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 124 (1651). It is also in contrast
to a more civic republicanism view, considered by some scholars as more representative of the
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandings of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 821 (1995), discussed in more detail in Section III.A, infra.
12. See infra Section III.A.
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when the Constitution and its amendments were adopted. This is in
contrast to what the words might mean today or what we would like
them to mean today. It is inevitable that language evolves; it is also
inevitable that our beliefs reflect our times. But to the extent that
is timeless, we must be careful
not to imbue that document with modern accidents of linguistic drift
or the passion du jour.
Focusing on the meaning of the actual words of the Constitution
an endeavor that often led to attempts to discern what the drafters
of the Constitution intended the words to mean based on a combination of writings and modern suppositions. Historians may be good at
uncovering many attributes of the past, but reading the minds of the
dead is beyond the ken of even the most insightful modern scholar.
the words employed in the Constitution were understood to mean by
the general populace that ratified the Constitution or its Amendments. Randy Barnett, for example, in Restoring the Lost Constitution
in contemporary newspaper articles and similar documents to conclude that it may have had a more limited meaning than the generous reading often given today in arguments over the reach of the
Commerce Clause.13
In 1985, Attorney General Edwin Meese gave speeches to the American Bar Association and the Federalist Society urging a return to
originalism. He said:
A jurisprudence based on first principles is neither conservative
nor liberal, neither right nor left. It is a jurisprudence that cares
about committing and limiting to each organ of government the
proper ambit of its responsibilities. . . . [A]n activist jurisprudence,
one which anchors the Constitution only in the consciences of
jurists, is a chameleon jurisprudence, changing color and form
in each era. The same capacity of activism hailed today may
threaten the capacity for decision through democratic consensus
tomorrow, as it has in many yesterdays.14
13. BARNETT, supra
/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/11-15-1985.pdf.
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When thinking about originalism in the context of property, we
have a daunting task. The Founders wrote much about property, but
little about what the Takings Clause was supposed to mean. There is
no question that property was a fundamental concern to the Founders and to the people who ratified the Constitution. But we are also
well aware today that some of the notions of property held by some
of the people of the founding era are anathema to our basic understandings of property today.
John Locke wrote in his Second Treatise of Government that people
create property by combining labo
a farmer cultivates a field and converts it into property by his labor.15
the South Carolina Constitution which countenanced the practice
benefit of others.16 The Founders spoke of equality in the Declaration of Independence, yet some of the signers owned slaves. Perhaps
some of the drafters and ratifiers17 did not recognize the humanity
of those whom they oppressed. Perhaps they were themselves captured by an immoral economic system from which neither they nor
those they enslaved could escape. No matter, the practices of many
of the founding generation were evil and a stain on the document
they wrote to preserve our liberties. But those practices have proven
to be far less timeless than the language and spirit of the Constituthe Constitution to banish forever the notion that people could be
property. We have since endeavored to remove the vestiges of slavery
and racism from our laws and practices. And through all this, the
goal of preserving liberty through the Constitution has remained
constant. As we progress, we have become better at it. And thus, it
in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
OCKE, supra note 11, § 25.
makes it his Property
16. That constitutional provision (since repealed) stated that
See id. at note to § 23. Locke suggests that just as
enslave himself
Id. at § 23. Scholars believe, as unfathomable as it may seem, that Locke
considered African-American slaves to have been the captives of a just war in Africa. Id. at
note to § 23.
ratification of the Constitution. Thus, we look not only to what Madison may have said, but
what words and understandings were prevalent in the people as a whole.
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remains important to figure out what the Constitution itself had to say
about property, and what it means to have property taken where
just compensation is required.18
Ultimately, we should pay attention to the words of the Constitu-

II. WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT SAID ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF
THE DOCTRINE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS?
The whole question about whether the Constitution actually contemplates regulatory takings is curious, to say the least. How is it possible that the Court has been struggling to explain the doctrine for at
least the past thirty-five years without understanding whether the
doctrine has any constitutional legitimacy? There is, perhaps, no explanation other than that the Court does what it does and is not burdened by a need to understand the basis or consequences of its actions.
For quite some time the Court has labored under the belief that
the modern doctrine of regulatory takings arose in Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon.19 Justice Rehnquist, for example, called that case
20

For a time, even the more liberal members of the Court seemed
to understand the rationale and inherent fairness behind the idea
of regulatory takings. For example, Justice Brennan already understood well that a regulation prohibiting the use of property could
have as big an impact on a landowner as the direct condemnation of
that same property for a highway. After all, in his dissent in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego Justice Brennan wrote:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land
use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property
in order to promote the public good just as effectively as formal
condemnation or physical invasion of property. From the prop-

18. And as I have written elsewhere, where government today abuses property rights
through the abuse of eminent domain or the failure to pay just compensation, it is usually the
poor, minority populations and the politically powerless who suffer the most. See James
Burling, Private Property for the Politically Powerful, 6 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF.
J. 179 (2017).
19. See generally Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
nedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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is condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by regulation
to use in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive
the benefits flowing to the public from preservation of open space
through regulation may be equally great as from creating a wildlife
refuge through formal condemnation or increasing electricity production through a dam project that floods private property.21

trine of regulatory takings originated a few years later with Justice
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.22 In
that case the majority opinion fo
prohibition on building on beachfront parcels resulted in a total loss
taking without compensation.23 Justice Blackmun dissented.24
Citing to an earlier case, Justice Blackmun expressed concern
that the regulation in Lucas was designed to prevent a nuisance-like
public harm that the property owner had no right to inflict.25 Unlike
the scenario Justice Brennan described in San Diego Gas, this case
involved a regulation designed to prevent harm:
Long ago it was recognized that all property in this country is
not be injurious to the community, and the Takings Clause did
not transform that principle to one that requires compensation
whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it. 26

The majority opinion objected to the harm-prevention rationale as
being meaningless because of the imprecision of the line between
harm-preventing and benefit-conferring government actions.27 It also
21. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
22. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 1003 (majority opinion).
24. Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1051 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal
26. Id.
the relative importance of the
opinion). The Court then responds to Justice Blackmun:

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 (majority

of all developmental or economically beneficial land uses, the test for required
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had little difficulty dismissing the notion that building homes in a
residential neighborhood on lots surrounded by other homes could
rise to the level of being a nuisance.28 But the Court had more diffithat the doctrine of regulatory
takings was untethered to constitutional theory. Towards the end
of his dissent, Justice Blackmun calls into question the historical
For
authority, he cites to several sources, which will be discussed in later
sections of this Article. To summarize, Blackmun claims that state
governments often took property without paying compensation from
the founding era into the nineteenth century. He concludes:
29

In short, I find no clear and acce
doctrine. Instead, the Court seems to treat history as a grab bag
of principles, to be adopted wh
ory, and ignored where they do not. If the Court decided that the
early common law provides the background principles for interpreting the Takings Clause, then regulation, as opposed to
physical confiscation, would not be compensable. If the Court
decided that the law of a later period provides the background
principles, then regulation might be compensable, but the Court
would have to confront the fact that legislatures regularly determined which uses were prohibited, independent of the common
law, and independent of whether the uses were lawful when the
is its attempt to package the law of two incompatible eras and
peddle it as historical fact.30

compensation is whether the legislature has recited a harm-preventing justification for its action. Since such a justification can be formulated in practically
every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.
We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon artful
harm-preventing characterizations.
Id. at 1025 n.12 (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 1014.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1060.
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exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it was generally
31

Justice Scalia elaborated in a footnote:

Justice Blackmun is correct that early constitutional theorists did
not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property
at all, but even he does not suggest (explicitly, at least) that we
Mahon. Since the
text of the Clause can be read to encompass regulatory as well
as physical deprivations (in contrast to the text originally proposed by Madison . . . ), we decline to do so as well.32

In other words, Justice Scalia argues that because the text of the
Constitution is not expressly inconsistent with the doctrine of regulatory takings, and because there is no other reason to turn away
from the precedents established thus far, the Court is not about to
do so. That, however, is unsatisfying to those who would prefer to see
some better-developed historical antecedents for regulatory takings.
This historical treatment has been repeated. For example, in TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
volving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic
and, for the most part, involves the straightforward application of
per se rules. Our regulatory takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of
33

Finally, and most recently, Justice Thomas wrote in his dissent
in Murr v. Wisconsin:
The Court, however, has never purported to ground those precedents in the Constitution as it was originally understood. In
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
generally thought that the Taking

Mahon

31. Id. at 1014 (majority opinion) (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393
(1922)).
32. Id. at 1020 n.15 (citations omitted).
l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002).
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desirable for us to take a fresh look at our regulatory takings jurisprudence, to see whether it can be grounded in the original public
meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34

The scholarship on the legitimacy of the doctrine of regulatory
takings is far more extensive than these few mentions by the JusThomas has already been exhaustively conducted by scholars on both
sides of the issue. The remainder of this Article will serve to catalog
that scholarship. By focusing on several of the key articles on both
sides of the issue, I hope that the reader will have a more complete
understanding of the debate. As noted, the purpose here is not to
solve the riddle of originalism and the doctrine of regulatory takings,
but to spell out the clues. Time and space do not permit a thorough
examination of all the scholarship; many excellent sources have been
left out or minimized. But there should be enough here for the reader
to begin to draw conclusions. Lastly, summarizing these excellent and
scholarly articles cannot do them justice just as reading the Cliff
Notes version of Shakespeare is not reading Shakespeare. My hope
be piqued enough to go back and read
in their entirety the articles I have summarized.
III. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP SUGGESTING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF
REGULATORY TAKINGS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE HISTORY
AND MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION
A. Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process35
William Michael Treanor is perhaps the most influential of those
advocating for a limited view of the Takings Clause and is often cited
by advocates who believe that government regulations should be free
from the obligation to compensate for the loss of value and use. For
34. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1957 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
35. Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). Although Treanor packages his arguments in terms of
in use today, it is unlikely that any of his analyses or conclusions would change significantly
if he reanalyzed them under the rubric of textualism.
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thesis is that the doctrine of regulatory takings is inconsistent with
the history and meaning of the Takings Clause. As Treanor begins:
This Article contends that the limited scope of the takings clauses
reflected the fact that, for a variety of reasons, members of the
framing generation believed that physical possession of property
was particularly vulnerable to process failure. The Article then
argues on both originalist and non-originalist grounds for a
process-based theory of the Takings Clause that departs dramatically from current takings jurisprudence. . . .The decision whether
or not to provide compensation was left entirely to the political
process. The emergence of the compensation principle represented a break with that tradition, but only a partial one. While
the evidence of original intent is limited, it clearly indicates that
the Takings Clause was intended to apply only to physical takings,
and the early case law interpreted it and its state counterparts
as not extending to government regulations.36

Treanor continues in his introduction by suggesting that the Framers did not embrace classical liberalism to the extent assumed today,
but instead were in large part adherents to civic republicanism. Thus,
property; balancing societal needs against individual property rights
37
Treanor concludes
that the only circumstance where compensation may be appropriate
38

decision about whether to compensate should be left to the political

39

As a historical basis for his claims that compensation was not the
norm during the colonial period, Treanor points to various statutes
and practices that allowed the taking of undeveloped land, usually
for roads, without compensation.40 During the revolution, states intruded on property rights and economic activity to an even greater
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Treanor, supra
Id. at 783.
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id.
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degree.41 In the immediate post-revolutionary era, only the Northwest
Ordinance and the Constitutions of Massachusetts and Vermont conlanguage reading of the text indicates that [the provisions] protected
property against physical compensation, and the early judicial deci42
Moreover, Treanor contends that
James Madison and early scholarship thought the Takings Clause
encompassed only direct physical seizures of property.43 Lastly,
Treanor suggests that the regulation of nuisances was pervasive in
the nineteenth century and compensation was not required, even
when the impact on the use and value of property was severe.44
With this background and history, Treanor asserts that the development of the regulatory takings doctrine, which he squarely places
as beginning in Pennsylvania Coal,45 was more the result of the nonoriginalist beliefs of jurists like Holmes.46 Treanor says that Holmes
and others believed that the fundamental meaning and understanding
of property had to be changed or adapted to modern times.47 This had
nothing to do with any fidelity to any original understandings of property. In particular, Holmes and others believed that conceptions of
property must move beyond the focus on physical things to their
standing.48
to be the product not of his larger jurisprudential concerns, but of his
embrace of a syllogism: The Takings Clause protects property. Prop49
Ever
Treanor also criticizes modern
legal scholars including Joseph Sax and Richard Epstein for their
assertions that regulatory takings are consistent with utilitarian and
Lockean views of the Constitution, respectively.51 Ultimately, Treanor
50

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 797.
See generally Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
See Treanor, supra
See id.
See id.
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id.
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believes the strongest rebuttal to scholars like Epstein lies in their
failure to address the question:
If the framers opposed government acts with redistributive consequences as strongly as Epstein asserts, why did they craft a
Takings Clause that required compensation only for physical
thoughtfulness of framers like Madison, and thus another explanation is needed. The answer lies, not in some shortsightedness
in their thinking, but rather in the fact that they were not committed to absolute, liberal protection of property rights.52

On originalism, Treanor focuses on alternatives to the narrative
that the Founders were primarily Lockean, pointing instead to scholarship showing that they saw government more in terms of civic reliberty but in securing the general welfare.53 Property was less the refuge of man than a vehicle for men to fully participate in government.54
Looking at the three early compensation clauses in the founding
Treanor maintains that they were drafted only to address narrow
abuses where the political process did not provide adequate relief,
such as the military use of private property in war.55
was a small class of cases in which property concerns would not be
fairly considered, and . . . a compensation rule was necessary for
56
In fact, this is one of the primary reasons, according to
impressment of private property.57
tion of the United States, landowners would become a minority. 58
The Takings Clause was necessary to prevent those without property
from using their majoritarian power to take away the property of
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 822.
See id.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 836.
See, e.g., id.
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landowners.59 Similarly. Madison believed the Takings Clause would
ensure that slave owners would be compensated should the government ever move to free the slaves (something that Madison advocated
for, along with an African repatriation scheme).60
Treanor wraps it up this way:
In sum, the background understan
concerned with redressing political process failure. There was,
admittedly, not a consensus motive for all the particulars. Madison was worried about majoritarian confiscation of land and slaves.
The Vermont farmers opposed invalidation of their land grants by
a legislature in which they were the minority. Some proponents
of the Northwest Ordinance may have feared that the territorial
legislature would revoke the land grants of the unrepresented.
There was a widespread reaction against military confiscation
of personal property. However, these various understandings of
why a takings clause was needed shared the same basic themes:
Physical property was vulnerable in the political process and the
Takings Clause sought to redress that problem.61

B. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use and Its Significance for
Modern Takings Doctrine62
haustive exposition of colonial land use regulations, finding them to
be extensive and uncompensated. Regulations included requirements that landowners must continuously occupy and improve their
land, fence their land, maintain an adequate pace for mining land,
utilize potential mill-sites for milling, the draining of swamps, the
removal of barberry bushes (to prevent wheat blight) and even to
keep private lands open for public hunting and fishing.63
59. Treanor does not explore whether any modern-day regulations of property, such as the
imposition of development restrictions on rural residents by urban majorities, or the imposition of rent control in communities where renters outnumber apartment owners, implicates
this very sort of political process failure.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 855.
62. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996).
63. Id.
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Of most relevance to regulatory takings debates today are those regulations relating to community planning, such as restraints on alienation of land to outsiders without prior approval and restrictions on
low and high densities (depending on the needs of the community).64
Community planning also included aesthetic regulations such as
height restrictions and the choice of building materials (to limit the
spread of fires.)65
66
Like the
requirements that open land be occupied and farmed, there were
mandatory requirements that urban lots be developed. 67
Hart concludes that the belief held by many people today that
landowners in colonial times were free to do with their property
anything short of a nuisance that they wished, or nothing at all, is
false. Instead:
[Colonial land use regulations] indicate an understanding of
private rights and public prerogatives on the part of colonial
lawmakers that flatly contradicts the supposed tradition of
minimal land use regulation in early America. The first century
and a half of private land ownership in America reveals no sign
of the later-imagined right of landowners to be let alone as long
as they do not harm others. In the minds of colonial legislators,
the bundle of property rights received by patentees and passed
on to their successors did not include a right to use the land for
everything short of nuisance. In
control and utilize land remained subject to an obligation to
further important community objectives. Property ownership
exempted the individual owner
that the public entrusted to an individual, for both private and
68

Hart does note, however, that unlike the assertions of some scholars
today, in most cases of direct condemnation of land in the colonial
era, landowners were paid:
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id.
Hart, supra note 62, at 1281 (quoting BARRY A. SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN
INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 183 (1994)).
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But throughout the colonies, when substantial parcels of land
would receive compensation equivalent in value to the land taken.
Compensation was also generally provided when government
took temporary possession of private property, as in the compulsory lodging of troops.69

Because of the pervasive nature of colonial-era land use laws and
because they were not objected to, Hart sees a natural progression to
nineteenth-century legislation that regulated property and even transtive transfer of rights in private land from owners to entrepreneurs
for essentially private use, a process identified as a characteristic
feature of nineteenth-century law, seems to be foreshadowed in co70

The implications of this history on modern takings law, Hart
asserts, is to undercut the assumption that owners were able to do
what they wished with property short of creating a common-law
nuisance.71 This refutes, Hart says, the theory that the Founders did
not address takings caused by land use regulations because they did
not anticipate the modern levels of regulation. The drafters were
well-aware of, and quite comfortable with, land use regulations that
went far beyond the mere prohibition of nuisances:
The historical records surveyed in this Article show that the colonial experience of land use regulation cannot fairly be confined
within the imagined boundary of nuisance control. The preferences of landowners were regularly subordinated to a vision of
the public good that embraced many objectives beyond protecting health and safety.72

use regulation suggests that the Takings Clause means what it says
73

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1287.
See id.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1292.
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Hart also obliquely defends cases like Berman v. Parker, where the
Court conflated the power of eminent domain with the police power,
finding the former limited only by the latter.74
history of colonial land use legisl
tially as broad as its police power, so that the Takings Clause imposes
75

Lastly, Hart takes to task Justi
be newly legislated or decr

Lucas that
76

Hart rebuts:

This premise is wrong. Throughout the colonial period, lawmakers regularly used statutes and ordinances to define nuisances
and prohibit certain uses of land in certain areas. In that era,
legislation was a principal source of nuisance law, perhaps the
predominant source. This rulemaking allowed flexible responses
to changed circumstances and public needs.77

C. Other Work
Some additional writings that claim that the doctrine of regulatory takings is not based in originalism include an article by former
San Francisco City Attorney Andrew Schwartz, a frequent defender
of the City against regulatory takings claims.78 Schwartz espouses
els.79 He also suggests that principles of federalism are in tension
with the doctrine.80 This article is more polemical in tone than most
academic treatments and has been less influential so far than those
by Treanor or Hart.81
74. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
75. Hart, supra note 62, at 1305.
76. Id. at 1297 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)).
77. Id. at 1298.
78. See Andrew W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Justifies
Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 247 (2015).
79. Id. at 258.
80. Id. at 294. By the same token, any of the liberties protected by the Bill of Rights and
Fourteenth Amendment could be said to be in some tension with principles of federalism.
Such tension, however, may be more a feature of the Constitution than a bug.
See Treanor, supra note 35, and Hart, supra note 62. While
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Another contribution to the literature comes from property scholar
Nicole Stella Garnett, who addresses questions raised by the work
of regulatory takings skeptics such as Professors Treanor and Hart,
list supporters such as Professors
Kobach, Gold and Claeys.82 In
tions from an Armchair Originalist,83 Professor Garnett suggests
that the skeptical analyses may understate the contextual differences between modern-day regulations and ownership structures,
and those of the colonies and states in the colonial era.84 On the other
hand, she suggests that the doctrine may be inconsistent with federal practices in the territories, a practice that may be more germane
to the Fifth Amendment which concerned itself only with federal
actions at the time of the founding.85
Garnett likewise questions the relevance of later nineteenthcentury state court decisions to an understanding of the Fifth Amendment, a topic to be discussed next.86 Her concern is that the further
in time these decisions are from 1791, the less helpful they may be
to originalist constructs.87
IV. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP FINDING THAT THE DOCTRINE
OF REGULATORY TAKINGS IS CONSISTENT WITH
HISTORY AND ORIGINALISM
A. Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting
the Record Straight88
Professor Kobach writes this article to refute the statements by
both Justices Scalia and Blackmun in their respective majority and
dissenting opinions in Lucas that the doctrine of regulatory takings
See Schwartz,
supra note 78.
82. Kobach, Gold, and Claeys are discussed in Part IV, infra.
83. Nicolle S. Garnett,
Originalist, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 761 (2008).
84. Id. at 764.
85. Id. at 770.
86. Id. at 764. One answer may lie in suggestions that we should look more to the Fourteenth
Amendment than to the Fifth. See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory
Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the
Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (2008), discussed in Part V, infra.
87. See Garnett, supra note 83, at 764.
88. Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 1211.
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ch is to review a number of postratification cases from the states that he suggests are early expressions of courts providing compensation for regulatory takings. 89
Kobach asserts that the story that regulatory takings began with
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon
cisions where compensation was not provided when nuisance-like
activities were banned in Mugler v. Kansas,90 and Hadacheck v.
Sebastian.91 But these decisions were themselves inconsistent with
the earlier cases that Kobach summarizes:
Accordingly, it seemed that the doctrine enunciated in Mahon was
truly something new. This assumption has pervaded scholarly
writing on the subject ever since. In this Article, I challenge the
notion that the recognition of regulatory takings first occurred in
Mahon, arguing that this jurisprudential step took place not in
the 1920s, but in the 1810s. State courts interpreting the takings
clauses of their constitutions and refining state common law delineated the early contours of eminent domain doctrine in America,
and many of these early expressions of takings law embraced
what we might now describe as regulatory takings. Antebellum
courts repeatedly acknowledged non-acquisitive, nondestructive
takings; and the frequency of such holdings increased with time.
By 1861, numerous courts required compensation when property
remained in the possession of its owner but the state restricted
92

Part of the reason why the federal judiciary, as opposed to the state
courts, did not develop a robust doctrine of takings was because of the
fact that until after the Civil War Amendments and the subsequent
incorporation, the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states.93
While the Court began to tentatively develop theories of compensation
for state takings after the Civil War, a decade later it retreated from
those cases.94 Mahon, in fact, was a return to the status quo ante.95
Kobach sees much to be learned from these earlier cases:
89. See generally id.
90. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding ban on alcoholic beverages).
91. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (banning brickmaking in a Los Angeles
residential neighborhood).
92. Kobach, supra note 88, at 1213.
93. Id. (citing Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Several twentieth-century doctrines have analogs in the half century of takings jurisprudence before the Civil War. Finally, I suggest that the present Supreme Court would do well to revisit these
forgotten decisions of the early nineteenth century. Not only do
they lend historical legitimacy to the notion of regulatory takings,
many possess a doctrinal coherence that is lacking in recent treatment of the issue. Moreover, they cast doubt on the claims of both
factions in Lucas to reflect the historical understanding of takings.96

stated, as a simple fact, that the doctrine of regulatory takings began
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.97 BeLucas, Kobach
points out that all the authorities relied upon by Blackmun simply do
not stand for the proposition that there was no doctrine of regulatory
takings prior to Pennsylvania Coal
tion that, until the end of the nineteenth century, state courts did
not require compensation for government takings short of outright
possession is simply incorrect. The requirement of compensation for
nonacquisitive takings was commonplace in state constitutional in98

Kobach finds similar fault in the scholarly articles cited by Justice Blackmun because they ignore some cases and misread others.99
After spending some time defining terminology, Kobach describes
main power that are not found in the Federal Constitution: 1) state
constitutions, 2) natural law, and 3) common law.100
Beginning with state constitutional law, Kobach notes, like Treanor,
that early takings clauses were first written into the Massachusetts
and Vermont constitutions.101 Pennsylvania and Delaware added
theirs shortly after in 1792.102 But only four states (plus the Northwest Ordinance) were not a lot.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1218.
See id.
Id. at 1229.
Id.
Id.
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Kobach asserts, however, that natural law was more important
of compensation clauses in several early state constitutions did not
significantly impair the recognition of compensable takings in the
jurisprudence of the early republic. Most judicially recognized restrictions on the power of eminent domain were drawn from an older and
103
Moreover, the other nineteenthcentury source of limits on government, the common law, was based
on natural law:
Indeed, natural law arguments, because they were so malleable
and because they reflected the prevailing judicial philosophy of
the period, provided the underpinnings for much of the common
law that was created in American courts in the early nineteenth
century. Accordingly, when there were no specific constitutional
provisions to invoke, most state courts afforded property interests
the protection of the common law. And these common-law rights
were in turn shaped with reference to principles of natural law.104

Most importantly, starting in the 1810s and with increasing frequency until the Civil War, state courts required the payment for
Most prominent of these were cases where there
sort of action that today could be
classified as a form of regulatory taking. For example, in Gardner
v. Trustees of Newburgh, the town of Newburgh, New York, piped
106
While it compensated
spring water into th
the owner of the spring and the owners of the land over which the
pipe ran, it did not compensate the owners of downstream riparian
water rights.107 (This situation is quite analogous to some modernr rights are reduced for endangered fish. Courts have found these to be direct physical takings.)108
105

103. Id. at 1230.
104. Id. at 1232.
105. Id. at 1226.
106. Id.
wburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)).
107. Id.
108. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding
that the requirement to install a fish ladder
of water).
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Writing for the Court, Chancellor Kent found that the riparian owners
109

This was a semi-

Gardner as an authoritative
110

As the nineteenth century progressed, more and more states
adopted holdings similar to, or expanding upon, Gardner. Kobach cites
additional cases from New York, Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
cal and broadly applicable. And it would continue to spread. During
the decades that followed, numerous states would adopt the doctrines established in these early cases and expand them to apply in
111

Moving from the taking of riparian property, Kobach turns to the
ne applied to non-riparian property by the states during the nineteenth century. For example, when
construction prevented the use of a store, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts found compensation was due. 112 In Woodruff v. Neal,
the Connecticut Supreme Court found a taking from a statute that
authorized towns to adopt regulations that would allow the public
to graze cattle upon private property adjacent to public highways.113
The court found these to be easements, not land to which the state
took title.114 As Kobach summarizes the holding:
vidual usage rights associated with a parcel of land were the ownuld not appropriate or deny any
discrete right without providing compensation. The Connecticut
act took from all landowners abutting public highways the right to
the exclusive use of the herbage of their lands. Hence, the regulation amounted to a taking of property without compensation.115
109. Kobach, supra note 88, at 1235 (quoting Gardner v. Tr. of Newburgh, 2 Johns Ch. 162,
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 2136.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1245 (citing Patterson v. City of Boston, 37 Mass (20 Pick.) 159 (1838)).
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1249.
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Other types of devaluative takings from this era that Kobach addresses include the takings of access rights and takings caused by
penses that he otherwise would
116
This could include a requirement or need
of landowners to erect fences.117
While these state cases are important to an understanding that
there was a vibrant doctrine of regulatory takings in the nineteenth
century within the jurisprudence of the states, even more important
to the question of whether the Federal Constitution supports the
doctrine are a series of post-war federal cases. Kobach describes a
period between 1870 and 1877 where the federal courts recognized
regulatory takings after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.118 Most notable of these cases was Yates v. Milwaukee.119 This
case involved the taking of the wharfage rights from a riparian
owner.120 The Supreme Court unanimously held that the prohibition
on building or maintaining a wharf was a taking:
This riparian right is property, and is valuable, and, though it
must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it
cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed or impaired. It is
a right of which, when once vested, the owner can only be deprived in accordance with established law, and if necessary that
it be taken for the public good, upon due compensation.121

While Yates was not deprived of the naked use of his fast land, he
was denied the most valuable aspect of that land: using it for riparianrelated purposes. This case, therefore, stands firmly for the proposition that the Supreme Court had begun to recognize regulatory
takings by 1870.122
After 1877, however, Kobach asserts that the Court retreated
from its recognition of regulatory takings.123 The Court seemingly
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 497 (1870).

docks, and related structures a certain distance into the adjacent navigable waterway. See
generally id.
121. Yates, 77 U.S. at 504.
122. See Kobach, supra note 88, at 1266.
123. Id. at 1275.
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ignored its earlier holdings and ruled against landowners seeking
He posits that perhaps the Court was overworked because there was not yet an intermediate appellate branch. This might
direction, but it might explain its
failure to refer to or try to distinguish the older cases such as
Yates.125 Also:
124

The mid-1870s witnessed a profound acknowledgement by the
Court of the vast scope of regulatory powers available to state
legislatures. Indeed, two of the most prominent Supreme Court
decisions of the era, the Slaughter-House Cases and Munn v.
Illinois
deference to the states in the internal regulation of economic
affairs.126

In any event, this reversal still does not take away from the fact
that there actually were some significant regulatory takings cases
from the Supreme Court a half-century prior to Pennsylvania Coal.
Concluding, Kobach notes that there were five common threads
in the nineteenth-century cases, some of which differ markedly from
first was that boundary between
a compensable takings and legitimate use of state police powers lay
at the outer limit of the background common law of nuisance and
127

distinctions between devaluative takings and acquisitive or de128
Third, there was no minimum threshold for
129
liability. Fourth, only vested rights were protected.130 And fifth,
ment. Government actions that
devalued property only very indirectly did not constitute compen131

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1278.
Id.
Id. at 1280 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1292.
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B. Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The
132

Professor Gold begins his comprehensive treatment with this
summary:
Due to a scant and ambiguous historical record, the original intent
of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cannot be known. Yet,
with increasing frequency, commentators have declared that the
lacks historical support. Contrary to most recent scholarship,
the text and historical record of the Takings Clause arguably
support a just compensation requirement for regulatory takings.
The existing evidence, however, is sufficiently ambiguous to preclude a clear sense of the original understanding.133

address the actual original understanding . . . . ln contrast, the postratification commentary of James Madison . . . and the influential
philosophies of William Blackstone, John Locke, and Hugo Grotius
134

Gold begins his analysis with a textualist exploration of the
notes that some scholars assert
not by interfering, however se

135

But

removal from its original owner,
his dispossession, and not the mode of that removal, such as a
136

Gold also notes that in the eigh
extended beyond physical objects to appurtenant rights, and even to
137

direct, physical takings come to mind most naturally does not lead
132. Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings
, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181 (1999).
133. Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 184.
135. Id. at 187.
136. Id. at 188.
137. Id. at 188.
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logically to the conclusion that other types of takings are not well
138

The next avenue of inquiry Gold undertakes is to look at the Takings Clause in the larger context of the Fifth Amendment, especially
the Due Process Clause. Gold notes that some scholars like Bernard
Siegan139
140

Other scholars, Gold points out, such as Jed Rubenfeld, argue that
rty to be taken so long as there
are certain protections for the individual. It follows that takings that
fall outside of the Takings Clause . . . are textually permissible so
141
Ultimately, Gold concludes that either
ble, and neither is conclusive.142
Gold notes next that the writings of James Madison have been
very influential with some authorities. Turning to the scholarship
was physically taken from the
not conclusive in light of the change of language from the draft
143
to the final version.144 Some,
like Justice Scalia and the Federal Circuit have found this change
in language to be persuasive, others have not.145
Not having found a definitive answer from the language of the Fifth
rights.146 While there was no agreement among the Framers of what
constituted property, Madison may have had a broader view wherein
property included nonphysical things, leading to the possibility that
138. Id. at 190.
139. Two books by Siegan are well worth reading for a more complete understanding of this
subject. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (2001); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION (1997). Time and space do not permit a more thorough
description of these works in this Article.
140. Gold, supra note 132, at 190.
141. Id. at 191 (citing Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993)).
142. Id. at 192.
, where it may be necessary for public use,
Id. at 194 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789)).
144. Id. at 194.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 195.
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other aspects of property could run afoul of the Takings Clause.147
nt that Madison could not have
intended for the Takings Clause to apply to regulatory takings because Madison believed that the structure of the Constitution, pitting
factions against one another, was enough to protect property, Gold
has three responses. First, this ignores that the Takings Clause
originally applied only against the federal government.148
Madison would have preferred to
extend the Takings Clause to protect individual property rights from
149
But this did not happen, arguably
because the states objected to a clause that was seen to have a
broader effect than the existing norm of compensating only for
direct physical takings.150 Gold also notes that Madison may have
he wanted the states to protect the same property rights as were
151

remarks, Gold is quite skeptical
extend only to physical takings:
Treanor concludes that Madiso
when the government physically
sation for regulatory takings as well. In light of the scholarly
disagreement about their meaning, one cannot conclusively argue
that Madison opposed compensation for regulatory takings. The
post-ratification remarks of Madison certainly do not provide the
strong support Treanor describes.152

Gazette, Madison states that a government

National

147. Id. at 198.
148. Id. at 198.
149. Id. at 198.
150. Id. at 199.
151. Id. at 200.
152. Id. at 200 (quoting in part William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791 (1995)).
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which indirectly violates their property, in their actual possessions, in the labor that acquires their daily subsistence, and in
the hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve their fatigues
and soothe their cares, the influence will have been anticipated,
that such a government is not a pattern for the United States.153

While Treanor thinks this supports his thesis that only direct
takings are compensable, others disagree. James Ely, for example,
mental action short of actual seiz
rence to indirect
infringement indicates a generous understanding of the Takings
Clause to encompass more than just the physical takings of prop154
Moreover, according to Gold:
It is nearly impossible to read the Property essay and contend that
to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his

155

voking Madison, it is nonetheless compelling: Madison believed that
the best policy for the nation would be for the government to pur156
Madison
also believed that if the government did not directly purchase the
slaves, but emancipated them instead, that would make it impossi157
If that were the case,
then just compensation would have to be paid.158 Gold asserts that
t inherently a direct, physical act
159
Therefore, the logical extension of a requirement to pay compensation in
153. Id. at 201 (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT L GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 1792)).
154. Id. at 203 (citing JAMES ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 56 (1992)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 205 (citing to an 1819 letter from Madison to Robert J. Evans, an opponent of
slavery: Letter from James Madison to Robert Evans (June 15, 1819), in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 315 (Marvin Meyers ed.,
1931)).
159. Id. at 205.
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this instance would be to pay in other regulatory instances where
the otherwise lawful use and profit from property is prohibited.160
In turning to the colonial, state, and territorial precursors to the
161

that provided for just compensation . . . were deeply concerned that
their legislatures would show insufficient regard for property
162
Tracing the evolution of constitutional protections from
the Magna Carta to the colonial charters to the state constitutions,
Gold finds that the requirement for compensation was common and
well-accepted.163
On the question of whether the founding generation was more
philosophically attuned to the philosophy of classical liberalism in
the spirit of John Locke or civic republicanism as argued by Treanor,
Gold asserts:
The republican view was overcome, in part, by liberalism during
the Founding Era. It is difficult to argue that the Takings Clause
was anything but a product of liberalism, unless it was a reflection of a more narrow distrust of legislatures. Compensation for
individual property owners, if not an indication of distrust of
government, is centered on a concept of individual rights. Republican theory may explain why just compensation clauses were
not a part of the early state constitutions, or why the Takings
Clause was not proposed as a limitation on the state governments, but it does not explain the intended meaning of the
Takings Clause. Recent studies of the Takings Clause agree that
the Takings Clause was intended to support judicial review of
legislative actions. This policy cannot be squared with the republican vision that the common good should take priority over
individual rights.164
160. Similarly:
to another the profit of those lands, to have and to hold to him and his heires,
and maketh livery secundum formam chartae, the whole land itselfe doth passe;
429, 590 (1895) (Field, J., concurring) (quoting
Coke upon Littleton, Lib. 1, cap. 1, § 1, p. 4b.).
161. Gold, supra note 132, at 207.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. Id.
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Gold continues his analysis by reaching back not only to John Locke
and Blackstone but to civil law scholars such as Grotius and
Puffendorf, who can be read to support early and robust support for
compensation in some circumstances.165
166

history does not prove that the Takings Clause does not cover regulatory takings. It merely proves that many colonists were familiar
with such regulatory measures. It is worth remembering that only
two states had just compensation clauses in their constitutions
167

Like Kobach, Gold also reviews the early case law, where
nineteenth-century state courts awarded compensation for regulatory takings not necessarily based on constitutional provisions but
on principles of natural and common law. While there were some
courts that did not follow this at first, most came around by the middle of the century.168
Gold ultimately concludes:
[T]he historical record for the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause is limited. There is enough material for a party on either
side of the regulatory takings debate to muster an argument for
his or her position. But there is nothing remotely sufficient to
prove the Takings Clause originally was intended to cover only
The strongest evidence that the Takings Clause is limited to
direct, physical takings is the fact that many colonies had a practice of uncompensated regulation that directly took private property rights. The import of this evidence is curtailed by the fact
that the colonies did not have takings clauses that regulated the
legislature and thus, no strictures on colonial regulation comparable to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. . . .
The strongest evidence that the Takings Clause originally was
intended to cover regulatory
leanings in favor of protection for property rights, James Madits, and the just compensation
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 225.
See id. at 228.
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philosophy contained in the writings of Blackstone, Locke, and
Grotius. . . .
....
The constitutional text is clear enough to require something
s so as to raise questions on
whether courts may interpret the Takings Clause at all. Accordingly, the judicial system is well within the original intent framework in granting compensation for regulatory takings.169

C. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property
Rights170
Professor Eric Claeys examines the philosophical understandings
of property in the founding era and nineteenth century. He conications for a regulatory takings
jurisprudence, as exemplified by Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York, are severely misguided and not reflective of earlier understandings of property understood properly in the context
171
This, Claeys says, has led
to a crabbed and largely incoherent doctrine of regulatory takings
that exists today.
As Claeys summarizes this article,
The Article offers three main lessons. First, the Article explains
why modern federal and state regulatory-takings law suffers
from serious doctrinal problems. The nineteenth-century cases
fashioned workable doctrinal standards because they consistently followed the principle that the free use of property deserved protection; Penn Central v. City of New York and other
leading modern cases respect prop
tently, if at all. Second, the nineteenth century cases provide a
different way to conceive of property rights. Most modern property theory is strongly utilitarian; the nineteenth-century cases
justified the free use of property as an extension of the moral
freedom inherent in being human. Finally, the distinction these
important insights into the original meaning of the Takings Clause
in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.172
169. Id.
170. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1549 (2003).
171. Id. at 1556 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)).
172. Id. at 1549.
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nineteenth-century cases should dispel any notion that Penn Central
suggest, the doctrinal problems that have accreted around Penn
Central over the last 25 years are a muddle of Penn Central
173
Because Penn Central
against the value of the regulation, and because most every regulation can be justified in some manner, landowners routinely lose
these cases. That would not necessarily have been the case under
nineteenth-century thought, which gave a more absolute sense of
worth to private property.174 Thus, Claeys asserts the law does not
have to be the muddle it is today:
Rather, even if we prefer Penn Central
other alternative, we must accept that some serious doctrinal
costs weigh down Penn Central
the Penn Central approach is admittedly standardless. In its
consequences, it leads to all-or-nothing results, awarding nothing
much more often than it awards anything. . . . Penn Central makes
it cheaper for the government to pursue a wide range of social
actions it could not afford under the natural-right approach. It
probably also facilitates transfers of property-use rights that the
natural-right approach would forbid. This Article does not assess
which of these two approaches promotes better policy. But it
does show that the Penn Central approach cannot be defended
solely on the ground that the law cannot do any better.175

In addressing the work of scholars like Treanor, Kobach, Hart,
and others, Claeys points out their limitations:
This Article does not examine all the sources covered in this
scholarship, but it does warn that those sources should be reread carefully. This Article shows that modern scholars read
nineteenth-century regulatory takings decisions anachronistically,
their judgments shaped by the utilitarian commitments that
currently predominate in property law. Modern readers are not
sensitive enough to the ways in which natural-right theory gave

173. Id. at 1556.
174. Id. at 1560.
175. Id.
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176

that Treanor is drawing an unsupported conclusion:
[While] William Treanor recognizes that Madison likened partial
regulations to takings in Property, he stresses that Madison never
actually called such regulation
from this omission that Madison meant to exclude the possibility
that the Takings Clause applies to regulations as a matter of
constitutional law.
This is a strained conclusion. Although Property tells us clearly
that Madison thought partial regulations violate property rights
as a matter of principle, it says nothing about what he thought
with respect to the constitutional law question. Treanor asks us
to make an inference: if Madison had thought the Takings Clause
cast judicially enforceable penumbras over property regulations,
he would have made legal arguments, not political arguments.
Maybe, maybe not.177

Claeys explains that the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
opinions on property and takings fit within the natural rights philosophical framework of the era. His discussion of these opinions buttresses his argument that a framework that is strongly protective
of property rights, as natural rights, is entirely consistent with the
principles that animated our founding documents.178
After his review of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases
dealing with property in the contexts of riparian rights, nuisance
regulation, and the like, Claeys distills his conceptual understanding
179
For
180
Claeys
explains:
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1562.
Id.
See generally id.
Id.
See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). This article was the

ulatory takings in Penn Central. See Claeys, supra note 170, at 1646.
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The natural-right approach differs
grounds use rights, and all other rights incident to property, in
how much freedom people and groups possess to pursue their
own distinct goals with as little outside interference as possible.
This concept may be abstract in certain respects, but no more so
d a wide range of other concepts
that abound in modern property theory.181

Claeys continues:
Natural-right theory centralizes the concept of freedom of action
in property law. Property is an individual right. It gives owners
a moral entitlement to a zone of freedom because that freedom
encourages people to respond to self-centered motivations, like
the acquisitive and industrious passions that spur them to work.
By encouraging these productive passions, property encourages
people to pursue obvious personal goods like self-preservation
and advancement. Because property encourages such useful,
selfish tendencies, the freedom associated with property is a selfcentered freedom. To borrow from a classic property case, if two
neighbors build competing duck-decoy ponds, in ordinary circumstances each should prefer to compete by improving his own
arrangements, each pond owner stands in the same relation to
the other. But in the former, each pond owner has a great deal of
freedom of action to use his own pond and labor to make a living;
in the latter, each has the power to stop the neighbor from making a living, but little freedom to use what is nearest and dearest
to him for his own preferred purposes.182

With examples from the law of nuisance (especially Hadacheck v.
Sebastian,183 billboard cases,184 and finally Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon185
181. Claeys, supra note 170, at 1610.
182. Id. at 1611 (citing Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128 (K.B. 1707)).
183. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding the brickyard ban in Los
Angeles), discussed in Claeys, supra
184. See, e.g., St. Louis Poster Adver. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919) and
Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917)), discussed in Claeys, supra note
185. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), discussed in Claeys, supra note 170, at
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plays out, or should have played out, in these various contexts. As
for Pennsylvania Coal
approach experienced both its greatest advances and its worst set186
Claeys explains that Justice Holmes,
consistent with his prior legal work, approached the case in part by
following a natural rights tradition of those cases where landowners
had rights legitimately curtailed when
an idea consistent with the rubric of reciprocity of advantage. But
In particular Claeys
highlights this passage from Pennsylvania Coal:
187

Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its
limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone.188

189
190

Euclid v. Ambler,191 he states:
Euclid did more than any other
decision to discredit the natural-right approach to regulatory takconstitutional problems in the
nineteenth-century framework. When the Court cited naturalscheme, it sent a strong message
that these principles no longer needed to be taken seriously.192
186. Claeys, supra note 170, at 1619.
187. Id. at 1621.
188. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
189. Claeys, supra
190. Id. at 1622.
191. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning), discussed
in Claeys, supra
192. Claeys, supra note 170, at 1627.
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ning, Claeys says, were thin and
simply inconsistent with natural law principles. While the trial court
warned that zoning threatened to become a tool of anti-immigrant,
care.193 It was natural rights theory in name only.
Claeys continues to explain how the more modern cases signal a
further retreat from natural law theory and how this has led to the
hopeless mess of today. He observes, moreover,
In the vast majority of cases, the law is muddled, though the muddle never quite seems to stop the government from winning. In the
remaining cases, the law is too rigid and too friendly to owners.194
The natural-right approach to takings has a simple diagnosis for
both tendencies. From this perspective, the Penn Central regime
distorts regulatory takings law because it does not attach enough
importance to equal freedom of action over property. When a law
restrains the equal and free use of property, it inflicts demoralization costs on the rest of society. Such a law scares owners who
are not directly affected, by threatening that they will be stripped
of use rights like owners who are directly affected. These dequire just compensation whenever
gains. By and large, Penn Central interest balancing disregards
these costs.195

From a theoretical standpoint, Penn Central and Loretto paint a
strange picture of human psychology. According to Penn Central,
when a regulation strips use rights, people tend not to suffer any
193. Id. at 1634. The trial court found that the zoning scheme in Euclid reflected the disturbing prejudices of the era and would pave the way for the sort of racial zoning outlawed
in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), a case much more consistent with a natural rights
approach to the protection of property rights. As stated in the trial court opinion in Euclid:
[I]t is equally apparent that the next step in the exercise of this police power
would be to apply similar restrictions for the purpose of segregating in like manner
various groups of newly arrived immigrants. The blighting of property values and
the congesting of population, whenever the colored or certain foreign races invade
a residential section, are so well known as to be within the judicial cognizance.
Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Eucl
194. Here Claeys is referring to
s like Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), or Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
195. Claeys, supra
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But according to Loretto, when a regulation restrains the right to
exclude, demoralization profiles spike off the charts. Not only is the
fear that they, too, may lose their exclusionary rights. Are human
beings naturally this schizophrenic, and is it reasonable to found
a system of takings law on the assumption that they are? 196

To be sure, Claeys is equally harsh on the reasoning of what is
generally considered a favorable case
point, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.197
result was wrong as much as Justi
especially with the total wipeout of a threshold.198
With each modern case, the Court has continued to diverge from
justices who favor property rights are unable to put up a coherent
theory. Claeys concludes by recognizing that:
If we choose to keep Penn Central, we should have the integrity
to accept that we are making takings law less clear than it could
be, and the probity to admit that we keep the law the way it is
now because we prefer the utilitarian theory Penn Central endorses and the substantive political results it delivers.199

D. Other Scholarly Work
Time and space do not permit a thorough examination of many
other excellent works on the colonial origins of the doctrine of regulatory takings. But two are worth at least brief mentions.
1. David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings
Puzzle: How Correcting History Can Clarify Doctrine200
Professor Thomas catalogs state by state the various nineteenthcentury holdings on property, regulation, and takings to conclude
196. Id. at 1650.
197. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, discussed in Claeys, supra
198. See Claeys, supra
199. Id.
200. David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History
Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497 (2004).
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that the doctrine of regulatory takings is perfectly consistent with
the early law.201 He also catalogs, summarizes, and when appropriHe calls the
notion that early compensation cases were limited to direct physical
203
He concludes:
202

With these clarifications, it is more defensible to conclude that,
in general, early police power regulations were limited mostly to
nuisance suppression and therefore did not justify compensation.
Some early regulations went beyond the nuisance limits and
were often compensated, but sometimes were not. Compensation
practices were widespread in the states before enactment of the
dment and counterpart provisions
in state constitutions. It is reasonable to conclude, and perhaps
mandated by the Fifth Amendment, that as police power land
use regulations extend beyond their traditional boundaries of
nuisance suppression, they must be governed by the constitutional takings rules, requiring validation of public use and payment of just compensation for deprivation of private property
rights considered as takings. While the history elucidated in this
article may not demand that these conclusions be reached, it
certainly shows that history poses no impediment to them.204

2. Paul J. Larkin,
the Constitution205
This article is a deep dive into the original understandings of property from English common law to American common law in the
nineteenth century. After noting the relationship between property
and freedom, Larkin compares the basic meaning of property today
with that of the past.206 Regulations were abundant in the eighteenth century, Larkin asserts, but they were usually consistent
201. Id. at 519.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 545.
204. Id.
205. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Original Understanding of
MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2016).
206. Id.

, 100
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with a regime of robust protection for property.207 As Larkin sums
up his article,
In sum, the Colonists and new Americans certainly believed
that property was essential to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, but they did not also assume that property was impervious to regulation. The claim that Americans in the new
nation sought to install a lai
lary claim that the Supreme Court sought to do the same early
in the twentieth century via th
ciled with seventeenth and eighteenth American history. The
Colonies and states saw no inconsistency between the value that
should be afforded to property and the need for reasonable
regulation. Accordingly, there is no merit to the argument that
the young nation treated all forms of regulation as an anathema.
The Americans of that era placed a high value on property . . . .
Nonetheless, the government could regulate property for the
it.208
....
serving of far less protection than
Framers, however, did not see it that way. They believed that
neither liberty nor property could exist without the other. That
belief, moreover, was nothing new to any eighteenth century English subject, whether he lived in London or Williamsburg. AngloAmerican traditions, customs, and law held that property was
an essential ingredient of the liberty that the Colonists had come
to enjoy from Massachusetts through Georgia and must be protected against arbitrary governmental interference. The Supreme
Court has forgotten the status that property had for the Framers.
Reminding the Court may help lift property out of the basement
to which it has been relegated.209

Larkin, however, does not address the doctrine of regulatory takings
itself in great depth, explaining that that might be addressed in a
later article.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 80.
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V. SCHOLARSHIP ON THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR
AMENDMENTS ON REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings:
Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory
Takings, But the Fourteenth Amendment May210
Turning from the scholarship that looks primarily at eighteenthand nineteenth-century developments in compensation and regulation,
Professor Rappaport suggests that we cannot justify the doctrine of
regulatory takings on the Fifth Amendment alone. Instead, we must
an understanding that reflects the changes to conceptions of liberty
211

This article is most notable because Justice Thomas called it out
in his Murr
desirable for us to take a fresh look at our regulatory takings jurisprudence, to see whether it can be grounded in the original public
meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the

212

Rappaport is essentially an originalist who strongly believes in
of regulatory takings is firmly supported by the text and original
meaning of the Constitution:
As a friend of both economic liberty and originalism, it saddens
me to acknowledge that the critics have, so far, had the better
argument. They have strongly argued that the legal regime at
the time of the Constitution allowed regulatory takings, that there
was little or no criticism of this aspect of the legal regime, and that
there was no case law applying state takings clauses to regulatory takings. Thus, I unhappily conclude that on the available
evidence, the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment does not
cover regulatory takings.213
210. Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment
May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 729 (2008).
211. Id.
212. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Rappaport,
supra note 210).
213. Rappaport, supra note 210, at 731.
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Rappaport does not spend a great deal of ink in this symposium
paper on why he believes the skeptics have the better argument. As
Kobach, Gold, and Claeys have indicated above, there is substantial
evidence that the doctrine of regulatory takings comports to an
originalist understanding of the Constitution, although all these
scholars admit there are limits and ambiguities.214
ficult to demonstrate conclusively that the doctrine of regulatory
takings is compatible with an originalist interpretation. All is still
not lost, he argues. While it may be impossible to justify the doctrine
based on an originalist understanding of the Fifth Amendment, it
is quite conceivable that the doctrine finds support in the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporated.215
Building on a theory developed by Professor Akhil Reed Amar,
Rappaport argues that the doctrine of regulatory takings may be
completely consistent with the understandings of the ratifiers of the
Civil War Amendments.216
today must reflect not only the understanding of those who ratified
the Fifth Amendment but also the views of the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.217
Amar notes that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment,
coming from the tradition of the abolitionists, were of the view that
the original bill of rights could and should have been applied against
the states.218 Indeed, it was an article of faith among many abolitionists that the principles of the Declaration of Independence, combined with the Equal Protection Clause, made for an argument that
slavery itself was unconstitutional even before the adoption of the
Civil Rights Amendments.219 But even putting aside pre-Amendment
constitutional interpretations, we cannot discount that by the time
214. Other scholars not discussed above have agreed that originalism is consistent with the
doctrine of regulatory takings. See, e.g., JAMES ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT (3d ed. 2007); Edward H. Trompke, Originalism Supports Compen
, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 627
(2004); as well as the works of Bernard Siegan cited in note 139, supra.
215. Rappaport, supra note 210, at 731.
216. Id. (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998)).
217. See AMAR, supra note 216, at 77, 80 (cited in Rappaport, supra
218. Id.
supra
219. See, e.g., TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION (2015).
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we ratified the Civil War Amendments, we had, as a nation, drastically different views of liberty than those held by many of the founding generation. In particular, we now understood that individual
rights belonged to all individuals and that the states were wrong in
suppressing those rights. The Civil War and the Civil War Amendments were assurances that this would never happen again.
So, just as we use the understandings of words and legal principles common to the ratifiers of the original Constitution to figure
out the meaning of the various parts of that 1791 document, so too
must we consider the language and understandings of the ratifiers
of the Civil War Amendments in 1868 to understand the meaning
of the amended constitution.
As such, those expansive mid-nineteenth century understandings
of our rights must now be considered part of the DNA of the Constitution, as amended. Professor Rappaport suggests that these newly
expanded rights were made a part
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in particular with
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.220
other rights incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment such as the
Second Amendment.221 It does not attempt to parse out the midnineteenth century understandings of regulatory takings. This is the
void that Rappaport attempts to fill.
there is a strong case for the possibility that the incorporated Takings
in particular, that the incorporated Clause protects against some
222

After explaining his agreement with views by Treanor and Amar
that the original Takings Clause did not protect against regulatory
takings,223 Rappaport explains the basis of his opinion that the
Fourteenth Amendment did:
The argument for expanding the Takings Clause to cover nonphysical takings is supported by two mutually reinforcing arguments.
220. Rappaport, supra
221. See generally AMAR, supra note 216.
222. Rappaport, supra
majoritarian as other righ
n.80.

Id. at 749
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First, the structure and purposes of the incorporated Bill of Rights
favor an expanded Takings Clause. Second, the legal landscape
concerning takings that preced
adoption also supports an expanded Takings Clause. 224

As for the structure and purpose, Rappaport asserts that unlike
the Fifth Amendment, the purpose of the Fourteenth was to protect
majorities.225 Reflecting the abuses by the southern states against
freedman and others, Rappaport concludes that:
Applying the Takings Clause to the states would have been necessary to protect these unpopular groups from having their property
seized without compensation. But applying the Takings Clause
only to physical appropriations might have been inadequate. That
would still have allowed state governments to impose uncompensated consequential or regulatory takings on these disfavored
groups, either to punish them or to transfer onto them the costs
of needed projects.226

initial draft, it does contain the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 227
which was designed to effect the same purpose.228 Now this is slightly
problematic, of course, because we know that the Privileges and
The Slaughterhouse Cases,229 despite attempts to revive it.230 Whether the Court
is more likely to reexamine its doctrinal bases for its current regulatory takings mess or reopen the question of the meaning of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is an open question. 231
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 750.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 751.
The Fourteenth Amendment,

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
228. Id. at 752. Bingham is credited with being the principal architect of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
229. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
230. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 742 (2010) (finding no need to
revisit The Slaughterhouse Cases).
231. Yet another possibility would be the Due Process Clause, long favored by Justice
Kennedy as the answer to all thorny constitutional questions.
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In any event, the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates protections against regulatory takings is entirely consistent
with the growing body of state-law jurisprudence summarized by
Kobach and others showing that state courts were protecting its
citizens from regulatory takings.232 It would not be a stretch to argue
stood the tenor of these cases and were comfortable with an understanding that the owners of property should be protected from or
compensated for regulatory takings. In other words, as it became
common for state courts to protect property from excessive control,
these state law understandings became part of the philosophical
and legal environment in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified. As Rappaport puts it:
[S]tate decisions had recognized that takings could occur not only
from physical seizures, but from consequential and regulatory actions as well. While Treanor and others have argued that takings
principles only covered physical takings until after the Civil War
Mahon, recent scholarship
has challenged this view. This new scholarship argues that the
law prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment grew to
incorporate an understanding of takings that extended beyond
physical seizures of property. This understanding included the
government actions that infringed on those rights.233

CONCLUSION
There is much to criticize in the suggestions by some scholars that
the doctrine of regulatory takings is inconsistent with an originalist
view of the Fifth Amendment. These views may be too crabbed and
rely too much on incomplete analyses of the relevant cases and philoguments are not completely without merit. It is likely that not all
the ratifiers of the original Constitution were classical liberals; there
was a strong streak of civic republicanism among some of them. And
equivocally demonstrating that those who ratified the Constitution
232. Rappaport, supra note 210, at 754 (citing Kobach, supra
233. Id. at 755 (citations omitted).
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were thinking about regulatory takings. Into this vacuum of evidence, it is possible to fit many analyses of originalism.
With all due respect to scholars like Treanor, Hart, and even
Rappaport, I think the stronger arguments are those in favor of an
originalist interpretation of the Constitution that is consistent with
the doctrine of regulatory takings. The Founders were far more sympathetic to Lockean views then they were of civic republicanism.
Their deeply held beliefs of the essential nature of property, and the
broad meaning of property itself, all point to an originalist understanding of the Takings Clause that is consistent with the doctrine
of regulatory takings. Of course
the relationship between property and freedom were never tested in
the crucible of a modern interconnected regulatory state where individual actions are less atomistic than those of people living in a
largely rural and agrarian economy. Put another way, outside the
negative externalities of land use.
Be that as it may, no one on either side of the debate can say with
complete confidence that they are one hundred percent correct. No
one really knows. Unless that uncertainty were to be erased by
reanimating those who ratified the Constitution and asking them
point-blank about the effect of regulations on property, this debate
to 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.234 While there
may be disagreement about whether the Fifth Amendment embraces
regulatory takings, there is a stronger argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment does. But unless and until scholars, or the Court, examines in more detail the animating principles behind the incorporation doctrine, uncertainty will remain.

234. See generally Rappaport, supra note 210.

THE ECOLOGY OF THE COMMON LAW

HENRY E. SMITH*
ABSTRACT
The common law and the environment appear to have had a falling out. Legal realists and their environmentalist successors see the
complexity of environmental problems involving ecosystems as outstripping the abilities of traditional common law to handle them.
Ironically, it is complexity in the very sense invoked by realism and
to explaining and justifying the common law in general and property
rights in particular. Property law and institutions are a dynamic
modular system that can handle a range of complex problems well,
and that breaks down or runs out in characteristic ways. Private law
is a hybrid of spontaneous and directed order, and it coevolves with
the economy, and the natural environment itself. While no panacea, the common law should not be
sold short: it is an attractive system for many of the very reasons for
which it is most often dismissed.
INTRODUCTION
The common law and the environment are widely seen as being
in tension with each other. Legal realists and their environmentalist
successors see the complexity of environmental problems as outstripping the abilities of old-fashioned common law to handle such
new and pervasive problems.1 These same critics see the traditional
* Fessenden Professor of Law and Director of the Project on the Foundations of Private
Law, Harvard Law School. Email: hesmith@law.harvard.edu.
AMES E.
1. See, e.g., THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM
HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE,
A HISTORY
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA.
L. REV. 279 (1973), reprinted in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136, 139 (1978); see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013) (arguing from complexity against
formalism and for a new judicial realism). In litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court has foreclosed
the possibility of federal public nuisance claims relating to climate change and has left open the
possibility of suits under state law. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011);
see also, e.g., County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(holding that removal based on federal common law was improper).
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baselines of private law, and property rights and private ordering in
particular, as obstacles to more enlightened regulatory solutions.
While occasionally such solutions are sought in public nuisance litigation and there has been some resurgence of interest in nuisance
among commentators,2 the rest of private law, and property law in
particular, is seen as unhelpful at best.
To see the common law as a static barrier to progress not only
sells it short; such a view is deeply ironic, because the common law
and property are flexible and dynamic for many of the very same
reasons invoked by the realists and environmentalists. While the
common law is no panacea, it is likely to run out of usefulness less
readily than is usually thought.
The themes of environmental complexity and the responses of the
3
He has argued forcefully that by promoting private ordering and bottom-up
solutions, the common law should not be counted out when it comes
to dealing with environmental problems and the challenges of human
interactions with complex ecosystems. In this Article, I will argue
that one reason for the common law to be more apt a source of solutions than it is often given credit for is its architecture: a partially
modularized system that manages information and can evolve through
a significant range.4 That is, for the very reasons of complexity cited
by its skeptics, the common law itself is an ecosystem. We must attend
to the ecology of the common law.
Legal theory reflects unstated assumptions about the nature of
complexity in law and the environment. Environmentalism rests on
the foundational idea that everything is connected with everything

2. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753 (2008)
(advocating nuisance for harm to ecosystem services); Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon
Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1828 (2008)
(proposing strict liability for climate change in public nuisance). Nuisance has long been taken
more seriously by market-oriented commentators. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD
R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).
3. See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Common Law and the Environment, 58 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 583 (2008) [hereinafter Eagle, Common Law]; Steven J. Eagle, Environmental
Amenities, Private Property, and Public Policy, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 425 (2005).
4. See, e.g., CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY VOL
ERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL
210 (2d ed. 1981).
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we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything
5
This makes environmental problems very
difficult, because any change and any activity can have far-reaching
and hard-to-predict ripple effects. Such systems tend to be chaotic.
On the other hand, legal realism has left us with a very different
approach to complexity embedded in its view of property. In the classic bundle of rights picture of property, a more or less explicit as6
The benefits and costs
of each stick contribute additively to the features of the system as
a whole.7 So tinkering with one stick to make it better unambiguously
makes the whole better. The bundle of rights appealed to progressives and realists because it dethroned traditional notions of property and it made property rights more malleable.8 Sticks could be
added and subtracted, distributed and redistributed, at will. However, the picture of complexity standing behind the disaggregated
or additive bundle picture of property is the opposite of that in environmentalism. In the bundle, elements are not interconnected,
and that is precisely why the bundle is so protean.
So which is it? The combination of environmentalism and common
law is an important one, but we have to be on our guard against
letting rhetoric triumph over reality. When it comes to the environment, the all-connections picture is a reason for intervention: one
5. JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 211 (1911); Eagle, Common Law, supra
s of Aldo Leopold and John Muir).
6. O. Lee Reed,
, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 459 (2004); Walton H. Hamilton
& Irene Till, Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOC. SCI. 528, 528 (Edwin R.A. Seligman
& Alvin Johnson eds., 1937) (declaring that property is nothing more th
location of letters which serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons
see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1936)
see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle?: The
Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV
how the Restatement was largely based on the legal concepts formulated by Hohfeld that
minimized the distinction between in personam and in rem rights).
7. See Lee Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Towards a More Evolutionary Theory of Property
see also Henry E. Smith, Complexity and the
Rights, 100 IOWA L. REV
Cathedral: Making Law and Economics More Calabresian, 48 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43 (2019).
8. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 81
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (noting that th
whole supportive of the regulatory and welfare state, and in the writings that develop the
bundle-of-rights conception, a purpose to remove the sanctity that had traditionally attached
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set of property rights is interconnected with everything else and the
system as a whole is key, making a top-down view attractive. When
it comes to the common law and especially what is internal to the
bundle of rights, the assumption is the opposite: there may be numerous elements, but they are not interconnected and can be manipulated without worrying about unintended side effects. The overall
picture is that complexity is both assumed or assumed away but
always to the detriment of the common law.
What we need is a realistic view of complexity across the board,
in terms of benefits and costs, which will in turn allow us to see the
true strengths and weaknesses of the common law in relation to the
environment. Part I begins with complexity and how both environmentalists and realists see complexity in the world. By contrast,
they typically assume that the common law itself is simply additive,
and at the same time should employ narrow and shallow concepts
that reflect the complexity of the world directly, without benefiting
from or needing to control complexity within the law itself. In Part
II, I argue that more traditional versions of the common law are more
systematic, not in the sense of a deductive system, but as a complex
system: the concepts, rules, and institutional devices of the common
law are themselves interconnected but in an organized way. Part III
shows how the organized complexity reflected in and built into the
common law allows for evolution of the common law through a large
range and lends it a greater, but not unlimited, capacity to deal with
environmental problems than is usually thought. The Article concludes with some thoughts on where accounting for complexity leaves
the relationship of the common law and the environment.
I. COMPLEXITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
In discussions of both the environment and property, there is a lot
ronment, and ecosystems in particular, commentators are drawing
on more useful notions of complexity than in the past.9
9. Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of
Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV
Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal Complexity, 101
IOWA L. REV. 191 (2015); see also Elinor Ostrom, A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems, 325 SCIENCE 419 (2009).
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bring out some key aspects of the problems the law and other institutions face with respect to environmental problems. In systems
theory, complexity stems from the interconnection of the components
of a system.10 A system is an interconnected set of elements, and a
complex system is one in which the interconnections are numerous
and dense enough that there arise properties at the level of the system that cannot be traced to individual elements of the system taken
separately.11 These emergent properties stem from the interactions
and preclude strong forms of reductionism.12 Studying a car by taking
it apart and studying the parts in isolation will not tell us much
about the functions served by cars or their subcomponents. Cars,
like many systems, are complex but not unmanageably so. Complexity
ponents contribute additively to

ll changes at the micro level can
lead to large and unpredictable changes at the macro level.
In between is what Warren Weav
in which the elements of a system are connected (unlike simplicity)
but not maximally (unlike disorganized complexity).13 In organized
complexity, some groups of elements may be more connected to each
other than to elements outside the cluster. If so, algorithms can find
community structure and the system may be nearly decomposable,
14
The system can be treated as modular,
in which components show dense interactions internally and more
stereotyped interactions across their interfaces.15 Such systems can
10. See, e.g., MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR (2011); HERBERT A. SIMON,
THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (2d ed. 1981); Ludwig von Bertalanffy, An Outline of General
System Theory, 1 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 134 (1950).
11. See, e.g., W. BRIAN ARTHUR, COMPLEXITY AND THE ECONOMY (2015); JOHN H. MILLER
& SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
OF SOCIAL LIFE (2007).
12. See, e.g., P.W. Anderson, More is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of the
Hierarchical Structure of Science, 177 SCIENCE 393, 393, 395 (1972).
13. Warren Weaver, Science and Complexity, 36 AM. SCIENTIST 536 (1948).
14. Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC Y 467, 477
(1962); M. E. J. Newman & M. Girvan, Finding and Evaluating Community Structure in
Networks, 69 PHYSICAL REV. E 026113 (2004); see also MATTHEW O. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC NETWORKS
Modularity (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
15. Henry E. Smith, The Economics of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW
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evolve more easily through a certain range because modules can be
altered or substituted without unmanageable ripple effects. In a car,
one can redesign the brake system without worrying about the
windshield wipers.
This conception of complexity has been adopted by ecologists and
environmentalists. Indeed, the view that when it comes to the environment and ecology everything is connected to everything else was
an intuition shared by the early ecological writers like John Muir
and Aldo Leopold. Taken literally, their views would correspond to
disorganized complexity. It is an empirical question of how and how
much the constituents of ecosystems are interconnected. In more modern ecology, the notion of complexity from complex systems theory
has come to the fore.
In the ecological literature, complexity is often cited as counting
against traditional common law solutions to environmental and resource problems. It is said that complexity of resource conflicts and
ecological effects are too much for old-fashioned devices like nuisance
law, which are too piecemeal and local to handle the complexity.16 In
this negative assessment of the common law, ecologists stand in a long
tradition stretching back at least to the legal realists of the early
twentieth century, who relentlessly argued that the common law,
ling the problems of an increasingly complex society. While the realists did not have the benefit of current definitions of complexity based
on interaction, people of that era often emphasized factors like the
numbers of cases and new factors involved in the context of decisionmaking.17 While continuing this kind of argument, the ecologists
make a stronger and more interest
sense of systems theory points away from common law and other
decentralized institutions.
ECONOMICS, VOLUME 2: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW
2017).
16. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
essential premise of much environmental law is . . . that the physical characteristics of the
ecosystem generate spatial and temporal spillovers that require restrictions on the private
use of natural resources far beyond those contemplated by centuries-old common law tort
see also Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies
for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE
17. AM. L. INST., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT
ORGANIZATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW
AND
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One reason that ecologists and realists more generally do not see
much promise in the common law relates more to their assumptions
about the common law rather than its true nature. The realists saw
themselves as hard-headed pragmatists interested in the facts, and
they saw traditional legal concepts as overly metaphysical at best and
a cover for the real grounds of decision at worst. In the most radical
versions of realism and in its successor critical movements, legal
concepts and legal reasoning of the traditional sort are smoke-screens
for ideology and the promotion of the interests of the powerful. The
preference among the realists was for narrow, shallow concepts that
would be tailored to real-world problems and that could be altered
in response to ever-quicker technological and social change.18
Nowhere is this realist vision more apparent than in the so-called
bundle of rights picture of property, often captured by the metaphor
19
Although the bundle picture antedates
realism, the realists took it on board and turned it into conventional
wisdom in American property law. The bundle picture downplays the
notion of thing (as in property as a law of things) by first pointing out
that rights avail between persons, not between persons and things. 20
Then it debunks the idea that there is any inherent content to the
bundle or any connection to a thing.21 Instead, in keeping with its
18. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 226 (1930); Karl N. Llewellyn,
, 30 COLUM. L. REV
guishing between abstract legal verbalisms and concrete empirical facts).
19. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
ive that views property as a bundle of rights
thinking of property as rights to things);
Arthur L. Corbin, Comment, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429
has ceased to describe any res,
supra
relations. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
20. Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL
21. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
reasoning in the whole field of unfair
COLUM. L. REV
competition is veiled by
property
supra
contrast, the theory of property rights held by the modern specialist tends both to dissolve the
notion of ownership and to eliminate any necessary connection between property rights and
things. Consider ownership first. The specialist fragments the robust unitary conception of
rights must be rights in things? Perhaps we no longer need a notion of ownership, but surely
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who has various rights; then various collections of those rights could
be denominated property if they are deemed important enough. But
nothing much turns on such a designation. The idea was to dethrone
property and to remove it as an obstacle to reform. If the individual
sticks can be added or (better)
there is nothing in the notion of property or its associated protections or moral force that should stand in the way.
This protean picture of the bundle also promised a more responsive
property law. Complexity in the world might require adjustments in
the bundle, and the bundle conception itself would facilitate such
change. Complexity of the world would be mirrored in the bundle
and the law could keep up.
The irony in the bundle picture and realism more generally is that
showing complex behavior itself as a system. The bundle of sticks
metaphor is revealing: in a bundle of sticks, the individual sticks
have little to no effect on each other. They thus do not form a complex
system; they contribute to the bundle additively. At the other extreme,
if every stick influenced the effect of every other stick, the bundle
would show unpredictable emergent properties, maybe even chaos.
even the right way to conceive of it) is structured: the various component rights and legal relations and the resource attributes they
correspond to interact in various ways but not maximally.22 Bundles
of rights surround things because interactions (among interests and
among legal interests) are more intense internal to a thing than between different things. In other situations, thinghood recedes in importance precisely because interactions do not cluster into modules.
Different versions of the bundle picture vary in their evolutionary
consequences. Alston and Mueller capture various versions of the
bundle of rights and tie them to evolution by invoking Stuart
property rights are a distinct category from other legal rights, in that they pertain to things.
But this suggestion cannot withstand analysis either; most property in the modern capitalist
see generally Henry E. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 95 (2014).
22. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012); see also
Alston & Mueller, supra note 7; Smith, supra note 7; Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An
Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV
(2012).
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N-K model.23 In biological evolution, genes were often
assumed, like sticks in the bundle theory, to be freestanding and noninteracting. If so, genes can vary and selection can operate straightforwardly: any improvement to one gene improves the genome. When
it comes to property, this picture is attractive because it promises
that reform can be done stick by stick without having to worry about
further consequences. Any improvement to one stick is an unambiguous improvement to the bundle overall. At the opposite extreme,
to disorganized complexity or
chaos. This seamless web would be highly unstable and unpredictable. If, however, genes or rights or attributes are somewhat connected, and especially if such connections cluster, then the fitness
landscape is jagged but manageable. One can alter one or a few
elements and get close to a local maximum. Other maxima and the
global maximum may not be reachable through ordinary variation
and selection or local tinkering and, in the case of law, may require
a remodularization. Historically, such major changes to property
systems are associated with overhauls instituted by strong rulers
(Napoleon, William the Conqueror), revolutions, or major legislative
initiatives.24 The property legislation in England in 1925 that replaced the estate system with the fee simple, lease, and trust was a
relatively peaceful example of such major changes.
Thus, post-realist conventional wisdom sees the world in general
and ecosystems in particular as
to the common law. It is an empirical question how much internal
interconnection there is in the property bundle. We can begin by
noting that bundles correspond to things because certain attributes
are more interconnected to each other than they are to the background context, from which they can be more or less separated.25
Thus, in the case of land, certain kinds of water (groundwater, riparian water) interact with the land in terms of usefulness, and the
bundle of rights to a plot of land may well include some access to
23. STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SELECTION
supra
24. Chang & Smith, supra note 22, at 52.
25. Smith, supra note 15; Sichelman & Smith, supra note 14.
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this associated water. Nearby reaches of airspace are highly complementary to the surface, but distant reaches, where airplanes typically fly, are not, with intermediate altitudes being in between,
depending on the uses to which the land is being put. The ad coelum
doctrine extends the association of airspace with the surface upward
indefinitely but in a weakening way as altitude increases, as one
would expect.26
As in all institutional analysis, we need to compare feasible solutions. While the common law may need to be reformed or superseded,
and while it is correct to be concerned about the challenges of complexity, we need to evaluate the common law itself in the spirit of
complex adaptive systems.
II. COMPLEXITY AND THE COMMON LAW
Complexity does shape the common law, but not necessarily in
the way that is conventionally supposed. Ironically, realism and its
progeny deduce from the complexity of the world the need to superformal and narrowly deductive. Instead, complexity calls for system
in the common law, but not in the sense of a deductive system. Far
from being obviated, the concepts and systematic connections in the
common law are what allows it to respond to true complexity arising
out of the interconnections and emergent properties of the world.
Start with the idea that property is a law of things.27 This idea was
disdained by the realists as metaphysical and outmoded. And yet,
modularizing the world into things is what gives the system of property law much of its flexibility. The rights people claim over things
are simpler for others to understand if those rights are well defined
and standardized along some dimensions.28 We could imagine a world
in which the consequence of trespass would vary by parcel. Instead,
26. See STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM

THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON (2008); Eric R. Claeys, On the Use and Abuse of Overflight Column

Doctrine, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF.
27. Smith, supra
28. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 55 (2000); Henry E. Smith, Standardization
in Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 148 (Kenneth
Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
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the message sent to third parties is relatively simple (keep off), and it
is enriched by interfaces like servitudes, nuisance, and regulation.29
Packages of property rights also combine easily and scale up and
down. If parcels are subdivided, their legal features are predictable,
as they are when combined. It is one of the advantages of the rectangular survey that parcels scale up and down so easily.30 The Supreme
hat counts as a single parcel for
takings purposes does not fare well in this regard.31
The device of the trust allows information to be managed in a
hybrid and very sophisticated fashion.32 Most of the intense and
possibly idiosyncratic information is of relevance to the immediate
parties to the trust, the trustee and the beneficiary (and perhaps the
settler and a protector if there is one). But by having the legal title
in the trustee, the trust presents a simple interface to the outside
world.33 Third parties are responsible only for not acquiring trust
property with notice or gratuitously. Good faith purchasers for value
take free of beneficial interests (the trust extends to the proceeds in
the hands of the trustee).34
The evolution of property as a system is facilitated by modularity.
The more detachable parts of property can be easily modified without huge ripple effects.35 By contrast, those aspects of property that
29. Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel as a
Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549, 560 (2012).
30. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating
Property Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426 (2011).
31. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); see also Steven J. Eagle, Land Use
Regulation and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 87, 142 (2017); Thomas W.
Merrill,
Doctrine and the Perils of Common Law
Constitutionalism, 34 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism,
166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2017).
32. See Ben McFarlane, The Essential Nature of Trusts and Other Equitable Interests: Two
and a Half Cheers for Hohfeld, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR WORKS,
SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al.
eds.) (forthcoming 2020).
33. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV
34. See, e.g., Kline v. Orebaugh, 519 P.2d 691, 696 (Kan. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS
M. LAW INST. 1959); 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
35. Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Convergence and Divergence in Systems of
Property Law: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses, 92 S. CAL. L. REV
Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055 (2015).
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are more interconnected are more difficult to change.36 For example,
changing the definition of possession would have many implications
throughout property law.37 For this reason, the notion of possession
itself is best kept simple, with much of the associated contextual
detail relatively detachable. As Albert Kocourek argued, we could
let possession be a very concrete notion close to social facts and then
handle all extended notions of possession through the right to possess.38 Two specialized notions, one concrete and local and the other
abstract and general, would work in tandem to handle possession
for ownership, possession for trespass, possession for adverse possession, and so on. Changes to the social definitions of possession are
cabined and do not create massive ripple effects. Changing the idea
of the right to possess would be a big step and we correspondingly
find more stability there. If such change were needed, it might even
have to come from legislation.
Over time and across legal systems we find signs of the expected
evolutionary patterns. Those aspects of property law that are most
structural will converge among systems, and of those that are more
stylistic, those that are more isolated will converge and those that
are most interconnected will diverge.39
As in biology, modularity facilitates evolution toward local maxima of fitness but may put other maxima, even a global maximum,
beyond reach.40 However, in comparative institutional analysis the
standard is not nirvana but the best feasible system.41
Finally, as in biological systems, including ecosystems, property
law may show emergent properties that are not directly traceable to
the constituents of property law. Particularly for those aspects of
property law that are closely tied to its system, we should not expect
such traceability. Thus, one exercise of the rights of an owner under
trespass law may look selfish, but the system of property including
trespass based on an exclusionary strategy may produce stability,
efficiency, and even fairness and generosity overall.
36. Chang & Smith, supra
37. Id.
38. ALBERT KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS
39. Chang & Smith, supra note 35.
40. See Alston & Mueller, supra note 7; Smith, supra note 22; see also BALDWIN & CLARK,
supra note 4.
41. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1969).
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The possibility of emergent properties points to the importance of
distinguishing the micro and the macro and asking how the one
relates to the other.42 Part of the fallacy of the conventional wisdom
about complexity and the common law is complexity can be produced
at a macro level from the interplay of simple rules. Not only is it the
case that simple rules can be used by transactors in a complex world;
simple rules can interact to manage complexity and even to produce
complex results.43 Private law theories generally need to pay more
attention to how the micro relates to the macro, and how this is
shaped by the problem of complexity.44 Possession may be based on
conventions that emerged on the local level, but their strength is
that they scale up well.45 An important question is how much we need
to intervene to change the results of such local interacting rules as we
scale up to society.
This scaling-up problem is essential to evaluating the role of the
common law in handling environmental problems. There are no a
priori answers here, but certainly pointing to the simplicity or lack
of change in local parts of the system does not begin to tell us how
the system performs in flexibly handling complex and changing
phenomena like the environment.
If property is a complex system, we can ask if it is better regarded
as a system of systems. Private, common, and public property can
combine in various hybrid systems on various scales.46 Consider a
simple example of a common pool, say a fishing pond. If the pond and
all the fish belonged to one person there would be no tendency toward
a tragedy of the commons. But there would also be no tragedy of the
commons if the fish were owned in common both in the pool and
after removal.47 Overfishing would not be a problem (unless people
42. See Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Sizing Up Private Law, 70 U. TORONTO L.J.
(forthcoming 2020), https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/abs/10.3138/utlj.2019-0038.
43. See, e.g., JACK COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS: DISCOVERING SIMPLICITY IN A COMPLEX WORLD (1994). Systems theory emphasizes the interaction of components
of systems more than the stability of simple rules over time, as in RICHARD A EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1997); Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common
Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253 (1980).
44. Gold & Smith, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Dean Lueck, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions,
35 NAT.RESOURCES J. 625 (1995); Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 28, at 35.
47. Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998).
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could easily steal the fish or consume them before anyone noticed).
There might even be underfishing, along the lines of the shirking
that happens on a collective farm. It is the interface between common
and private property that creates the tragedy of the commons: fish
removed from the common become private, which creates the incentive, and the ability, to get all the benefit of the withdrawal while
bearing a fraction of the cost. That is what creates the problem.
A semicommons is a property regime in which significant elements of common and private property are present and interact. 48
Instead of being adjacent (as in the tragedy of the commons), the
semicommons is conceived as one system with multiple interacting
subsystems. The open fields of medieval England are an example:
peasants would privately own scattered long strips for grain-growing,
and these strips would be thrown open for common grazing after
harvest and during fallow periods. The interface between the two
subsystems is not trivial: because of the access people had during the
commons period, they might favor parts of the commons that were
theirs in the other period with manure and attempt to avoid excessive trampling by the common herd. The pattern of long, thin,
scattered plots may have dampened this kind of strategic behavior
because it would be too costly to direct benefits and detriments (associated with the animals) in the commons period. Here, boundary
placement can be seen as a device to obscure the interface in order to
avoid its misuse. Such systems require interfaces between the component systems, and here is where things get interesting. One reason
is the possibility of strategic behavior.
Attention to complexity also helps us isolate parts of the common
law that have the most difficulty in dealing with interactions and
changing context. If property employs modular bundles at some cost,
that cost will vary depending on the pattern of interactions in the
world. Some clusters of attributes can be separated from their context more easily than others. It is easy to treat a chair as an object and
to define legal rights to it, to enforce those rights, to transfer them,
and so on. Real property requires more delineation, by social convention and legal institutions. The demarcation of boundaries is costly
48. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000); see also Enrico Bertacchini et al., Never Two Without Three: Commons,
Anticommons and Semicommons, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 163 (2009); Fennell, supra note 46.
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and socially embedded, and produces different effects depending on
how it is done (metes and bounds, rectangular survey) and in what
communities it arises.49 And a whole apparatus of records has built
up around real property and certain other kinds of property. Even
more strikingly, intellectual property is wholly constructed: inventions and expressions in the contemplation of law must be spelled out
in the law even more than in the case of tangible property. Boundaries themselves are socially and (especially) legally constructed.
In what I have called fluid property, the costs of separation and
delineation into things is high, and the benefits of multiple access
are also high.50 With fluid property, uses of the resource cannot be
easily isolated. (The analogy is to physical fluids, which deform under
stress and which also flow.) Thus, delineating things and providing
the means of restricting access is less attractive as a strategy than
in the case of tangible property. The nonrival nature of some of these
resources underlines the cost of preventing access. And the uses
people put such resources to are so intertwined that modules with
stereotyped interfaces are difficult to employ. This dynamic pushes
exclusion strategies to be indirect (pegged to proxies that can be measured) and for governance strategies to be extensive.51 Because it
facilitates multiple uses and the application of different incentives
to different uses at different scales, we often find semicommons for
fluid property, to which I turn in the next Part.
III. COEVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
If the common law is a system for managing complexity through
a certain range, we can now see how it responds to environmental
problems and where it falls short. Recall that environmentalism rests
on the foundational idea that everything is connected with everything else. This makes environmental problems very difficult, because
any change and activity can have far-reaching and hard-to-predict
ripple effects. Such systems tend to be chaotic.
49. See Maureen E. Brady, The Forgotten History of Metes and Bounds, 128 YALE L.J. 872
(2019); see also Ostrom, supra note 9.
50. Henry E. Smith, Semicommons in Fluid Resources (2015 Annual Helen Wilson Nies
Lecture in Intellectual Property), 20 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 195 (2016).
51. Id.; Henry E. Smith, Governing Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
2019).
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The literature on ecosystems has recognized that they present a
problem of complexity. One response is to look to hybrid systems
like semicommons for dealing with different aspects of ecosystems.
This may allow for better tailoring to resource attributes. Wildlife
could be common even over private land, but this also presents the interface problems including strategi
regime over oyster beds in the nineteenth century was a semicommons: within an area, some resources were treated as private and
others as common.52 Brett Frischmann shows that semicommons
can be used in many complex situations including ecosystems and
other resources that are similarly complex.53 Frischmann emphasizes hybrids involving regulation. In intellectual property, transactors can bundle shared and proprietary assets to create hybrid
regimes.54 Hybridity can be supplied by the common law, statute, or
contracting into a regime. Comparative institutional analysis is required to evaluate which hybrids make sense, who should supply
them, and how they can be changed.
Nuisance is the most prominent part of the common law when it
comes to governing activities that impact the environment. Nuisance is but one institutional device, and a comparative institutional
analysis needs to consider how it complements and substitutes for
other institutional devices, both at any given time and dynamically
over time.55 The question for nuisance is not whether it is a complete
solution to environmental problems but whether it fits into an overall
system of solutions. And to answer that question we need a better
handle on what nuisance does. The idea that it is pure balancing or
a kind of judicial version of cost-benefit analysis better undertaken by
regulators is bound to make nuisance comparatively less attractive.
52. Zachary C.M. Arnold, Against the Tide: Connecticut Oystering, Hybrid Property, and
the Survival of the Commons, 124 YALE L.J. 1206 (2015).
53. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES
(2012).
54. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property As Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation
Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 402 (2009).
55. Donald J. Kochan, A Framework for Understanding Property Regulation and Land Use
Control from a Dynamic Perspective, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 303 (2015); see also Robert
C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); Keith N. Hylton, The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law
and Implications for Environmental Regulation, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673 (2008); Henry
E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004).
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Nuisance law involves different and structured rules of thumb, 56 and
in many ways involves a second-order mutual adjustment of presumptive first-order rights in neighbors to use their land. 57
For regimes at any given time and for dynamic evolution, water
law presents a good case study of how a great deal of flexibility is
provided by the common law and how some of the flexibility comes
from complex hybrids and extensions of the common law that eventually may require public regulation.
The evolution of the common law of water into multiple systems
is familiar, but its hybrid character is often downplayed.58 Both riparianism and prior appropriation mix elements of exclusion and
governance, with a tilt toward governance in comparison to non-fluid
property.59 Both systems employ governance strategies to manage
the interaction of private and common property. In riparianism, owners of land (private property) abutting the waterway have a right to
use water reasonably in a kind of commons.60 Riparianism is not all
governance: water cannot be sold to third parties or used on nonriparian land in a kind of exclusion.61 In more recent times, riparian
rights have been regulated in a more public law fashion. 62 Whether
this makes sense depends on how well riparian rights scale up,
including to larger areas, and the relative competency of courts and
agencies in governing the use of water.
In prior appropriation, the regime has often been portrayed as a
parcelization of water in a move from riparian sharing toward private
property.63 Because the West was more arid and uses tended to be
56. Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Nuisance Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECO-

NOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 28, at 323; Hylton, supra note 55; Smith, supra note 55.

57. John C.P. Goldberg & Henry E. Smith, Wrongful Fusion: Equity and Torts, in EQUITY
309 (John C.P. Goldberg et al. eds., 2019).
58. On hybrid water law and its sources in the common law, see MARK KANAZAWA, GOLDEN
RULES: THE ORIGINS OF CALIFORNIA WATER LAW IN THE GOLD RUSH (2015). On the role of
equity, see Duane Rudolph, Why Prior Appropriation Needs Equity, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
AND LAW: FUSION AND FISSION

59. Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (2008).
60. Olivia S. Choe, Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing Water in an Era of Scarcity,
113 YALE
61. Smith, supra
62. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
§ 9.06(c)(2), §§ 9-244 to 9-247 (Amy K. Kelly ed., 3d ed. 2012).
63. Jedidiah Brewer et al.,
, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM
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less consumptive, prior appropriation was a more effective regime. 64
Prior appropriation does not tie rights to ownership of riparian land;
still mixes significant elements of exclusion and more governance than
65
Third-party effects downstream abound.66
Because of high measurement costs and benefits of multiple use,
water is difficult to separate and requires more emphasis on advanced
forms of separation and governance to contain strategic behavior.
Thus, while prior appropriation uses a prior-in-time-prior-in-right
approach, what is acquired is a right to use water. Instead of acquiring
a volume of water that can be used for any purpose, prior appropriation rights are more tied to their context and formulated in terms of
contextualized use. Prior appropriation rights are rights to use water
and they are delineated by use: the quantity traditionally was measured in terms of use, and even today quantification occurs mostly
at the time of transfer.67 Crucially, junior appropriators of the return
flow must not be injured by a shift by the senior appropriator to another use or to another user (in a water transfer).68 This no-injury
rule is often criticized, but it is part of a governance regime that
allows maximum appropriation of the water in a highly interlocking
fashion. The price for this interlock is difficulty in changing from
one use to another or from one user to another.69
To make transfers work, more delineation has been required. First
of all, there is a public law overlay on prior appropriation rights,
ranging from the common law public trust doctrine to public law
regulation. In between are water organizations like mutuals that
have facilitated transfers in many areas.70 These mutuals can be

64. Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water
Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD
65. Smith, supra
66. Ronald N. Johnson et al., The Definition of a Surface Water Right and Transferability,
24 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1981).
67. Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG
68. Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1529, 1539 (1989).
69. George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 1, 21 (1988); see also Johnson et al., supra
70. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993).
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for functions to be specialized.71 Entity property often separates out
various management functions, which has occurred in water mutuals.
Transfers within the mutual are much smoother than between strangers. Water districts mix entity property and public functions. As
with riparianism but more so, there has been a shift to entity property and even public regulation.
One might think that the common law is ill-suited for water. This
is an empirical question that should be kept open in light of the
ability of the common law to evolve as a complex adaptive system.
The shift to prior appropriation and hybrid systems in the western
United States is but one example. The tightly interlocking rights
may present some limit on the common law to adjust. Extended
forms of property in mutuals may help, but large-scale water transfers may require legislation to overcome the inertia of tightly interlocking rights and the lack of separation from the context of current
patterns of use.
CONCLUSION
The question of the common law and the environment is itself
complex. Legal realists were more correct than they knew when
law. And ecologists rightly emphasize complexity in the sense of
complex adaptive systems. But they are too quick to assume that the
common law is not up to the task. Partly, it is the conventional impoverished view of the law with its suspicion of system in the law
itself that forecloses a range of options that should be left on the table.
Empirically oriented comparative institutional analysis informed by
will enable us to decide how well and how far the relatively simple
local structures of the common law scale up and produce desirable
emergent properties at the level of systems like society and the planet
as a whole. In other words, we need to reckon with the ecology of the
common law.

71. Smith, supra note 50, at 208.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER ENERGY TAKINGS: A TALE OF
PIPELINES AND EMINENT DOMAIN

JAMES W. ELY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Pipelines are certainly in the news. The prolonged dispute, and
accompanying litigation, over the proposed Keystone XL oil pipeline
from Canada is only the most visible tip of the iceberg. In New York
in May of 2019 Governor Andrew Cuomo rejected a project for a
natural gas pipeline linking New York City with shale gas fields in
Pennsylvania. Nor is the controversy confined to the United States,
as both Canada and Mexico have experienced sharp conflicts over
pipeline construction.1
It seems apparent that much of the opposition to pipelines is
grounded on broad environmental arguments and not the niceties
of eminent domain law.2 The fundamental goal of opponents is to curtail reliance on fossil fuels by hampering the transportation of oil and
natural gas to markets.3 Even the replacement of existing pipelines
prone to corrosion has aroused political opposition. I recognize that
* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History, Emeritus,
Vanderbilt University. This Article is an expanded version of remarks presented at the
Sixteenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at the William & Mary Law
School on October 4, 2019. I want to thank Jon W. Bruce, Christopher Serkin, Ilya Somin, and
J.B. Ruhl for helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article. I also wish to acknowledge the outstanding research assistance of Katie Kanschke of the Massey Law Library of
Vanderbilt University.
1. Robert Whelan, Legal Fight Stalls Mexican Gas Pipeline, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2019,
at A16; Paul Vieira, Canada to Proceed with Controversial Pipeline Expansion, WALL ST. J.,
June 19, 2019, at A9; Paul Viera, Canadian Rail Blockages Snarl Supply Chains, WALL. ST.
J., Feb. 21, 2020 (protestors seeking to prevent construction of natural gas pipeline in British
Columbia temporarily blocked railroad lines). For an analysis of the exercise of eminent
domain in various nations, see EMINENT DOMAIN: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Iljoong Kim,
Hojun Le & Ilya Somin eds., 2017).
2. Puntenney v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 928 N.W.2d 829, 851 (Iowa 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
s and warranted concern about climate change
3. Alexandra B. Klass, Eminent Domain Law as Climate Policy, 2020 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Klass, Eminent Domain Law as Climate Policy
environmental groups have focused time, money, and effort on these challenges is that addressing climate change requires preventing the construction of the new fossil fuel infrastructure
warming energy resources
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challenges to the exercise of eminent domain for the purposes of pipeline acquisition is only one front in the battle against fossil fuel
energy. Although the issues posed by pipeline construction are multifaceted,4 I will confine my remarks to the question of whether energy
takings by non-governmental entities
ment in state condemnation statutes or as a constitutional norm.
I. TAKINGS BY PRIVATE PARTIES
In assessing the acquisition of land by pipeline companies, it is important to bear in mind that the taking of property by private parties
is hardly novel. Indeed, lawmakers delegated the power of eminent
domain to private parties in the colonial era.5 The most conspicuous
example of this was the widespread adoption of mill acts. During the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the harnessing of waterpower was a crucial source of energy. Under the mill acts the proprietor of a grist mill was authorized, upon payment of compensation,
to erect a dam across a creek and flood a portion of the land of a
neighboring riparian owner to create a mill pond. As treatise writer
John Lewis explained in 1888:
Prior to the Revolution, and, consequently, long before the courts
of this country were called upon to adjudicate upon the question
of public use, it had been the practice to permit the erection of
dams for water power and to provide for a statutory adjustment
of the damages to property overflowed. After the Revolution and
the adoption of State constitutions containing the eminent domain provision in question, this practice continued, no question
being made for some time as to the constitutionality of such
proceedings.6

This time-honored practice went unchallenged for decades, and
courts were later disinclined to question it. Moreover, the charges of
4. See, for example, U.S. Forest Service v.
3146692 (S. Ct. 2020) (Thomas, J.) (upholding grant of special use permit by the Forest Service
for an easement to construct natural gas pipeline passing under the Appalachian Trail).
5. James W. Ely, Jr.,
the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
6. JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 245
(1888).
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grist mills were regulated and the mills were obligated to serve all
customers.7 Thus, grist mills functioned as a kind of early public
utility.8 With these considerations in mind, Lewis had no difficulty in
cotton gins and other mills, which are regulated by law and obliged
9

Yet eminent domain is among the most intrusive powers of government because it compels owners to relinquish their property. Following the Revolution, therefore, constitutional provisions expressly
limited the exercise of eminent domain in two respects. The Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1791, provided in part:
10

State constitutions generally adopted similar provisions.
In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the Supreme Court determined that the
Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, restricted the federal
government but did not apply to the states.11 The upshot was that
state courts took the lead in estab
restriction on eminent domain under state constitutions.
Against this background, courts experienced difficulty in dealing
with mills that generated waterpower for manufacturing. Some
upheld the acquisition of private property to generate power for
manufacturing purposes, although the judicial reasoning varied and
gave weight to long-established usage.12 Others insisted that such
7. HENRY W. FARNHAM, CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED
STATES TO
(affirming the exercise of eminent domain
to acquire land for a grist mill, and observing:
required, and to which it is appropriated. The grist-mill is a public mill. The miller is a public
v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 266 (1828) (Green,
d as public establishments, subject to public
controls in various ways; and the building of them has been encouraged by condemning the
property of others, for the use of one wishing to build, and allowing him to overflow the lands
see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 172 (1985).
9. LEWIS, supra note 6, at 253.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. LEWIS, supra
ng judicial decisions considering constitutionality of mill acts in connection with generating waterpower for manufacturing purposes). In
Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., 113 U.S.
statute authorizing the acquisition of mills to encourage manufacturing but evaded address-
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takings did not constitute public use within the meaning of the state
constitution.13
Any controversy over mills, however, was soon dwarfed by the onset
of the transportation revolution.14 The widespread desire to improve
transportation facilities in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries triggered frequent delegation of eminent domain power to
novel development of nineteenthegation of the power of eminent domain to private corporations,
generally in the field of communications or water power develop15
As early as the 1780s, states created corporations to construct canals and improve river navigation, granting such corporations
the authority to take private property.16 Frequently these corporations were empowered to acquire both land and needed building
materials, upon payment of compensation. Viewing canals as water
highways, courts readily upheld the exercise of eminent domain by
private canal companies.17 Similarly, courts raised no objection to
grants of eminent domain power to private turnpike companies.18
Yet it was the delegation of eminent domain power to railroads that
forced courts to give systematic a
government-sponsored projects carried out by private enterprise. Originally granted in individual railroad charters, the power of eminent domain to acquire land for the
construction of rail lines was commonly conferred on all carriers by
general railroad laws.19 As with canals, this authority was sometimes
13. E.g.
14. See GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION
See also DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA
the transportation revolution on
American society).
15. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES 63 (1956).
16. Ely, supra
17. See, e.g., Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer,
exercise of eminent domain by canal company); In re
(sustaining use of eminent domain to erect a dam and create a reservoir to feed canal); see also
LEWIS, supra
18. Whiteman v. Wilmington & Susquehanna R.R. Co., 2 Del. (1. Harr.) 514, 522 (1839)
(declaring that roads constructed by private turnpike companies were public roads even if
tolls were charged).
19. JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW
of eminent domain power to railroad companies).
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extended to encompass the acquisition of timber, stone, or gravel from
adjacent lands.20 This set the stage for a potential collision between
Both federal and state courts regularly sustained laws empowering
railroads to take private property and in so doing determined that

21

They reasoned that railroad companies were carrying out a public
use by improving transportation. They also stressed that railroads,
as common carriers, had public responsibilities and a legal duty to
serve all comers. Moreover, railroads had to construct their lines on
feasible routes and could not readily detour around a parcel whose
owner declined to sell. Hurst explained that the power of eminent
right of way without hindrance or blackmail by individual property
22
Courts therefore expressed concern that a single recalcitrant landowner could block desired public improvements.23 Some
20. See, e.g., An Act to Incorporate the Florida, Atlantic, and Gulf Central Rail Road Comgravel, clay, sand, earth, wood, or other
21. See, e.g., Whiteman
ercise the power of eminent domain in behalf
of railroads has always been upheld by the courts on the grounds that the use was a public
one. Indeed this is elementary
Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co. v. Davis, 19 N.
Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co.,
22. HURST, supra note 15, at 9.
23. People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 482 (1870)
nity against the selfishness of individuals in a similar way. . . . A railroad cannot go around
the farm of every unwilling person, and the business of transporting persons and property for
long distances by rail, which has been found so essential to the general enjoyment and welfare
could never have existed if it were in the power of any unwilling person to stop the road at his
see also Strickley
v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (Holmes, J.) (sustaining exercise
of the legislature and the Supreme Court of Utah the public welfare of that State demands
that aerial lines between the mines upon its mountain sides and the railroads in the valleys
below should not be made impossible by the refusal of a private owner to sell the right to cross
Newcomb v. Smith, 2 Pin. 131, 140 (Wis. 1849) (upholding validity of mill act for generating
is sometimes exhibited in the pernicious obstinacy of one man, who pursues his common-law
right of resisting the occupation of his land, perhaps of some small and insignificant but
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state legislatures facilitated this use of eminent domain by passing
laws declaring that property taken by railroads was deemed to be
for public use.24 Further, courts occasionally muddied their analysis
25

Railroads continue to the present to
exercise the power of eminent domain.26
By the mid-nineteenth century, courts regarded the delegation of
eminent domain power to corporations to be a settled matter. In 1854,
when it is proper to discuss or question, judicially, the power of the
legislature to exercise the right of eminent domain resting in the sov27
Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals in 1868 sweepingly concluded:
It is far too late in the history of legislation and of adjudication, in
this country and in this State, to claim that private property may
not be taken for what are in common parlance called public improvements, such as railroads and canals, with their incidental
and reasonable conveniences and appurtenances, notwithstanding the work is done by individuals or a corporation, who are to
derive a pecuniary benefit therefrom, if the legislature deem it
for the public interest.28

These actions by lawmakers and judges clearly established a
ownership. It was irrelevant that
24. E.g., An Act to Provide for the Incorporation of Railroad Companies, 1855 Mich. Pub.
Acts 153; An Act to Authorize the Formation of Railroad Corporations, 1850 N.Y. Laws 211;
see also Buffalo & N.Y.C. R.R. v. Brainard, 9 N.
doubt lawfully declare that all lands taken for the construction of their roads shall be deemed
25. E.g., Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady
y way prompted by the taking of private property, it must rest in the wisdom of the Legislature to determine whether the benefit to the
public will be of sufficient importance to render it expedient for them to exercise the right of
see also ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW
LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN
26. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Grohne, 2019 IL 180063 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (upholding exercise
of eminent domain by railroad to acquire land for an intermodal facility and additional track),
perm. app. denied, 135 N.E.3d 577 (Ill. 2019).
27. Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603, 610 (1854).
28. In re Townsend, 39 N.Y. 171, 173 (1868).
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orate body that charged for its
constitutional inhibition which restrains our legislature from exercising the right of eminent domain, and condemning land to the public
use, and employing, as an instrument to carry the appropriation to
the public use into effect, an individual or a copartnership of indi29

courts took the position that the legislature had wide discretion to
decide what instrumentalities should be employed to effectuate such
use and could select either state agencies or private corporations to
take private property.30
Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that throughout the nineteenth century eminent domain was more frequently employed by
private enterprise than by government at all levels. Not until 1875
did the Supreme Court establish that the federal government had
eminent domain power as an inherent aspect of sovereignty. 31 State
governments were hobbled by tight budgets and the inability to
32

This picture
changed in the twentieth century as government undertook a broad
range of activities. Eminent domain was increasingly used by government itself for more complex projects. For example, there was a
sharp increase in urban renewal programs to eliminate blighted conditions, schemes that necessitated the acquisition of large amounts
of land.33
29. Id. at 175.
es, however, have
found it more convenient to devolve upon private individuals and corporate bodies the exercise
31. In Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876), the Supreme Court sustained the exercise of eminent domain to acquire land for a post office, noted that such power had not been
previously utilized by the federal government, and observed that historically the states had
condemned land for use by the federal government. See William Baude, Rethinking the
Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738 (2013) (maintaining that the federal government
was not originally understood to have any general eminent domain power and that historically
the federal government relied on the states to condemn needed land).
32. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 124 (3d ed. 2005).
33. Wendell E. Pritchett,
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL Y REV.
domain was not new to post-war America, but the urban renewal scheme was nonetheless
See generally Steven J. Eagle, Does Blight Really Justify
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To be sure, there were skeptical voices questioning whether private
railroad companies were in fact e
among them was Thomas M. Cooley, a leading jurist and treatise
private property, and rejected any notion that a legislative determi34
Accordingly,
Cooley, on the Michigan Supreme Court, struck down the exercise
of eminent domain by a private party to erect a mill for the purpose
of generating waterpower for manufacturing.35 He grappled at length
with the delegation of eminent domain to railroads, asserting that the
nient fiction, which treats a corporation managing its own property for
36
its own profit, as merely a p
But
Cooley also acknowledged that railroads might be a special situation, given public supervision and common carrier duties.
This record of utilizing eminent domain to promote transportation
and commerce readily dovetailed with the nineteenth-century emphasis on the productive potentia
James Willard Hurst perceptively
37
Protection of a passive rentier
class was never the primary goal. Instead, as Hurst famously reproperty, property in motion or
at risk rather than property secure and at rest, engaged our princi38
In this light eminent domain was seen as a vehicle
to bring about economic growth.
II. EARLY HISTORY OF ENERGY TAKINGS
Like other transportation companies, pipeline operators generally
sought to secure easements in a corridor rather than fee simple title.
It bears emphasis that pipeline companies are often able to obtain
needed easements through voluntary transactions with landowners.39
Condemnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833 (2007) (questioning whether the elimination of blight con34. James W. Ely, Jr.,
Jurisprudence, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV
36.
37.
38.
39.

People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 480 (1870).
HURST, supra note 15, at 24.
Id.
Puntenney v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 928 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.
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Nonetheless, the potential to invoke eminent domain would certainly be a background factor in such negotiations.
Building upon the experience with highways, canals, and railroads,
the use of eminent domain for energy purposes has a long history.
States started chartering pipeline companies to transport oil during
the 1860s, and despite railroad opposition, soon conferred eminent
domain power upon such enterprises.40 Courts compared oil pipelines to other modes of transportation and sustained such grants of
eminent domain.41
tubing for the conveyance of petro
42
By the early twentieth century several states had enacted laws placing common carrier
obligations on oil pipelines.43 Following suit, Congress in the Hepburn
Act of 1906 declared interstate oil pipelines to be common carriers
and placed such enterprises under the supervision of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.44 During World War II, Congress granted
federal eminent domain authority for oil pipelines if deemed necessary for national defense. When this measure expired, pipelines
companies again needed to rely of a patchwork of state laws in order
to exercise eminent domain power. States have different permitting
requirements and different rules governing the exercise of eminent
domain. Moreover, a pipeline company must secure permits from
each state through which the line passes.45
The history of natural gas pipelines has followed a somewhat different path. Natural gas operators, unlike oil producers who can ship
by rail or water, are heavily dependent upon pipelines to transport
worthy that most property owners along the route chose to
make voluntary easement agreements with Dakota Access to allow the pipeline to go under40. ARTHUR MENZIES JOHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PETROLEUM PIPELINES:
A STUDY IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLICY,
1956) (discussing
enactment of an 1883 Pennsylvania law granting statewide eminent domain authority to oil
pipeline companies); PAUL H. GIDDENS, THE BIRTH OF THE OIL INDUSTRY
Alexandra B. Klass & Daniel Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure
Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV
41. W. Va. Transp. Co. v. Volcanic Oil & Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382 (1872).
42. LEWIS, supra
43. E.g., 1905 Kan. Sess. Laws 526, at § 1; N.Y. Laws 1136, at § 50; 1872 Ohio Laws 194;
1890 1891 W. Va. Acts 337.
44. JOHNSON, supra
45. James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building the Energy Transport, 80 OHIO
ST.
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their product. Since the 1870s some states empowered such pipeline
companies to acquire property by eminent domain. In 1886, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remark
set up against [the act conferring eminent domain power on natural
gas companies], in light of the present consumption of natural gas,
46

of it is necessary to its use, the means so used for its transportation
must be of prime importance to the public and directly affect its wel47
Congress did not regulate natural gas pipelines in the Hepburn
Act nor impose common carrier status on them. In the Natural Gas
porting and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the
public is affected with a public in
thereof in interstate commerce and foreign commerce is necessary
48
When some states, influenced by energy
rivals such as the coal and railroad industries, blocked the expansion
of natural gas pipelines following World War II, Congress amended
the Natural Gas Act in 1947 to establish federal eminent domain
authority for interstate natural ga
of public convenience and necessi
mission.49 A natural gas pipeline company must obtain this certificate
before it can build a new pipeline. The result was an unusual division
of eminent domain authority with respect to pipelines. In contrast
to oil pipelines, the taking of property by natural gas pipelines is
50

For decades after World War II, the acquisition of land for pipelines was not particularly controversial and few doubted that pipeexample, federal courts regularly
sustained the award of natural gas pipeline easements pursuant to

47. Id.
48. An Act to Regulate the Transportation and Sale of Natural Gas in Interstate Commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1938).
49. An Act to Amend the Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. 80-245, 61 Stat. 459 (1947) (codified
as amended 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2019). In 1977 the FPC was renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, with authority to supervise interstate natural gas pipelines. See generally
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended
50. Klass & Meinhardt, supra
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the Natural Gas Act.51 This picture changed, however, in recent years,
in part a result of new technologies such as hydraulic fracturing. As
oil and gas production soared, so did a need for expansion of the pipeline infrastructure. This in turn triggered mounting environmental
concerns, and landowner opposition, driven in part by pipeline spills.
Consequently, matters once settled were reopened. Among other
objections to pipelines, critics maintained that takings for pipelines
ing these challenges, it is useful to review the diminished place of
III. EROSION OF

UBLIC USE

NORM

Although there was some variation among jurisdictions in the
nineteenth century, most state courts adhered to the view that eminent domain was limited to acquisitions by the government or private
entities under a legal obligation to serve the public.52 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine articulated the prevailing view:
Strictly speaking, private property can only be said to have been
taken for public uses when it has been so appropriated that the
public have certain and well defined rights to that use secured, as
the right to use the public highway, the turnpike, the public ferry,
the railroad and the like. But when it is so appropriated that the
public have no rights to its use secured, it is difficult to perceive
how such appropriation can be denominated a public use. 53

Starting in the late nineteenth century, however, both state and
federal courts began to adopt a broader reading of the power to take
private property. The evolving natur
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1899:
51. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND
§ 6:6 at 448 (rev. ed. Spring 2020); see also Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land
in Lake County, 947 F.3d 1362, 1364 (11th Cir. 2020)
natural gas companies to acquire through eminent domain private property on which to con52. SOMIN, supra
State Constitutional Law and the Protection of Economic Rights Before the Civil War, 9 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY
53. Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317, 324 (1855).
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The uses which should be deemed public in reference to the right
of the legislature to compel an individual to part with his property for a compensation, and to authorize or direct taxation to pay
for it, are being enlarged and extended with the progress of the
people in education and refinement.54

As judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain became increasdeclined.55
The Progressive movement of the early twentieth century laid the
intellectual groundwork for a jurisprudence that substantially
stripped property of constitutional protection.56 The political triumph
of the New Deal in the 1930s brought this trend to fruition, inaugurating a profound shift in the constitutional protection afforded private property. New Deal constitutionalism distinguished between the
rights of property owners and other personal liberties. Henceforth
private property received a greatly reduced level of constitutional protection. Since the new constitutional orthodoxy strengthened governmental authority over private
clause was just one manifestation of the larger jurisprudential change.
57

As if to underscore that point, in a line of subsequent decisions
Fifth Amendment. At issue in Berman v. Parker (1954) was the taking
of a non-blighted property within an urban redevelopment area for
transfer to a private agency as part of an urban renewal plan.58 Writing for the Court, Justice William O. Douglas sustained the project
ss. 1899) (upholding statute limiting height
of building around public park upon payment of compensation to affected landowners).
55. Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV.
56. James W. Ely, Jr., The Progressive Era Assault on Individualism and Property Rights,
29 SOC. PHIL. & POL Y 255 (2012).
57. Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
YALE L.J. 599 (1949); see also Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of
Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV
cline of the strict view of
use is still in the Constitution, but as it relates to underlying purpose rather than intended
land use, it is not a part of the law of eminent domain, and will become of minor importance
58. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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and likened the eminent domain power to the police power. With
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
59

merely because the power of eminent domain is involved. The role
of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exer60

The judicial endorsement of increasingly aggressive exercises of
eminent domain was affirmed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984), for example,
the Justices sustained a land redistribution scheme that entailed the
transfer of fee simple title from certain landlords to tenants in order
to overcome a perceived problem of land oligopoly in Hawaii.61 Highly
us bench, declared that the
62

Almost any taking of property
would satisfy such an open-ended standard.
This trend culminated in the controversial decision of Kelo v. City
of New London (2005).63 In Kelo, the Court considered a redevelopment plan designed to revitalize economically distressed areas in
New London, Connecticut. Some residential owners challenged the
taking of their property pursuant to this plan as a violation of the
tention, a 5 to 4 majority of the Court upheld the exercise of eminent
domain to acquire land for transfer to private developers for the goal
Stressing deference to legislative judgments regarding the resort to
dence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in
favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what
64
The
59. Id. at 32.
60. Id.; see Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV.
Berman as an expression of Progressive ideology that
sought to downplay claims of individual property rights).
61. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
62. Id. at 241.
63. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
64. Id. at 483.
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Court majority made plain, however, that the ruling did not prevent
65

four dissenters, maintained that
and as a practical matter placed no limitation on eminent domain.
She denied that incidental public benefits potentially arising from
ment.66 In a separate dissenting opinion Justice Clarence Thomas
vailed in the nineteenth century. He maintained that the government
or the public has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to
67
taking it for any public purp
Kelo did not squarely address takings for energy projects. Yet the
public outcry over the decision influenced the debate over the exercise
of eminent domain by pipelines in two respects. First, it triggered the
enactment of legislation or the amendment of state constitutions to
bar or limit the resort to eminent domain for economic development
purposes. These measures do not target pipeline takings and the
efficacy of such restrictions appears to vary widely between states.
Nonetheless, they do provide another avenue to challenge pipeline
acquisitions. Second, and ultimately perhaps most important, the
controversy over Kelo produced heightened public awareness of eminent domain and property rights. Parties became more willing to
68

Absent a fundamental rethinking of this question by the Supreme
Court, there is little prospect for any meaningful judicial review of the
federal courts have seen Kelo as virtually barring any room for a

65. Id. at 489.
66. Id.
James W. Ely, Jr.,

Kelo, see
, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J.

67. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508.
68. See generally James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half
Empty?, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127 (2009).
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are invalidated in federal court.69 The picture is somewhat more
promising for property owners at the state level. Some state courts
have been more receptive to challenges to eminent domain grounded
number of state courts have struck down the taking of property for
economic development purposes by private parties.70 Moreover, several state courts have specifically rejected Kelo as a guide to interpreting state constitutional limits on eminent domain.71 On the other
hand, many state courts have adhered to the highly deferential approach of the Supreme Court and broadly sustained the taking of
private property.72
IV. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO ENERGY TAKINGS
A. Statutes Authorizing Eminent Domain
Some states impose only minimal oversight of oil pipeline construction. Many states require approval by an administrative agency
before an oil pipeline company can exercise eminent domain authority.
Pipeline opponents have increasingly challenged the approval of
proposed projects on statutory grounds.
Litigants have enjoyed some success in questioning whether state
laws governing the delegation of eminent domain power encomissues, but in a statutory rather than a constitutional context. Two
state court opinions illustrate this point. A divided Supreme Court
of Colorado, invoking the doctrine that statutes conferring eminent
69. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the acquisition of propto determine, in all but the most extreme cases, whether a taking fulfills the public-use
cert. denied, 554 U.S. 930 (2008).
70. E.g.
City Envtl., LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002); Cty. of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 1115 (Mich. 2006).
71. Puntenney v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 928 N.W.2d 829, 848 (Iowa 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.
a more sound interpretation of the public use re
Norwood v. Hornet, 853 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio
2006); Bd. of Cty. Commissioners v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639 (Okla. 2006).
72. Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v.
deference to legislative determin
In re Goldstein, 921
N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 2009).
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domain authority upon private entities must be strictly construed,
determined that the state legislation did not include petroleum pipelines.73 In what appears to be an exceptionally crabbed reading of
the eminent domain statute, the court majority found that the statute
only authorized eminent domain for the construction of pipelines
involved in delivering electric power. The three dissenting judges
the statutory grant to oil pipelines.
language of the statute and its legislative and political history compel
the conclusion that the statute does grant oil pipeline companies
74
In sync with earlier judicial comments
concerning the unique importance of eminent domain to transportalinear projects that necessarily involve condemnation when the
threshold attempt to negotiate agreements with intervening landowners is unavailing. Odd angle turns to avoid non-consenting
landowners can make conveyance of the raw material or product im75

Similarly, in Bluegrass Pipeline Company v. Kentuckians United to
Restrain Eminent Domain, Inc. (2015), a Kentucky appellate court
narrowly construed a state statute and held that, on the facts presented, a pipeline company did not have the right to rely on eminent
domain.76 The company proposed to construct a pipeline to transport
natural gas liquids, a mixture of pentane, propane, butane, and ethane, from other states to the Gulf of Mexico.77 The court raised two
objections. First, it ruled that, unlike oil or gas pipelines regulated
by the Public Service Commission, the statute conferring eminent
domain authority did not extend to transportation of natural gas
liquids which were not so regulated. Second, it stressed that the liquid
natural gas was only being transported through Kentucky and the
73. Larson v. Sinclair Transp. Co., 284 P.3d 42 (Colo. 2012).
74. Id. at 57.
75. Id. Colorado appears to be the only state in which oil pipeline companies do not have
eminent domain power.
76. Bluegrass Pipeline Co. v. Kentuckians United to Restrain Eminent Domain, Inc., 478
S.W.3d 386 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied (Feb. 10, 2016).
77. Pipelines carrying natural gas liquids are treated as oil pipelines, and therefore are
subject to state regulations and eminent domain laws rather than federal authority under the
Natural Gas Act. James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104
MINN. L. REV. 659, 681 n.119 (2019).
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proposed pipeline had no on- or off-ramps in the state. Thus, it concluded that the product was not benefiting Kentucky consumers and
78
This problematic reasoning ignored the
highly interconnected nature of the national energy market and the
fact that Kentucky benefited from energy products shipped from
elsewhere reaching Kentucky consumers.
To this point the Colorado decision, based on state law, does not
appear to have attracted any support in other jurisdictions. A West
Virginia ruling, discussed below, has cited Bluegrass Pipeline as infor the people of the state authorizing eminent domain.79
Yet not all states have moved to confine energy takings on statutory grounds. For example, a number of courts have declined to follow
Bluegrass Pipeline. Indeed, both federal and state courts have found
that proposed pipeline construction satisfies state statutory requirements to exercise the power of eminent domain. A federal district
court in Kentucky distinguished Bluegrass Pipeline and validated a
property taking in connection with a natural gas pipeline. It pointed
out that the pipeline was regulated by the Public Service Commission and served customers in Kentucky. The court also stressed that
a Kentucky law declared that the transportation of natural gas
80

Likewise, an Ohio appellate court emphatically rejected objections
to an interstate pipeline taking based on the scope of the statutory
authorization for common carriers to appropriate land.81 First, the
court ruled that propane and butane constituted petroleum for the
purpose of the eminent domain statute. Second, the court readily
found that the pipeline company was a common carrier organized to
transport petroleum products. Third, the court determined that the
proposed pipeline satisfied the statutory requirement that the appro82
Focusing primarily on
78. Bluegrass Pipeline
Bluegrass Pipeline, see
Kristin J. Hazelwood, Pipelines, Electric Lines, and Little Pink Houses: Do Any Limits on
Law?, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV
79. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. McCurdy, 793 S.E.2d 850, 862 (W. Va. 2016).
80. K. Petroleum, Inc. v. Prop. Tax Map No. 7 Parcel 12, 2016 WL 937329 (E.D. Ky. 2016);
see also Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Avery, 92 Va. Cir. 387 (Cir. Ct. Va. Nelson County 2016)
(finding Bluegrass Pipeline inapplicable as based on Kentucky law).
81. Sunoco Pipeline L.P. v. Teter, 63 N.E.3d 160 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016), appeal dismissed,
81 N.E.3d 1267 (2017).
ted § 163.021(A) (West
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market. The court reasoned that some products containing Ohio
propane and butane would return to be consumed in the state. It
sweepingly added that:
[C]ommon carriers, as defined by statute, provide our citizens with
necessities such as electricity and water. The products, propane
and butane, are being transported to heat homes and as an additive to gasoline. Propane and butane are also used in the production of many products our society uses every day. Thus, the
transportation of propane and butane provides more than economic benefit to Ohio, it provides some of the necessities of life.83

Fourth, the court found no merit in the contention that the statutory
authority to appropriate land was confined to intrastate projects.
Lastly, the court distinguished Bluegrass Pipeline on grounds that
the pipeline in this case served as a means to deliver Ohio resources
to market.84
Similarly, at issue in Enbridge Energy (Illinois) L.L.C. v. Kuerth
(2018) was a grant by the Illinois Commerce Commission of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the acquisition of property
by an oil pipeline operator.85 This action by the Commission raised
a rebuttable presumption of public use and necessity.86 Landowners
sought to rebut this presumption. The opinion turned upon construction of the Illinois eminent domain statute. The court tellingly
to modern American life and must be transported from production
facilities to refineries and ultimately to consumers. Pipelines are
necessary for this transportation and are often safer and more
agency shall appropriate real property except as necessary and for a public use. In any appropriation, the taking agency shall show by a preponderance of the evidence that the taking
83. Sunoco Pipeline, 63 N.E.3d at 174.
84. Id. at 175.
85. Enbridge Energy (Ill.) L.L.C. v. Kuerth, 2018 IL App (4th) 150519, 99 N.E.3d 210 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2018).
86. The Illinois eminent domain law provides in part that the Illinois Commerce Comtion that such acquisition of that property (or right or interest in property) is (i) primarily for the
benefit, use, or enjoyment of the public an
LL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 30/5-5-5 (c) (West 2019).
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87

legislature has determined that pipelines are in the public interest
and that it is efficient for private companies, rather than government,
88
The court concluded
that the landowners failed to introduce evidence to rebut the presumption of public use and necessity.
B. New Laws
In response to the growing controversy over oil pipelines, some
states have recently enacted new laws governing siting approval and
the exercise of eminent domain. In 2011, Nebraska, in the wake of the
Keystone XL pipeline proposal, enacted the Major Oil Pipeline Siting
Act.89
90
It further required
any major oil pipeline to secure routing approval from the Public
Service Commission or the governor before exercising eminent domain
power. The Public Service Commission granted the Keystone XL
of the proposed route and eminent domain authority. It found that the proposal was in the public
interest. In 2019, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, stressing defer91

Lawmakers in other states have also taken steps to restrain the
exercise of eminent domain by oil pipeline companies by enacting
temporary moratoria and new procedural hurdles. In 2016, the South
Carolina legislature declared that the power of eminent domain
92
In 2018
93
this measure was extended until November of 2020. The Georgia
legislature mandated in 2017 that no new oil pipeline construction
could occur until a state-issued permit was obtained. In addition, it
87. Enbridge Energy, 99 N.E.3d at 218.
88. Id. at 220. See also Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Behm, 927 N.W.2.d 865 (N.D. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 521 (Mem) (2019) (holding that acquisition of pipeline for natural gas
by utility to service railroad switch was for
89. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 57-1401 to 57-1413 (Supp. 2018).
90. Id. § 57-1101.
91. TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP v. Dunavan (In re Application No. OP-0003), 932
N.W.2d 653 (Neb. 2019).
92. Act of June 3, 2016, No. 205, 2016 S.C. Acts 1494.
93. Act of Apr. 17, 2018, No. 165, 2018 S.C. Acts 1407.

192

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:173

provided that an oil pipeline company could not use eminent domain
94

This
law does not bar resort to eminent domain but establishes an administrative review process not unlike that in other states. The extent
to which these measures limit the exercise of eminent domain remains unresolved as of this writing.

In addition to legislative limits on eminent domain, its exercise may
be checked by constitutional restraints. As noted above, both state and
federal constitutions mandate that private property must be taken for

been diluted and takings are rarely invalidated on that basis.
Particularly instructive in this regard is a recent decision by the
Supreme Court of Iowa in Puntenney v. Iowa Utilities Board (2019).95
At issue was a challenge to the use of eminent domain to condemn
easements for the Dakota Access oil pipeline. The court first sustained
determinations by the Iowa Utilities Board that the pipeline would
96

Significantly, the court rejected the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in the controversial Kelo case, and adopted the dissenting opinion of
Kelo majority under
the Iowa Constitution, we find that trickle-down benefits of economic
97
Nonetheless, even under a heightened standard of review, the Iowa court
cheaper and safer transportation of
94. Act of May 9, 2017, No. 263, 2017 Ga. Laws 744.
95. Puntenney v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 928 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
1243 (Mem) (2020).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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all consumers of petroleum products.98 It was unimpressed with the
oil within the state, noting that Iowa agriculture depended upon
petroleum products from other states.99
not believe a common carrier of a raw material that is essential to
processed in Iowa is prohibited
from exercising eminent domain when so authorized by the general
100

As suggested in Puntenney, opponents have turned in recent
ing that the residents of the state authorizing eminent domain must
substantially benefit from any taking. They contend that advantages to residents of other states, standing alone, does not constitute
what extent must the residents of the authorizing state gain from
the exercise of eminent domain? To what extent should courts conpower of eminent domain should be limited to takings that provide
101
this position is unworkable and
would frustrate national energy policy. It ignores the interconnectedness of the national energy infrastructure. It would require a
judicial determination of whether in-state benefits were small or substantial, not an obvious task for courts. As Alexandra B. Klass and
Jim Rossi have cogently explained:
interferes with federal policies regarding interstate lines; it also
allows existing monopolies, such as incumbent state utilities to
extract monopoly rents because, in effect, the law limits the ability
of competing transmission operators (which are often not based
in that state) to obtain reciprocal access to eminent domain.102
98. Id. at 849.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 851. One judge dissented, arguing that the pipeline was not a common carrier
Id. at 854.
101. Coleman, supra note 45, at 714.
102. Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for
Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 188 (2015).
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This question of in-state benefits has been vigorously pressed in
connection with suits against the construction of interstate pipelines. It has figured prominently in attacks against preliminary survey
laws. Virtually every state empowers parties holding eminent domain authority to enter land withou
to conduct a preliminary survey of locations for proposed lines prior
to instituting eminent domain proceedings.103 Such pre-condemnation measures have been in existence for more than 100 years, and
their constitutionality was endorsed by Thomas Cooley in 1868.104
They were widely employed by railroads during the nineteenth century. Lately, however, they have been challenged on a variety of
This contention has occasionally found judicial endorsement. At
issue in Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. McCurdy (2016) was an
action by a landowner against a pipeline company to bar entry upon
his property to conduct a survey.105 The proposed pipeline was to
transport natural gas produced in West Virginia to markets outside
the state. It appeared that the pipeline would not provide service to
any customers in West Virginia. The Supreme Court of West Virginia
ruled that a company may enter and preliminarily survey private
land only when it has the power of eminent domain, and the purBluegrass Pipeline, the court concluded that the proposed pipeline would
not serve any West Virginia customers and therefore was not in
106
It gave remarkably little weight to the fact that the gas
would be produced in the state, giving direct benefit to numerous
landowners and well workers. In addition, it gave no attention to
the interconnected nature of the national energy market.
Chief Justice Ketchum, in a forceful dissent, stressed the economic advantages of the pipeline. He observed:
103. For a comprehensive list of state statutes authorizing pre-condemnation surveys, see
Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 418 n.2 (Va. 2017).
104. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 560 (1868)
to be entered upon and temporarily occupied for the purpose of a survey and other incipient
proceedings, with a view to judging and determining whether the public needs require the appropriation or not, and, if so, what the proper location shall be; and the party acting under
this statutory would neither be bound to make compensation for the temporary possession,
105. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. McCurdy, 793 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 2016).
106. Id.
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The gas pipeline will transport two billion cubic feet of West
Virginia natural gas a day to market. Not only will many, many
landowners benefit, the gas pipeline will also benefit West Virit will allow the State to collect large amounts of severance tax
on natural gas that is extracted from West Virginia land.107

ubt that the natural gas transportation pipeline will enlarge West Virginia resources, increase indus-

108

Mountain
Valley demonstrate substantial advantage for residents of the state.
In contrast, other courts have rejected challenges to pre-condemnation survey laws. In 2015 a federal district court, pointing to the
congressional language in the Natural Gas Act, concluded that the
Virginia survey statute facilitated the transportation of natural gas
and thereby served a public purpose.109 A year later a Virginia circuit
court likewise held that pre-condemnation surveys authorized by
requirement, as they prevent the
unnecessary expense and pointless condemnation of land that is not
110
It reasoned that the survey was necessary to gather data that would be relevant as part of the Federal
pproval process for an interstate
natural gas pipeline.111
D. Common Carriers Revisited
As we have seen, critics have also charged that some pipelines are
not in fact genuine common carriers and serve only the interests of
their owners.112 This issue was explored in a pair of decisions by the
107. Id. at 863.
108. Id. at 864.
109. Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 693 (W.D. Va. 2015).
110. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Avery, 92 Va. Cir. 387, 394 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2016).
111. Id.; see also Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 2017) (upholding
authority of natural gas pipeline to utilize statutory right-to-survey privilege, and finding that
Constitution do not include right of landowner
to exclude pipeline survey). See generally Barr v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 815 S.E.2d 783 (Va.
2018) (holding that pipeline company satisfied statutory requirements to conduct precondemnation survey).
112. ILYA SOMIN, Preface to the Paperback Edition of THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF
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Texas Supreme Court that highlight the issue of property rights
embedded in pipeline construction disputes. In addition, the court
addressed the necessity of striking a balance between the concerns
of property owners and the energy needs of the public.
At issue in
Texas, LLC (2012) was an application for common carrier designation by a pipeline company seeking to transport carbon dioxide from
out-of-state sources to oil wells in Texas.113 Under Texas law, common carriers of CO2 have the power of eminent domain. The Texas
Railroad Commission granted the company a permit to operate as a
common carrier. A landowner along the proposed route of the pipeline easement challenged the common carrier designation.
question of whether a particular use is a public use is a judicial ques114

Moreover, it declared that the
statute authorizing eminent domain was to be strictly construed in
favor of the landowner. The court articulated a test for determining
whether a CO2
probability must exist that the pipeline will at some point after construction serve the public by transporting gas for one or more customers who will either retain ownership of their gas or sell it to
115
If such designation was challenged,
the court placed the burden on the pipeline company to establish its
bona fide status as a common carrier. In remanding the case, it
recognized the tension between vital but sometimes conflicting inindisputably important given our
116

NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN
many pipelines are public utilities or common carriers that have a legal duty to serve the enmmon carrier requirements
113.
2012).
114.
115.
116.

Tex. Rice Land Partners
Id. at 198.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 204.
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On review of subsequent proceedings in this case, the Texas
e pipeline would serve the public.
It was therefore qualified as a common carrier and satisfied the
ment to exercise eminent domain
power.117 The Court explained that the recently formulated common
rights of Texas landowners with
terest in pipeline development,
while also respecting the constitutional limitations placed on the oil
118
No longer in Texas could a carbon dioxide pipeline exercise eminent domain authority without demonstrating that
its facility would transport for other customers. The decisions may
prove a harbinger of heightened judicial scrutiny of common carrier
designations, but they certainly stopped well short of shutting the
door on the construction of pipelines.119
V. INTO THE FUTURE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES
A. The Wages of Kelo
Mountain Valley highlights a dilemma that opponents of eminent
domain for pipeline takings need to confront. He urged the West
Kelo. It is difficult to perceive that, under this openended and deferential standard, attacks on pipeline takings on

x. Rice Land Partners, 510 S.W.3d 909,
118. Id. at 915. For an assessment of the Texas Rice decisions, see Thomas Alan Zabel, TX
Rice v. Denbury, 48 ST. MARY S
Texas Rice adopted
a new and more searching analysis of whether eminent domain was being exercised for a
public use, as well as a new test for determining the common carrier status of CO2 pipelines).
119. In TC & C Real Estate Holdings, Inc. v. ETC Katy Pipeline, LTD, No. 10-16-00134-CV,
2017 WL 7048923 (Tex. App. Waco 2017),
(May 24, 2019), the Texas Court of
Appeals upheld the acquisition of a pipeline easement to transmit hydrocarbon natural gas
Denbury Green concerned a carbon dioxide
pipeline and was inapplicable to this case, and further pointed out that in any event the pipeline at issue transported natural gas for a fee for all shippers. The court revealingly added:
domain is to be given great weight by the court in reviewing a complaint that a particular use,
Id. at *3.
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rubric of economic development. It therefore follows that in the federal courts and in the many states adhering to such a deferential
doctrine, Kelo presents a formidable obstacle to successful pipelines
takings under the Fifth Amendment. Recall that the condemnation
of easements for natural gas pipelines are heard in federal courts
under the Natural Gas Act. They are unlikely to disregard both the
congressional directive in the Act as well as the relaxed notion of
more rigorous review just for natural gas pipelines.
The limited prospect of success in challenges to natural gas pipelines in federal court may well explain why opponents have sought
to bar pre-condemnation surveys. This strategy can be seen as an
indirect way of blocking the construction of such pipelines under
state law before the proposed condemnation is presented to Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and the federal courts.
With regard to Kelo,
nomic development takings pose a significant threat to environmental
120
One
might therefore think that pipeline opponents would seek to overturn Kelo. That, however, has not been the case.121 On the contrary,
environmentalists appear to treat any judicial decisions upholding
property rights as a threat to environmental goals.

Of course, state courts, interpreting their state constitutions, are
not obligated to follow the deferential federal standard and are free
to fashion a more restrictive under
cussed above, some state courts have rejected Kelo as a guide to
construing state constitutional provisions and have taken a harder
look at whether property was in fact being acquired largely for private advantage. At first glance pipeline opponents would seem likely
to fare better in such jurisdictions. But here as well pipeline critics
120. Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Alder, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development
Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. L. REV. 623, 666 (2006).
121. Perhaps surprisingly, many environmentalists favored economic development takings.
Id.
ve been notably absent among Kelo
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face a difficult path. First, there is the long history of courts finding
pipelines to be common carriers and upholding the exercise of eminent domain to acquire pipeline easements. Second, most courts will
almost certainly conclude that pipelines are an integral part of the naThird, as with railroads and canals in earlier time periods, pipelines
are particularly vulnerable to the holdout problem. Without eminent
domain, a single landowner could block a project of national significance.122 Such a result is simply unacceptable even in a propertyconscious society.
Prominent property-rights scholar Richard A. Epstein, for instance,
safeguard the rights of private owners.123 Yet he aptly pointed out
that:
[T]he classic conception of public use also permitted a restricted
class of takings for private use in order to overcome a serious
holdout problem that could arise if, for example, a newly discovered mine was cut off from the only rail connection by a tract of
scrubland. In essence, state power was allowed when high transition costs of reassigning property rights blocked the sensible
use or assembly of land resources.124

Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Michigan in County of
Wayne v. Hathcock (2004) made a telling distinction between general
economic development schemes, with merely conjectural benefits to
the public, and the particular concerns of private entities in constructing instrumentalities of commerce.125 Overruling prior authority,126
122. Coleman, supra note 45, at 288 (observing that em
for linear infrastructure such as roads, pipelines, and power-lines because, otherwise, each
landowner along the proposed route can, in theory, hold out for a higher price to try to capture
Eminent Domain Law as Climate Policy,
supra
ghways, transmission lines, and pipelines have
a particular need for eminent domain authority because of the difficulty of assembling
see also sources cited supra note 23.
123. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST
FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 358 (2014).
124. Id.
see also Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107
COLUM. L. REV
owner along the path from gaining
de facto monopoly power,
125. Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 648 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
126. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding

200

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:173

the court rejected economic development by private parties as a valid
tion. In contrast, it stressed that
instrumentalities of commerce must proceed in a more or less straight
line and were therefore susceptible to unreasonable holdouts by individual property owners. Affirming its long-standing position, the
court declared:
The likelihood that property owners will engage in this tactic
makes the acquisition of property for railroads, gas lines, highcal and practical nightmare. Accordingly, this Court has held
that the exercise of eminent do
collective action is needed to acquire land for vital instrumental127

I therefore predict that even in jurisdictions such as Michigan where
courts more rigorously scrutinize
the lead of the Supreme Court of Iowa in Puntenney and uphold the
exercise of eminent domain for pipelines. 128
C. Electric Transmission Lines
Although this Article has focused on the exercise of eminent domain
for pipelines, similar complaints have been advanced against electric transmission lines.129
oil pipelines grab the national headlines, power-lines across the
130
Indeed, historically power lines have attracted more popular opposition
use of eminent domain to acquire tract of land for conveyance to private corporation as part
of project for economic development).
127. Hathcock
128. See Klass, Eminent Domain Law as Climate Policy, supra note 3 (maintaining that
most pipeline projects will not be stopped by state court inte
provisions in state eminent domain statutes or constitutions, particularly where the pipeline
at issue provides service to the state or where the state courts recognizes national advantages
of oil and natural gas transportation).
129. See
2017) (finding that acquisition by regulated public utility of easements for electric trans130. Coleman, supra note 45, at 292.
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than pipelines.131 To complicate matters, the existing interstate transmission infrastructure is fragile and overloaded. It is badly in need
of an upgrade.132 Like oil pipelines, the exercise of eminent domain
for transmission lines is largely governed by state law.
Opposition to new electric power lines by environmental advocates is ironic.133 Locations for generating solar and wind power,
e usually distant from centers of
consumption.134 Therefore, enhanced transmission capability is essential to transport renewable electricity to population centers.135
Antagonism to eminent domain for transmission lines by environmental groups is misplaced and seemingly reflects a rigid mindset
adverse to any energy takings. In short, environmental advocates
risk being hoisted by their own petard. It is difficult to envision a
principled argument against pipelines that would not also apply to
transmission lines.136
D. Strange Bedfellows
It is an old adage that politics makes strange bedfellows. In
several states affected landowners and environmental advocates
have recently joined in an unlikely alliance to oppose approval of oil
pipelines.137 Such groups have little in common and often have quite
131. Klass & Rossi, supra
lines remain extremely unpopular.
Although everyone wants the grid to work and the lights to go on, few people want high132. Andrew P. Morris, Roy Brandys & Michael M. Barron, Involuntary Cotenants: Eminent
Domain and Energy and Communications Infrastructure Growth, 3 LUS J. ENERGY L. &
RESOURCES, 29, 36 (2014). See also DAVID E. NYE, WHEN THE LIGHTS WENT OUT: A HISTORY
OF BLACKOUTS IN AMERICA
was a patchwork of old and new
133. Klass & Rossi, supra
though environmental groups
generally favor renewable energy, they have historically been the primary plaintiffs in law134. Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39
ENVTL. L. 1015, 1029 (2009).
135. Id.
that a large increase in renewable energy
resources will not only require transmission lines in new locations of the United States, but
also will require more transmission infrastructure than historically may have been necessary
ergy, residents and communities in Oregon,
New Mexico, and Wisconsin are battling the construction of electric power lines to transmit
such energy and have instituted lawsuits to block projects. Clean-Power Line Sparks Outcry,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2019, at A3.
137. Yet many property owners have voluntarily granted easements to pipeline companies.
See Puntenney v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 928 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
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different objectives. Owners are concerned about pipeline spillage,
damage to drainage tile, and the impact of such infrastructure on
the value of their land. Environmentalists, on the other hand, are
broadly dismissive of property rights and favor extensive governmental action limiting the rights of individual owners.138 For example, they are hostile to the doctrine of regulatory takings and, as
noted above, demonstrate little intere
on eminent domain except for pipelines.139 Their goal is to diminish
reliance on fossil fuels as a source of energy.
Given these sharply different agendas, I am skeptical that there
is any realistic basis for a durable coalition protective of property
rights. More likely, any alliance between landowners and environmentalists will prove tactical and fleeting.140
E. Revitalizing Energy Transportation
Where do we go from here? The current hodge-podge of pipeline
and transmission line approvals hardly seems adequate to address
growing energy needs. Even where objections to pipeline and transmission line construction are denied, the resulting delay and additional expense discourage the building of needed infrastructure.141
Thus, environmental activists can, in a sense, prevail despite eventually losing on the merits in court. In fact, opposition to new pipelines
1243 (Mem) (2020); see also Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Parkshill Farms, LLC, 905 N.W.2d
proposed route of transmission line).
138. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 239 (1990) (expressing
concern that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment could retard development of land
use regulations protective of the environment and urging public control over private rights
in land); John D. Echeverria, The Politics of Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 351 (1997) (viewing property rights as an obstacle to environmental protection measures).
139. J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine,
22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995) (warning that the regulatory takings doctrine inhibits environmental initiatives); see also Peter J. Byrne, A Hobbesian Bundle of Lockean Sticks: The Property
Rights Legacy of Justice Scalia, 41 VT. L. REV
140. See Coleman & Klass, supra note 77, at 682 (pointing out that the objectives of environmental advocates seeking to promote governmental intervention to safeguard the
environment differ sharply from property rights advocates working to restrain governmental
many of the arguments of their libertarian predecessors despite the differences between their
philosophies and ulti
141. See Katherine Blunt, Pipeline Cancelled Following Years of Delay, WALL ST. J., July 6,
2020, at 1A (despite favorable court rulings, sponsors of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline have dropped
the project in view of environmental opposition, regulatory delays, and mounting costs).
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has produced rather curious results. For example, New England has
imported liquified natural gas from Russia to supplement an inadequate pipeline capacity to carry cheaper domestic natural gas to the
region.142 Moreover, lack of sufficient oil pipelines has caused a growing reliance on railroads to transport crude oil to refineries. This has
raised difficult questions concerning which mode of transportation
is better to handle safety and environmental concerns.143
There have been a number of thoughtful proposals to address
energy transportation needs. One suggestion is that Congress should
establish a federal procedure for the exercise of eminent domain for
interstate oil pipelines and transmission lines akin to that for natural gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act of 1938.144 Such a step
would preempt state law and provide a uniform set of requirements.
However, as of this writing congressional action seems improbable.
Another proposal is for courts to invoke the dormant commerce

narios where there is reason to be concerned about adverse effects
145
Klass has further suggested that state
legislatures could overhaul eminent domain law to promote conpresumption against new pipelines that would carry fossil fuels.146
But absent a national energy disaster that captures public attention, none of these are likely to be adopted in the near future. I
predict that the United States will muddle along without an overall
policy concerning eminent domain and energy. One must hope that
building of pipelines and transmission lines, or we will surely face
a shortfall in the delivery of energy to consumers.

142. Coleman, supra
143. Alexandra B. Klass, Future-Proofing Energy Transport Law, 94 WASH. L. REV. 827,
supra note 45, at 279 (observing
are now traveling by rail as well. Transporting this oil by pipeline would be safer than rail,
144. Coleman, supra note 45, at 296.
145. Klass & Rossi, supra note 102, at 208.
146. Klass, Eminent Domain Law as Climate Policy, supra

THE ROLES OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW IN
ENERGY CONDEMNATIONS

STEWART E. STERK*
When an energy provider condemns fee interests or easements to
permit construction of transmission lines, what roles do state and
affected landowners? That question has arisen in a number of different factual contexts. Usually, condemnors seek to avoid state law rules
that provide for compensation beyond what they believe represents
the market value of the property they seek to acquire. For instance,
condemnors may seek an offset for benefits the condemnation generates for neighboring land owned by the condemnee. Condemnors may
property or the condemnation itse
cation of federal evidentiary rules rather than the evidentiary rules
the state would apply.
Federal courts have struggled with these cases and have, for the
In particular, courts have lost sight of the role the Federal Constitution plays in these disputes and have cast the issue as a choice between state law and federal common law. Part I of this Paper explores
existing law. Part II reconceptualizes the issue to highlight the federal
constitutional issues.
I. CONDEMNATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND
ITS DELEGATES: THE ROLE OF STATE LAW
During the nineteenth century, Congress frequently granted franchises to private entities to establish interstate railroads,1 and both
Congress and the states delegated condemnation power to those
private entities. The Supreme Court explicitly upheld the practice In
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., where a condemnee unsuccessfully
* H. Bert and Ruth Mack Professor of Real Estate Law and Director of the Center for
Real Estate Law & Policy, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University.
1. See generally
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ndemn land for construction of an
interstate bridge.2 Until the United States Supreme Court decided
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins in 1938,3 federal courts had no reason to consider whether valuation issues should be governed by state or federal
law. Because state valuation doctrines had largely been the product
of judge-made law, federal courts were, under Swift v. Tyson,4 free to
ignore those doctrines in favor of federally created valuation principles. Courts had little reason to be sensitive to differences between
state and federal law. Not until United States v. Miller5
only five years after Erie
just compensation should be determined in accordance with state
law principles.
A. United States v. Miller: The Origin of the Supremacy of
Federal Law with Respect to U.S. Government Takings
In Miller, the federal government condemned a strip of land for
tracks of the Central Pacific Railroad.6 Congress authorized the condemnation on August 26, 1937, but the government did not file its condemnation complaint until more than a year later, on December 14,
1938.7 Apparently, the congressional authorization of the railroad
project increased the value of the land during that interim period.8
The trial judge required the valuation experts to exclude from their
valuation any increment accruing after August 26, 1937, and charged
the jury that it should disregard any such increment.9 The condemnees, who were not happy with th
Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted cert.10
determination, the Supreme Court cited its own pre-Erie precedent
to support the proposition that once it is known that land will be
2. Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 534 (1894).
3. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id.
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condemned, owners ought not to gain by speculating on probable in11
But the
crease in property value due to
apply.12 Condemnees relied on federal statutes which directed federal courts to apply forms and methods of procedure afforded by the

13

ed power of Congress to affect
the constitutional measure of just compensation, not on the role of
state law. Because states play the primary role in defining property
rights, it would have been peculiar for the Court to conclude that
state law plays no role in measuring just compensation for loss of
those rights. On the other hand, the property value at issue in
Miller
by federal action, not by state law. When the federal government
creates value, there is good reason to hold that the Federal Constitution does not require the federal government to compensate for
the value it has created.
B. U.S. Government Takings: Miller
Cases have routinely cited Miller for the proposition that federal
law determines the measure of compensation when the U.S. government exercises its eminent domain power. Most of the cases do not
elaborate on whether the source of that federal law is the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal common law. Often, the recitation
that federal law applies appears in cases without any indication
that state law would have differed from federal law.14 In other cases,
11. Miller
12. Id. at 379.
13. Id. at 380.
14. See, e.g., United States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States ex rel. TVA v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 343 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2018); United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Los Angeles Cty., 63 F. Supp. 175, 186 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
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concludes that state law is irrelevant without explaining how state
law differs from federal.15 In still other cases, courts acknowledge
that state law determines the existence of a property right while
concluding that federal law governs the measure of damages available for a taking of that right.16
C. Delegation of the Eminent Domain Power: The Role of State Law
Federal courts of appeal have declined to extend Miller to cases
in which the federal government has delegated its eminent domain
power to private energy companies. The Fifth Circuit was the first
to address the issue in Georgia Power Company v. 138.30 Acres.17
Pursuant to authority granted by the Federal Power Act, 18 Georgia
Power instituted condemnation proceedings to acquire land for a
power project. Georgia rules for assessing just compensation differed
from federal practice in at least two significant respects. First, under
land, any benefits accruing to the remainder cannot be offset against
federal practice permitted such offset. Second, under Georgia law,
compensation might include increase in value of property caused by
knowledge of the project while, under Miller, federal practice precluded recovery for any such increase in value. The district judge
appointed a commission to determine compensation. The condemnees
asked the judge to instruct the commission in accordance with Georgia
compensation rules, but the judge declined and gave instructions
based on federal practice. When the condemnees appealed from the
ultimate condemnation award, a Fifth Circuit panel, relying on an
earlier decision in a related case,19
tions.20 The Fifth Circuit, however, granted a rehearing en banc and
15. See, e.g., United States ex rel. TVA v. 15.66 Acres of Land, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1366
(N.D. Ga. 2018).
16. See, e.g., United States v. 131.68 Acres of Land, 695 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Certain Land In City of Newark, 314 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. N.J. 1970).
17. Ga. Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980).
18. 16 U.S.C.S. § 797(e).
19. Ga. Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977).
20. Ga. Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres of Land, 596 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979). Because the panel
found other errors in the commi
nel vacated the judgments and
remanded the cases.
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on the disputed compensation issues.21
The Fifth Circuit started by noti
ity to condemn was derived from a federal statute.22 The court then
concluded that because the federal
propriate rule of decision, the task of interstitial federal lawmaking
23
The remaining question for the
Citing the Rules of Decision
Act, the court started with the premise that federal courts should
choose state law as the federal rule unless there is an expression of
legislative intent to the contrary.26 Finding no express congressional
intent that federal common law should supply the federal rule in
determining the measure of compensation, the court turned to an
evaluation of federal interests in determining the amount of compensation a private licensee must pay a landowner and concluded that
they were not sufficient to warrant displacement of state law.27 The
ment that application of state
law would impermissibly interfere with the congressional objective
of providing inexpensive hydroelectric power.28 The court concluded
that even if Georgia law resulted in higher cost to consumers, the
court would not presume that Congress would have balanced the interests of Georgia landowners and Georgia consumers differently
from the balance struck by Georgia condemnation law.29
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Miller and cases following
Miller had applied federal rules in condemnation cases brought by
the United States but concluded that those cases were not controlling
when a licensee, rather than the federal government, is the condemnor.30 The court concluded that fede
in those cases.31
24

25

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Ga. Power Co., 617 F.2d at 1113.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1652.
Ga. Power Co., 617 F.2d at 1116.
Id. at 1118.
Id.
Id. at 1124.
Id.
Id. at 1120.
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Although Georgia Power involved a delegation of eminent domain
authority under the Federal Power Act, two circuit courts have since
held that state law should determine the measure of compensation
when a private entity condemns land pursuant to authority granted
by the National Gas Act. In Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement, the Sixth Circuit held that
Ohio law should determine whether a landowner was entitled to
compensation for loss of the present value of expected future income
from wells that had not yet been drilled on the land.32 Most recently,
in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 7.053 Acres, the Third Circuit held
that compensation should be computed pursuant to Pennsylvania
law, which entitles a condemnee to certain consequential damages,
to the cost of alterations to remaining property made necessary by
the condemnation, and to recovery of professional fees under certain
circumstances.33
In holding state law applicable, the Columbia Gas court noted that
the legislative history of the Gas A
vant provisions were designed to mirror those in the Federal Power
Act.34
Georgia Power approach.35 The court also emphasized that whatever
rive its essence and much of its
carved out under state law and how the parties have previously
36
As a result, adopting
property right allocation onto the already well-developed state prop37

In Tennessee Gas Pipeline, the court emphasized that development of gas pipelines is not a core governmental function38 and
distinguished Miller by noting that in cases where the U.S. government is the condemnor, there is a concern about spending federal
32. Colum. Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easements, 962 F.2d
1192 (6th Cir. 1992).
33. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019).
34. Colum. Gas Transmission Corp., 962 F.2d at 1199.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1198.
37. Id.
38. 931 F.3d at 248.
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dollars that does not arise when the condemnor is a private entity.39
The court concluded that incorporating state law would not fruss, while applying a federal rule
would upset commercial relationships.40 The court did acknowledge,
however, that the Federal Constitution provides a baseline for compensation to which state law is free to add, but not subtract.41
D. Application of Federal Procedures
Although courts have applied state substantive law to Natural
Gas Act condemnations, they have consistently applied federal prothe most significant of those disputed issues.
The Natural Gas Act itself provides, in section 717f(h), that the
procedure in eminent domain proceedings for the construction of
procedure in similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State
42
That provision has been a part of
the statute since its original enactment in 1938. Thirteen years later,
however, the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 71.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. That ru
to condemn real and personal property by eminent domain, except
43
The Rules Enabling Act, which
authorizes the Supreme Court to enact rules of procedure, provides
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force and effect
44
As the Seventh Circuit has
explained in Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 64.111 Acres of Land,
Rule 71.1, in conjunction with the supersession clause, prevails over
section 717f(h).45
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 249 n.3.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018).
FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).
N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 64.111 Acres of Land, 344 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2003).
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With respect to issues explicitly addressed by Rule 71.1, courts
have had no difficulty holding state law inapplicable. The rule gives
federal district courts discretion to appoint a three-person commission to determine compensation, even if the condemnee seeks a jury
trial.46 Courts have upheld appointment of a commission even when
state law gives the condemnee a right to a jury trial.47 Rule 71.1 also
deposit with the court any money
48

The Eleventh Circuit has recently held that, because Natural Gas
that property not be taken for
49

Although Rule 71.1 is silent about precondemnation procedures,
courts have held that state precondemnation procedures do not apply
in federal condemnation actions, although they have taken different
routes to that conclusion. Section 717f(h) authorizes condemnation
the land needed for the pipeline.50 In Columbia Gas Transmission,
LLC v. Booth, the court held that section 717f(h) pre-empts state
law precondemnation procedures.51
claim that condemnor was not entitled to condemnation because condid not base its offer on the appraisal required by Ohio statutes. 52
In Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C. v. 295.49 Acres of Land, the court did not
rely on section 717f(h) at all, but instead read Northern Border Pipeline as holding that Rule 71.1 nullifies the conformity provision of
section 717f(h), eliminating any requirement for the condemnor to
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(h)(2).
47. See, e.g., N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 64.111 Acres of Land, 344 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2003);
S. Nat. Gas Co. v. Land, 197 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 1999).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(j)(1).
49. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 A
A. CONST. art. 1, § 3, ¶ 1(a).
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(h).
51. Colum. Gas Transmission, LLC v. Booth, No. 1:16-CV-1418, 2016 WL 7439348 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 22, 2016).
52. Id. at *4.
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comply with any state-mandated procedures not otherwise required
by Rule 71.1.53
ment that the condemnor negotiate in good faith as a jurisdictional
prerequisite to commencing an eminent domain proceeding is inapplicable to a condemnation proceeding brought pursuant to the Natural
Gas Act.54
Neither the Natural Gas Act nor the Federal Rules of Civil Proceeminent domain actions.55 In Guardian Pipeline, for instance, the
court discussed the Wisconsin statute, which entitled the condemnee
engineering fees whenever the jury
highest offer by more than 15% or at least $700.56 Condemnees asserted that condemnors had violated their equal protection of the law
by proceeding in federal court, where these fees would be unavailable, instead of proceeding in state court, as they had when seeking
to acquire land for earlier projects.57 In rejecting the equal protection
argument, the court implicitly acce
n for fees would not be applica58
ble in federal court.
By contrast, in Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate,59
tutional requirement that con60

as a substantive provision binding in a federal eminent

53. Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C. v. 295.49 Acres of Land, No. 08-C-0028, 2008 WL 1751358,
at *13 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., FLA. CONST
M. DOM. PROC. LAW
§ 701 (McKinney 2019) (giving courts discretion to award atto
see also Joseph B. Doerr Tr. v. Cent. Fla.
Expressway Auth., 177 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2015).
56. Guardian Pipeline, 2008 WL 1751358 at *5 (discussing WIS. STAT. § 32.28).
57. Id. at *19. Condemnor had brought condemnation proceedings in state court when
seeking to acquire land for a previous pipeline project.
58. Id. at *20 (concluding that condemnees had no fundamental right to the fees or to a
jury trial).
59. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ, 2017 WL
2783995 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017).
60. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a), as construed by the Florida Supreme Court in Joseph B.
Doerr Tr., 177 So. 3d at 1215.
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domain proceeding brought pursuant to the Natural Gas Act.61 In
federal law should apply, the
62

required application of Florida law.

63

Georgia Power

II. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR TAKINGS BY
GOVERNMENT DELEGATES
A. Difficulties with the Existing Doctrinal Framework
1. The Role of Federal Common Law
A number of courts have started with the premise that federal common law governs the measure of compensation in eminent domain
proceedings brought by federal government delegates and have then
invoked Kimbell Foods to hold that, as a matter of federal common
law, federal courts should apply state law to measure compensation.64 This approach, however, is analytically indefensible unless
one treats constitutional interpretation as a subspecies of federal
common law.
Federal common law permits federal courts to fill the interstices
in federal legislation, and also governs, as in Kimbell Foods
65

In

61. Sabal Trail Transmission, 2017 WL 2783995 at *7.
62. Id. For extensive discussion of the Sabal Trail decisions, see Andrew Prince Brigham,
Natural Gas Pipeline Easements: An Overview of the Takings Jurisprudence Associated with
the Acquisition of a Lineal Corridor When the Condemnor Is a Private Licensee of the Eminent
Domain Power Under the Natural Gas Act, 8 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J. 121 (2018).
63. Sabal Trail Transmission, 2017 WL 2783995 at *7. In a number of other cases, courts
have avoided analyzing whether state or federal law applies to
the case. See N. Nat. Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, 862 F.3d 1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 2017) (Kansas law
would not have permitted an award of fees); Colum. Gas Transmission, LLC v. Booth, No. 1:16CV-1418, 2016 WL 7439348, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2016).
64. See
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement, 962 F.2d
(6th Cir. 1992); Ga. Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres, 617 F.2d 1112, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980).
65. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (quoting United States
v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)).
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holding that federal common law governs the measure of compensation in energy takings by government delegates, courts have reasoned that because the federal statute authorizes condemnation
without mandating any particular measure of compensation, federal
common law must operate to fill in the gap in the legislation.66
This analysis, however, incorrectly assumes that the applicable
federal statute could dictate the measure of compensation paid to
condemnees. In fact, however, th
pensation Clause,67 sets a floor that federal statutes are not free to
ignore. For instance, if leaseholds and easements are property interests protected by the Constitution, the Natural Gas Act could not
provide that compensation is available only for fee interests. Of course,
the statute could provide for more generous compensation than the
Constitution requires, but the notion that federal common law
governs the measure of compensation cannot be right unless judicial
interpretation of the Takings Clause is treated as a matter of federal common law.
the United States and Takings by Its Delegates
In holding that federal common law selects state law to govern
the measure of compensation in takings by federal delegates, courts
have distinguished these private condemnations from condemnation
by the United States government,68 which are supposedly governed
exclusively by federal law. This distinction, however, is problematic
both analytically and as a matter of policy.
First, as we have seen, the Federal Constitution sets the floor for
compensation in all condemnation cases, and that constitutional floor
will soon return. That is, even when the United States itself condemns land, it cannot escape compensating for property interests
created by, and recognized by, state law.
66. See, e.g., Colum. Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement, 962
F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th
nationwide federal program. Accordingly, its
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. See, e.g.
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United States v. Miller69 is not to the contrary. First, in Miller, the
Court explicitly grounded its analysis in the Constitution.70 Second,
on the facts in Miller, the property interest for which the Court invoked federal law to deny compensation was an interest created by
state property law.71 Miller claimed compensation for the increase in
property value between the time the federal government announced
the condemnation and the time the government instituted formal
condemnation proceedings.72 That value was created entirely by the
federal government, and federal law certainly could have deemed
the condemnation to be effective at the moment of the government
announcement. Such a rule would not have interfered with any property interest created by state law. Similarly, Miller
pensation for the increase in value resulting from federal action did
not interfere with any interests created by state law. The result in
Miller, then, does not authorize courts to deny compensation for propis the condemnor.
Moreover, a distinction between takings by the United States and
takings by its delegates is difficult to justify as a matter of policy.
Courts have suggested that the concern for saving federal dollars is
at issue with U.S. government condemnations, but not private condemnations.73 In fact, however, federal dollars are at stake, albeit
less directly, when the government delegates condemnation power
to private entities. The government could, of course, charge private
entities for the permit necessary to exercise condemnation power.
And the price the government could charge would reflect the price
those entities would have to pay in the condemnation process; if state
law required those private entities to pay more to condemnees, the
entities would pay less for the permit. If the government instead
chooses to forego charging for the permit in order to create greater
incentives for those entities to develop transmission lines, the government is nevertheless expending government resources when it
increases the cost of private condemnations. There is no particular
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
Id. at 380.
See id.
Id.
See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Permanent Easement, 931 F.3d 237, 249 (2019).
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reason why condemnees should obtain greater benefits when government resources indirectly compensate those condemnees than
when compensation comes directly from the public fisc.
B. The Respective Roles of the Federal Constitution, State Law,
and Federal Law
1. The Basic Structure
s Clause includes four critical
When government explicitly exercises its eminent domain
power the government has conceded the existence of a taking, and
75
there
is little doubt that a taking for energy transmission purposes qualifies
as a public use. The critical questions involve the source of meaning
for the other two terms: private property and just compensation.
Tom Merrill has established that, within the context of the Takings Clause, the constitutional meaning of private property constitutes an amalgam of federal constitutional law and state law.76 Federal constitutional law establishes what categories of interests qualify
as private property.77 Those categories generally include common
law property: discrete assets in which the holder has a right to
exclude.78 Within the categories that qualify for constitutional protection, private property is define
principally state law.
74

tional component and a state law component reflects Supreme Court
precedent in eminent domain cases. Thus, in U.S. ex rel. Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Powelson, the Court denied compensation to a
74. U.S. CONST.
75. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
prudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what pub
76. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 952
(2000) (developing patterning definition of property for constitutional purposes).
77. Id. at 952.
78. Id.
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of the power to condemn, holding, in effect, that the power to condemn
was not within the categories of property protected by the Federal
Constitution.79 The Court has indicated that other elements of value,
including loss of good will, the expense of moving fixtures, and loss of
future profits, fall outside the category of property for which compensation is due.80 But once the court determines that an item falls
within the category of property protected by the Constitution, state
law becomes critical. As the Court indicated in Powelson
81

State law is critical in defining private property not because of the
Rules of Decision Act or because of federal common law, but because
the Constitution itself incorporates state law when it protects private
property. The Rules of Decision Act provides that the laws of the several states shall be regarded as rules of decision in the federal courts
The Takings Clause
is a constitutional provision that requires application of state law
independent of the demands of the Rules of Decision Act. Federal
common law is designed to fill gaps in federal statutory schemes; it
is inapplicable in the face of a federal constitutional mandate.
Unlike private property, whose source lies outside the Constituderal constitutional remedy for
interference with that property. Although the Court has equated
just compensation with fair market value,83
make a fetish even of market value, since it may not be the best
84
The Court has made it clear that
just compensation is a constitutional standard; federal statutes may
not dictate a standard that does not satisfy the Constitution:
82

But when the taking has been ordered, then the question of compensation is judicial. It does not rest with the public, taking the
property, through Congress or the legislature, its representative,
79. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943).
80. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
81. Powelson, 319 U.S. at 279.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
83. See, e.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470,
474 (1973).
84. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
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to say what compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be
the rule of compensation. The Constitution has declared that
just compensation shall be paid, and the ascertainment of that
is a judicial inquiry.85

Congress could, by express language, authorize compensation beyond
what the Constitution requires. When it does not, however, the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, furnishes
the relevant standard. States too may, for state constitutional or
statutory purposes, supplement the federal constitutional minimum,
but those supplements have no federal constitutional significance.
That is not to say, however, that state law is irrelevant in determining what compensation the Federal Constitution requires. As we
have seen, state law plays a major role in determining whether an
owner holds property for which the Constitution requires just compensation. To the extent states differ in their definition of property
rights, the compensation available for ostensibly similar takings may
vary from state to state. For instance, the Court has recognized that
effectively terminates a tenancy
at will, the compensation due to the tenant will depend on the state
law requirement for notice to terminate the tenancy.86
The Constitution itself says nothing about the procedures to be
followed in federal condemnation cases. More generally, however, federal courts have constitutional authority to develop and apply federal
procedural rules unless Congress has, by statute, dictated otherwise. As we have seen, in the Natural Gas Act, Congress did appear
Although one might contend that state law should play a role with
respect to issues not expressly addressed in Rule 71.1, the Advisory
Committee Report accompanying the Rule made it clear that unifor87

85. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893).
86. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 (1946).
87. FED. R. CIV.
condemnation rule in the federal courts arises from the fact that by various statutes Congress
has prescribed diverse procedures for certain condemnation proceedings, and, in the absence
of such statutes, has prescribed conformity to local state practice under former § 258 of Title
40. This general conformity adds to the diversity of procedure since in the United States there
are multifarious methods of procedure in existence. Thus in 1931 it was said that there were
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2. Applying the Structure
the federal government, federal delegees, and the states and their
r property rights recognized by
the state if those rights are within the categories of property encompassed by the Takings Clause. If a state recognizes rights outside
those categories, compensation is due only if federal statutes expressly or impliedly provide for compensation beyond the compensation required by the Constitution. With respect to most takings, and
particularly those under the Natural Gas Act, there is no express or
implied command to pay more than the Federal Constitution requires.
In light of this structure, the critical practical question involves determining which rights are within the categories encompassed by
the Takings Clause. This section examines a number of the issues
that have arisen in litigation so far but does not attempt to be comprehensive.

When state law allocates the right to use and exclude among private
state law allocation. For instance, in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. L.D.
Drilling, the Sixth Circuit held that the condemnor did not have to
compensate a surface owner for the value of gas in the ground under
longed to the party who had injected the gas into the ground rather
than to the surface owner.88

When state law gives condemnees rights peculiar to the eminent
domain context, but those rights substitute for the right to exclude
269 different methods of judicial procedure in different classes of condemnation cases and 56
methods of nonjudicial or administrative procedure. First Report of Judicial Council of Michigan,
1931, § 46, pp. 55 to 56. These numbers have not decreased. Consequently, the general requirement of conformity to state practice and procedure, particularly where the condemnor is the
(71A) but was eventually integrated into what
is now 71.1.
88. N. Nat. Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, 862 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2017).
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that the owner would have against a private party, the Constitution
generally mandates that those rights be enforced in federal condemnation proceedings. For instance, one of the Pennsylvania statutes at issue in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 7.053 Acres entitles a
parcel.89 Against a private party, the owner would have the right to
prevent the interference that necessitated any such adjustments.
The right to prevent that interference falls within the category of
rights typically protected by the Taking Clause: a right to exclude
from a discrete asset. Because Pennsylvania law recognizes that right,
the right constitutes property protected for which compensation is
due under the Takings Clause.
Similarly, if state law recognizes the right of a condemnee, in partial taking cases, to segregate the portion taken from the portion
retained, that right falls within the category of property rights protected by the Takings Clause. Before the partial taking, the condemnee had the right to sell the two portions separately, and if the
government condemned one portion, it would have to pay market
value for that portion, even if the government project benefited the
remaining portion. A state law that precludes government from
offsetting the benefits to retained land in computing compensation
for the land taken reflects state law recognition of separate rights
to exclude with respect to each po
As a result, in Georgia Power,90 the Fifth Circuit correctly applied
computing compensation for a partial
analysis improperly focused on federal common law principles rather
than the Constitution itself.

Although the Federal Constitution requires federal courts to
provide just compensation for state-created property rights, it does
not require federal courts to apply state rules of evidence about
valuation of those rights. Rules of evidence are rules of procedure.91
89. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019).
90. Ga. Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980).
91. Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provid
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Nothing in the Constitution requires federal courts to apply state
rules of procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence dictate that
federal courts apply them in eminent domain cases.92 Of course,
what evidence is relevant may depend on what property rights are
recognized by state law,93 but if there is no dispute on that issue, federal courts should not be limited by state rules about how to determine the value of those rights.
Consider, for instance, the taking of an easement under the Natural
Gas Act. If state law were to bar evidence of comparable transactions in assessing the value of the right taken, federal courts would
not be bound by that bar.94 Although, under state law, the only admissible evidence might be testim
and after the taking of the easement, that evidentiary limit does not
relate to the content of the constitutionally protected property right;
instead, it reflects a judgment about how best to determine the
value of that right. In a condemnation action in federal court, the
Federal Rules of Evidence govern how judgments about value should
be made.95

controversial and thorny issues surrounding compensation for Natural
Gas Act condemnations. The constitutional issue is an easy one: the
Takings Clause confers no constituti
so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing
ED. R. EVID. 102.
92. Rule 101 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provid
ED. R. EVID. 101.
93. For instance, evidence about the benefit conferred on remaining land would be
irrelevant if state law holds that the land condemned and the remaining land must be considered as separate parcels, and the condemnation award may not be diminished because of
benefits to the remaining land.
court initially faced the argument that Wyoming law barred evidence of comparable
transactions. After oral argument in the case, the Wyoming Supreme Court made it clear that
evidence of comparable transactions was admissible. The parties in Bison Pipeline stipulated
statutes, eliminating from the case any issue about whether federal or state law should apply.
95. See supra
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right to exclude from a discrete thing, and therefore falls outside the
category of property rights protected by the Clause. Long-standing
precedent confirms the conclusion that the Takings Clause does not
require the U.S. government to comp
demnation proceedings.96 If the Constitution does not require compensation from the U.S. government, it cannot require compensation
Although the Constitution does not mandate compensation, the
the condemnor.97 To qualify for fees, the condemnee must be
a party who obtains a final judgment (other than by settlement),
exclusive of interest, the amount of which is at least as close to
the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to
at trial on behalf of the property owner as it is to the highest
valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on
behalf of the government.98

reasonably low valuations; such valuations trigger an obligation to
those fees to $125 per hour).99 By its terms, however, the EAJA applies
The statute is not strictly applicable in condemnation proceedings brought by delegees.
That leaves federal courts with three alternatives: (1) in the absence
of constitutional mandate and congressional action, conclude that
condemnees are entitled to no fees; (2) incorporate fees provided by
state law; or (3) apply the fee structure of the EAJA as the best evidence of congressional intent. Of the three alternatives, the third is
the most defensible.
The first alternative is difficult to square with the congressional
purpose behind the EAJA. If Congress had not enacted the EAJA,
100

96. See United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 203 (1979) (quoting Dohany v. Rogers,
penses are not embraced within just com97.
98.
99.
100.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(H).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2).
§ 2412(d)(1)(A).
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the first alternative would be the most faithful to the Constitution and
statutes. But once we understand that Congress enacted the statute
to induce the government to make reasonable offers to condemnees, it
is difficult to see why Congress
delegates its condemnation power to private entities.
state condemnation law rules
right protected by the Takings
Clause. In the absence of a federal statute or constitutional provilaw. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
v. Wilderness Society, since Congress has approached the issue of
that federal courts cannot award a
ing party,101
over, because the Supreme Court has held that the absence of a
fees represents a congressional
choice the federal courts are not free to overturn, there is no basis
for asserting that federal common law should incorporate state law
102
Moreover, this approach is consistent
with the prevailing reading of the Rules of Decision Act,103 which
requires application of state law in federal question cases only when
104

of congressional authorization.
Moreover, even if one concluded that the absence of an explicit
federal statute provided an opening for application of state substantive law, determining whether to aw
matter of procedure which, in the federal courts, is governed by feddo so not to provide compensation to condemnees but to induce the
101. Alyeska Pipeline Serv
102. See Home Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gillam, 952 F.2d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 1991)(refusing
to incorporate Alaska law following the English rule permitting the prevailing party to
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
104. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4520.
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condemnor to make reasonable offers to the condemnee, obviating
the need for excessive litigation. This is especially obvious in the
highest offer by a stated percentage.105 But even Florida law, which
106
requires full
compensation for fees only when the condemnor is responsible for
excessive litigation.107 That is, the Florida compensation rule is aimed
at litigation abuse, an issue that goes to the heart of procedure. And
when federal and state law conflict about how to control litigation
abuse, federal law controls. Thus, in Burlington Northern Railroad
v. Woods, the Supreme Court held that even in a diversity case, an
Alabama rule prescribing a penalty for unsuccessful appeals could
not be applied in federal court because of a conflict with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 38, which permitted penalties only for frivolous appeals.108
The remaining alternative is to treat the EAJA as an expression
of congressional policy applicable to condemnation actions brought
by delegees as well as those brought by agencies of the federal government. The EAJA was enacted in response to Alyeska Pipeline.109
Although two courts of appeals held that the statute applied to eminent domain proceedings,110 some doubt remained. Congress responded to the doubt in 1985 by amending the statute to make it
viding a standard for determining when the condemnee is a prevailing party entitled to fees.111
105. WISC. STAT. ANN. 32.28(3)(d) and (e) (litigation expenses awarded to condemnee if
award by condemnation commission or jury exceeds the highest offer by at least 15%).
In Guardian Pipeline, LLC v. 295.49 Acres of Land, 2008 WL 1751358 (E.D. Wis. 2008), a
district court rejected condem
would constitute a deprivation of equal protection.
106. See Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ, 2017 WL
2783995 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017).
107. Joseph B. Doerr Tr. v. Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth., 177 So. 3d. 1209, 1217 (Fla. 2015)
108. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
109. See H.R. REP. NO
110. United States v. 101.80 Acres of Land, 716 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1983); United States
v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1983).
111. H.R. REP. NO. 99-102, at 18 (1986).
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suggests that Congress
had not focused on condemnation cases brought by delegees rather
than by the federal government or its agencies. But, in light of the
congressional concern about creating incentives to bring the parties
closer together in their land valuations,113 it would be peculiar to
think that Congress intended to immunize government delegees from
the incentives it sought to create for the government itself.
112

112. Id.
113. Id. at 19.

IN SEARCH OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING: HOW
DEREGULATORY STRATEGIES FAIL THE POOR

LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER*
As homelessness in California swells, Gov. Gavin Newsom is
asking state lawmakers to funnel $1.4 billion into programs
designed to alleviate the crisis. . . . [A]dvocates and officials . . .
acknowledged it would not be enough to get the 151,000 homeless
individuals in California off the streets.1
INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that there is a severe housing crisis in the
United States. Commentator after commentator has decried the
nationwide shortage of housing for those of limited financial means.
8.4 million jobs were lost. 2 This, combined with the subprime mortgage crisis, swelled the ranks of low-income renters by millions of
people at a time when housing that they could afford was already
scarce. The number of households paying more than 30% of gross income for rent rose by 3.6 million from 2008 to 2014, to a total of 21.3
million households.3
to a record 11.4 million households.4
The recovery of the economy has not done much to abate these
numbers. Low-income wages are simply inadequate to pay for housing costs. In 2017, 47.4 percent of renters paid more than 30 percent
of their incomes for housing. Among households earning between
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Alicia Victoria Lozano, California Governor Seeks $1.4 Billion to Combat Homelessness
as Crisis Grows, NBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2020, 9:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news
/california-governor-seeks-1-4-billion-combat-homelessness-crisis-grows-n1113926.
2. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION S
HOUSING 28 (2010).
3. See id. at 4.
4. See id. See also Brandon M. Weiss, Progressive Property Theory and Housing Justice
Campaigns, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV
the development of the
housing crisis in the United States over the past 15 years).
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$40,000 and $44,999, cost-burdened rates climbed 4.6 percent. For
households with incomes under $15,000, 83 percent paid more than
30 percent of income for housing, including 72 percent who were
han 50% of household income for
rent.5 Recently, Los Angeles opened a lottery for its Section 8 housing
voucher waiting list; 188,000 people applied for 20,000 spots. Only
about 200 names are drawn from this list per month.6 It is estimated
that to afford the median rent in Los Angeles County, an individual
has to earn $50.00 per hour.7
Then there are those who have so completely lost in the housing
scramble that they are homeless and living on the streets. Homegroups is the lack of housing that these people can afford. News outlets report that homelessness is at an all-time high in Los Angeles,
where nearly 60,000 people sleep in tent cities and on sidewalks.8
An annual survey taken one night in January 2019 counted more
than 5,500 people on the streets of Las Vegas and surrounding cities
and county property.9 There are swelling homeless populations in
every major city and most smaller cities in the United States.10
5. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 2, at 4.
6. See Aaron Schrank,
, MARKETPLACE
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://marketplace.org/2018/01/03/its-long-wait-section-8-housing-us-cities.
See also Weiss, supra note 4, at 261.
7. See Jamie Yuccas,
of Affordable Housing Contributes
to Los Angeles Homeless Crisis, CBS NEWS (July 5, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/homeless-population-los-angeles-county-california-rises-2019-07-05/.
8. See id.; Alicia Victoria Lozano,
Fuel Homelessness, NBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2020, 7:07 AM), https://nbcnews.com/news/us-news
/california-s-rising-rents-severe-housing-shortage-fuel-homelessness-n1127216 (Feb. 2, 2020)
9. Associated Press, Las Vegas Bans Homeless People from Sleeping on the Street,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2019, 1:37 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/07/las
-vegas-homeless-sleeping-street-ban.
10. See Teresa Wiltz, In Shift, States Step in on Affordable Housing, PEW (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/10/15/in-shift-states
-step-in-on-affordable-housing. For a very recent article about homeless people in the smaller
cities of Rochester and Duluth, Minnesota, see Randy Petersen, Council Considers Ban on Sleeping in the Skyway, POST-BULLETIN (Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.postbulletin.com/news/local/coun
cil-considers-ban-on-sleeping-in-the-skyway/article_7268ab2e-e6ab-11e9-a2b3-033f0697c
754.html.
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Dealing with these overwhelming homeless populations has caused
cities and individuals to suggest desperate measures. In Bakersfield,
California, officials have floated the idea that homeless people can
be removed from the streets by putting them in jail for long periods
for misdemeanor drug charges and trespassing.11 In San Francisco,
some residential property owners have put boulders on sidewalks to
deter the erection of tents by the homeless.12 Recently, Las Vegas
are available in established shelters. 13 Shelters include an open-air
courtyard offered by the city which has 220 sleeping mats.14 City
officials claim to have spent more than $35 million on homelessrelated services in the past year, including outreach, fire, police and
community services.15
Many solutions to the crisis have been proposed. The solution that
is now most consistently advanced by politicians, academics, and
strategies as a way to increase affordable housing. What unites these
strategies is the belief that regulatory controls (such as zoning controls) are an important cause of the housing crisis, and that with their
housed) will flourish. As one academic commentator described the
ascendency of this movement:
A consensus is . . . building [among many] that zoning is what ails
America. There is an increasing mainstream call for a massive
unlock development, make vibrant places accessible, and solve the affordable housing crisis.
11. Julia Wick,
, S.F. CHRON.
(Oct. 3, 2019, 3:55 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/nation/article/Jail-is-Bakersfield-s-solu
t-in-time count, conducted in January 2019,
recorded a 108% increase in unsheltered homeless people compared with the year before. See id.
12. Hannah Knowles, Residents Put Huge Rocks on Their Sidewalk to Keep the Homeless
, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2019, 9:21 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/nation/2019/10/02/residents-put-huge-rocks-their-sidewalk-keep-homeless-away
-launched-battle/.
13. Associated Press, supra note 9.
14. See id.
15. See id.
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Governments are heeding the call. [For instance,] Minneapolis
approved a new . . . plan that prohibits single-family residential
zones throughout the city, effectively eliminating one of the conventional cornerstones of traditional zoning.16

Other zoning-busting reforms include allowing developers of new
projects to exceed density, height, bulk, and other requirements, often

17

18
19

and to

All of this sounds too good to be true. In the case of the poor, and
low-income households generally, it is.
I. DEREGULATORY HOUSING STRATEGIES:
AN EXAMINATION OF COMMON FORMS
Deregulatory housing strategies as a way to increase the supply
of affordable housing have swept the United States over the past
thirty years. The basic idea is to entice or mandate the building of dee sector developers, in conjunction
with the abolition or waiver of zoning rules.20
There are two forms of deregulatory/inclusionary housing strategies
that are the most popular with commentators and public officials and
by abolishing a kind of restrictive
zoning classification altogether. This is not tied to any particular
16. Christopher Serkin, A Case for Zoning, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 3).
17. David Roberts, The Future of Housing Policy Is Being Decided in California, VOX
(Apr. 4, 2018, 9:22 AM), https://www.vox.com/cities-and-urbanism/2018/2/23/17011154/sb827
-california-housing-crisis.
18. See Sarah Mervosh, Minneapolis, Tackling Housing Crisis and Inequity, Votes to End
Single-Family Zoning, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us
/minneapolis-single-family-zoning.html.
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., David Tuller, Housing and Health: The Role of Inclusionary Zoning,
HEALTHAFFAIRS (June 7, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20180313.6687
transfers some of the burden for developing and managing affordable housing from the public
to the private sector and has grown in
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projects or other demands on developers. This is the kind of strategy
that the new Minneapolis ordinance, discussed above, involves.
The other kind of deregulatory/inclusionary housing strategy is
more programmatically complex. Th
regulatory strategy. Typically, mandates are enacted that require developers of new housing or other
defined low- or moderate-income
households.21 Some programs provide an option for developers to
primary market-rate development.22
To offset additional costs to developers, they are given
special exemptions from the zoning requirements that would otherwise apply to their projects such as height and bulk limits, density
limits, parking mandates, and others.24 In some models, developers
are given a choice: they can meet set-aside requirements or make
monetary contributions to the city as a way to comply with affordable
housing mandates.25 A recent and exhaustive study by Emily Thaden
and Ruoniu Wang estimated that there are 886 jurisdictions located
in 25 states and the District of Columbia that have some form of
inclusionary housing program of this kind.26
23

21. See Emily Thaden & Ruoniu Wang, Inclusionary Housing in the United States:
Prevalence, Impact, and Practices (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper WP17ET1
43, 46, 2017). See also Tuller, supra note 20.
See Tuller, supra note 20.
23. See Thaden & Wang, supra
24. See id.
The Effects of Inclusionary Zoning on Local
Housing Markets: Lessons from the San Francisco, Washington DC and Suburban Boston
Areas (Furman Center for Housing Policy at New York University Policy Brief, 2008); Joshua
Sabatini, Minimum Parking Requirements on Their Way Out in SF, S.F. EXAMINER (Dec. 4,
2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/minimum-parking-requirements-on-their
-way-out-in-sf/.
25. See Thaden & Wang, supra
26. See id. at 11. The analysis of Thaden and Wang included programs that require or
incentivize the creation of affordable housing when new development occurs, through policies
that are mandatory or voluntary; that are with or without incentives; that apply to particular
geographic areas or zoning categories; that yield affordable units on site, off site, or payments
in lieu of development; and that generate fees from commercial or residential development
or both. See id. at 4.
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strategies are:
ished, citywide. Residential structures with up to three dwellcity lot.27
effectively ends single-family zoning restrictions in all cities
with at least 10,000 people.28
more units must set aside 10% of units at affordable prices.
In return, developers can be granted greater project density
or use variances that are otherwise not allowed.29
sisting of 10 or more guest rooms must create one unit of
affordable housing for rent in the city for every 28 guest rooms

30

and other incentives to developers of residential projects of
five or more units for the inclusion of affordable housing for
very low-, low- and moderate-income groups.31
Sporadically, developer-mandate laws have been challenged by
developers as a taking of property without compensation.32 The gist
of these lawsuits generally has been that developer-mandate requirements place unique burdens on developers and that they deprive
them of the right to build on their properties as otherwise allowed
27. See Mervosh, supra note 18.
28. See Laurel Wamsley, Oregon Legislature Votes to Essentially Ban Single-Family Zoning,
NPR (July 1, 2019, 7:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/737798440/oregon-legislature
-votes-to-essentially-ban-single-family-zoning.
EPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
29. See CITY OF CHICAGO
AFFORDABLE REQUIREMENTS ORDINANCE (ARO) (2019), http://chicago.gov/city/en/depts/doh
/provdrs/developers/svcs/aro.html.
30. Portland, Me., Amendment to Code chp. 14, §§ 134-18/19 (passed Jan. 23, 2019). Affordable (low-income) rental housing is defined as affordable to a household earning 80% or less
of area median income; affordable housing for sale is defined as affordable to a household earning
100% or less of area median income. See Portland, Me., Code of Ordinances, § 14-485.
31. CAL. CODE, tit. 7, chp. 4.3, § 65915 (2017). See also Thaden & Wang, supra note 21, at 28.
32. See, e.g.
cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016); 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of W. Hollywood, 207 Cal. Rptr.3d
729 (Ct. App. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
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by law. Opponents of these laws had a few early victories, such as the
invalidation of a Fairfax County, Virginia, mandatory set-aside ordinance in the early 1970s.33 Since then, governments have avoided
takings challenges by pointing out the value that the developer retains, including value received by waivers of zoning requirements
(height and bulk restrictions, density restrictions, and others).34
asserted but have rarely succeeded. Under a cluster of U.S. Supreme
Court cases, a developer can challe
35

Fairness requires

mands and the reason for the original building restriction,36 and that
what the government now demands
that the original restriction was designed to prevent.37 These suits
mandates are generally imposed by general legislation. Under the
or oppressive conduct of the government toward particular developers
in the permitting process.38 The application of this theory to general
developer-mandate laws has been rejected by courts.39 Even if a court
33. See Bd. of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises Inc., 198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973) (developer of a multifamily project of 50 or more units was required to set aside 15 percent for
low- and moderate-income households).
34. See, e.g.,
ral matter, so long as a
land use regulation does not constitute a physical taking or deprive a property owner of all viable
accord,
616 Croft Ave., LLC, 207 Cal. Rptr.3d at 736. See also Challenges to Enacting an Inclusionary
Housing Policy, NAT L HOUS. CONF., https://www.nhc.org/policy-guide/inclusionary-housing
-the-basics/challenges-to-enacting-an-inclusionary-housing-policy/ (last visited July 18, 2020)
(discussing the role of waivers of zoning regulations in defeating takings challenges).
35. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013); Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan
36. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
37. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
38. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 614 (the central concern of Nollan and Dolan
the government may use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue
ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed use
39. See, e.g.,

, 351 P.3d at

ry set-aside law for
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were to find that the facts of a particular case triggered this rule,
the inherent vagaries involved in
of developer-mandates as a part of
affordable-housing laws makes success in such suits difficult.40
To date, laws abolishing single-family zoning or other zoning classification as a way to create affordable housing have not been challenged on takings grounds. Although possible, under the facts of a
particular case, the general ability of local governments to change
zoning for the perceived public interest makes success in any such
lawsuit unlikely. With shrinking land bases in cities and the housing
crisis as it exists, it has become increasingly difficult for developers
or landowners to convince courts that the losses they suffered as the
result of affordable housing rezoning should prevail over what is
presented as a critical societal need.
The unavailability of strictly legal challenges does not, however,
answer all fundamental questions about deregulatory programs.
to the crisis in affordable housing and homelessness in the United
States. The question remains: Is this true? Are these programs really
poised to address this severe problem of poverty and property?
616 Croft Ave., LLC, 207 Cal. Rptr.3d at 736 (when the
regulation broadly applies a nondiscretionary fee to a class of owners, the risk involved in the
Common Sense All. v. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 2015 WL 4730204 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015)
(Nollan/Dolan
40. For example, how related is a building restriction (of any sort) to an existing shortage
of affordable housing? If related, how proportionate is the requirement of the affordable
housing mandate? For an extensive rumination over these questions, see Michelle DaRosa,
When Are Affordable Housing Exactions an Unconstitutional Taking?, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
(2007). Compare Portland, Me., Amendment to Code, supra
hospitality developments create a need for new affordable housing. This need is the result of
the fact that hospitality developments necessarily create a number of jobs that do not pay
employees at a rate sufficient to allow those employees to afford market-rate housing in the
Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992) (upholding an inclusionary zoning ordinance
in light of evidence that new commercial development would employ additional low-income
workers, and there was a need for additional housing to accommodate them); Holmdel Builders
(N.J. 1990) (inclusionary zoning requirements
a legislative judgment that there is a reasonable relationship between unrestrained nonresidential development and the need for affordable
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II. DEREGULATORY SOLUTIONS AND THE POOR: BENEFITS,
COSTS, AND THE EW EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Housing for Whom?
When considering the impacts of affordable housing laws that rely
on deregulation and private-sector development, the most obvious
question is whether these laws have actually resulted in an increase
in affordable housing. Zoning-abolition laws are of very recent vintage,
so there is little evidence as to their effects. Developer-mandate laws
are a different matter. These have been around for more than thirty
years, and there is substantial evidence that can be examined.
From the time of their introduction, critics predicted that developermandate programs would not work. Critics claimed that mandatory
set-asides would add costs to projects, which would result in the
building of fewer units of affordable housing in the enacting jurisdiction.41 Developers have choices, they argued; they would choose to
build in jurisdictions without these requirements or would invest in
projects (such as nonresidential projects) that were more profitable
than affordable-housing-burdened developments.42
Whether developer mandates have actually increased the overall
number of affordable housing units produced is, of course, an empirical question. Studies that have examined this have generated mixed
answers. The efficacy of these laws seem to depend on a wide range
41. For instance, in Burnaby, Canada, where olde
been rapidly demolished to make way for condominiums, city council members recently considered a law that would ensure that renters evicted from demolished apartments are given
the opportunity to return to the new building at the same rental rate. The CEO of a landlord
Burnaby Council
Floats Huge Reforms to Rental Housing Policy, CBC (May 27, 2019, 8:43 PM), https://www
.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/burnaby-council-housing-policy-1.5152175.
42. See, e.g., Gary M. Galles, Op Ed: How Affordable Housing Mandates Make Housing
More Expensive, L.A.TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la
-oe-0104-galles-affordable-housing-court-case-20160104-story.html (citing studies that housing
starts decreased after mandatory affordable housing programs went into effect in some
California communities); Armstrong et. al., supra
tory affordable housing programs] will constrict development of market-rate housing by causing
developers to build instea
in the jurisdiction will rise, ultimately decreasing affordability).
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of factors, such as the number of mandatory set-aside units required,
for housing in the particular location, the price of land, the availability of alternative (out-of-town) land, and so on.43 Most studies of
multiple jurisdictions show that inclusionary housing laws, including developer-mandate laws, generally lead to an overall increase in
the building of defined affordable units, although the size of the
increase is characterized as modest.44 Thaden and Wang, in their
study of programs or policies that require or incentivize the creation
of affordable housing, reported the creation of 122,320 affordable
rental units in jurisdictions having such programs over a period of
approximately forty years.45 Determining how many of these units
were the product of developer-mandate programs was difficult because such programs were usually part of a package of strategies
designed to increase the availability of affordable housing, including
tax relief abatement or even direct public subsidies.46
Whatever the gross number of defined affordable units produced by
these programs might be, there is a deeper question that we must consider. A developer-mandate or a zoning-abolition program might be
other jurisdiction. When we speak of the housing crisis, however, we
Consider, first, zoning-abolition programs. The Minneapolis ordinance has been hailed by advocates as the key to the building of
47
Because
single-family zoning was historically used to maintain race and
class segregation, current racial segregation can be traced to the restrictions of single-family zoning.48 Abolition of this classification,
43. For instance, one study found no evidence that inclusionary housing laws impacted
either the prices or rates of construction of market-rate single-family houses in the San
Francisco area, but that there was some evidence of both in Boston. See Armstrong et. al.,
supra
44. See, e.g., id.
supra note 20.
45. See Thaden & Wang, supra note 21, at ii, 4, 31. These
See id. at ii.
46. See id. at 40; Tuller, supra note 20.
47. See Mervosh, supra note 18.
48. See id.
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it is claimed, will foster racial and economic diversity throughout
the city.49
Single-family zoning-abolition schemes might be emotionally
markets long dominated by powerful anti-housing activists (often
wealthier) residents [who use zoning] . . . to prevent new construc-

50

But does the outlawing of single family residential districts, and other
deregulatory schemes, really create actual, affordable housing for
the poor?
abolition schemes generally contain no guarantee that they will result
in the creation of any truly affordable units for the urban poor. Consider, for instance, the Minneapolis ordinance. Under this law, barriers to the building of two- and three-unit structures on single-family
lots are simply eliminated, and it
fordable housing will somehow be produced. However, there is no
requirement that any duplexes and triplexes built on the newly
rezoned lots will be affordable fo
ment will undoubtedly militate against that outcome.
In a recent article that appeared in MinnPost, a news organizaand the adoption of its zoning-abolition ordinance. She wrote,
The abolition of single-family zoning received the most attention
from national onlookers, many of whom touted the change as [a]
step toward reversing . . . damage from historical exclusionary
ckling Housing Crisis and In51

49. See id.
50. Roberts, supra note 17.
51. Jessica Lee,
Affordability in the City?, MINNPOST (May 31, 2019), https://www.minnpost.com/metro/2019
/05/how-much-will-minneapolis-2040-plan-actually-help-with-housing-affordability-in-the-city.
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The housing crisis in Minneapolis, Lee explained, is bad and getting
affordable housing is taking a toll
According to
census data, more than 36 percent of all Minneapolis households
spend more on housing that experts deem to be economically sustainable, including one of every two renters.53 The policy director of
52

of the folks who are struggling the most are households that are
tion that is most in need, and unable to access housing.54
with local housing experts, is that
land put existing single-family neighborhoods out of range for the
development of truly affordable housing. Developers who attempt to
build housing for poor households (those who earn 30% of area
median income or less) need local or federal subsidies to make the
economics work. And high transaction costs mean that government
subsidy programs are rarely available for small-scale, privately built
multifamily housing.55
All of which means, Lee wrote, that the effect of the zoning change
most likely will be to give middle- to upper-class residents more options for configuring their homes for middle-class occupants.56 A homeowner, for example, might decide to renovate her house into a duplex
As an attorney for a
Minneapolis affordable-housing non-profit predicted, unless local offiaddress the housing problems of extremely low income, disproportionately minority households, [the] . . .
58
commitment to regional equity w
57

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Margaret Kaplan, policy director of the Housing Justice Center).
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Margaret Kaplan, internal quotations omitted).
Id. (quoting Jack Cann, senior attorney for the Housing Justice Center of Minneapolis).
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For private builders who intend to build a profitable duplex or triplex
without government subsidy, it is very unlikely that low- or very
structures are built.
fact, rarely geared toward this population. The terms of developermandate laws, when closely examined, rarely require the creation
of housing for the low-income households which are in desperate
need. Although descriptions of these programs abound in rhetoric
low-income groups tend to vanish from the calculus when projects
are proposed and approved. For instance, in the Thaden and Wang
exhaustive study of affordable housing programs, no programs were
reported to require the renting of new units to households earning
less than 50% of area median income.59 As a result, the creation of
private-market housing for the very poor under these programs
luctance to mix middle-class and low-income residents in the same
make these programs poor tools for creating what can honestly be
60
Vancouver, Canada, adopted an affordable housing strategy in 2017 with a target of 72,000 new housing units to be built by private-sector developers by the year 2027.
59. See Thaden & Wang, supra note 21, at 47. Maximum household income allowed for
50% of area median income to a high of 150%
of area median income. See id.
60. Requiring the inclusion of truly low-income tenants in an otherwise middle- or upperTower entered through an elaborate entrance on the front; tenants of the 55 low-income units
used a separate, unadorned door on the back. In addition, the common space for low-income
tenants faced a courtyard that they were not allowed to enter. See Melkorka Licea,
Reveal Financial Apartheid Within, N.Y. POST, Jan. 17, 2016.
For an example of a set-aside project built
see Randy Billings, Affordable Senior Housing
Proposed in Downtown Portland, PRESS HERALD (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.pressherald
.com/2019/08/20/affordable-senior-housing-proposed-in-downtown-portland/ (Community Housing of Maine has proposed a project of 49 housing units, most for defined low- and moderateincome residents, but which will include 11 units of housing for long-term residents in the
city-run homeless shelter.).
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In a measure of success, government officials reported that a total
of 15,404 units were approved across the city in the first two years.
However, two-thirds of them were only affordable to households earning more than $80,000 per year. No private sector rentals were built
for groups in the lowest income ranges, even for those earning $2,500
to $4,000 per month.61
ojects under the Portland, Maine
ordinance above are priced so that they are affordable to households
earning up to 80% of area median income. A single person earning
per year.62
In-lieu-of payments received from developers under developermandate programs are potentially more promising; they might be
used by public authorities to create or subsidize what is truly housing for the poor. Using public subsidies from this source, non-profit
entities, for instance, could create units for the most critically needy
groups as a part of their housing plans.63 However, as long as such
mechanism will necessarily be limited.
When faced with the failure of zoning-abolition and developermandate laws to directly create low-income housing, advocates of deis actually) middle-income housing is created by these programs, that
will free units previously occupied by middle-income households, and
64
This might conceivably
happen somewhere, but it has not been detected in any meaningful
61. See Frances Bula, Vancouver Housing Report Shows Progress on Social Housing, Lag
on Low-Cost Rentals, GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.theglobeandmail.com
/canada/british-columbia/article-vancouver-housing-report-shows-progress-on-social-housing
-lag-on-low/; Eric Zimmer, Vancouver Housing Report Shows Progress in Some Areas, Big
Gaps in Others, DAILY HIVE (April 5, 2019, 4:48 PM), https://dailyhive.com/vancouver
/vancouver-housing-plan-progress-report-april-2019.
62. See Randy Billings, Portland Council Weighs Plan for New Hotels to Help Cover Cost
of Affordable Housing, PRESS HERALD (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.pressherald.com/2019/01
/23/city-council-weighs-fee-for-hotel-developers/.
63. See, e.g., Billings, supra note 60 (regarding Community Housing of Maine proposal).
64. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 51 (supporters of zoning ch
more housing of any kind, you will decrease the cost of housing overall because people who
can afford higher prices will move into those new places with more amenities (luxury apart-
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sense in the cities with severe housing crises that have been studied.65
Flaws in this theory include assumptions that vacated middle-income
housing will not simply be taken by other middle-income households,
and that vacated housing will be
iar with the current housing crisis in cities of the United States knows
that these assumptions are highly dubious at best.
such as citywide abolition of single-family zoning, or in conjunction
with developer mandates coupled
desperately needy and lowest-income groups. There might be some
in-lieu-of fees that are collected from developers who choose that
option under developer-mandate programs, but those fees are a minor
piece of the overall deregulatory strategy.
In view of the rhetorical concern about affordable housing for the
poor and other low-income groups that invariably accompanies the
announcement of these strategies, an obvious and common-sense
need for low-income housing, why try to coerce private developers to
family can afford on a newly rezo

Section 8 voucher programs, or
invest in the construction of housing by government or publicly
supported, non-profit entities? One hundred percent of those units
could be dedicated for those who are now homeless on the streets.
As far as effective solutions to the problem are concerned, it is far
more effective to give low-income people vouchers to afford existing
housing, or to build housing that is completely available to those in
contribute at best a token number of truly affordable units each. It
wealthy private developers to contribute a token number of truly
single-family areas to accept the
theoretical possibility that a duplex or triplex housing low-income
65. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra
an increase in the construction of housing since the end of the Great Recession, the number
of cost-burdened or severely cost-burdened low-income renters remains at peak levels).

242

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:227

families might appear on an empty lot. However, as evident on the
streets of communities that have these laws, they are hardly an adequate way to meaningfully address the overwhelming problem of
housing for the poor.66
It must be remembered that deregulatory laws are not simply
minor phenomena among affordable housing strategies; they have
become, in most jurisdictions, the front-line and overwhelmingly predirect and effective methods?
The answer, I believe, is rooted in the underlying financial reality
vouchers, public subsidies for the construction of low-income housing,
include affordable housing units (however defined) in response to
by city officials at no cost, and
with the stroke of a pen. As one study concluded, deregulatory laws
subsidy than traditional affordable housing programs, and therefore
67
Translated: With the
stroke of a pen, the government c
There is nothing wrong, in principle, with the creation of more
housing for households with more resources. The demographic of those
tant in our cities, and the additional availability of housing is always
welcome for any income group. The problem occurs when public
officials and policymakers claim that the deregulatory approach will
66. The income guidelines for the affordable housing program in New York City have led
Housing Programs Stack Up, NEXT CITY (Oct. 2, 2017), https://
nextcity.org/daily/entry/news-inclusionary-housing-survey-progress-limitations. As one comrograms in many jurisdictions include provisions for families
an income]. Thus, unless combined with
vouchers or other subsidy programs, they are not geared toward the poorest segments of the
supra note 20.
67. Armstrong et al., supra note 24, at 2. See also Tuller, supra note 20 (inclusionary
public officials because they can increase the
supply of affordable units without requirin
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officials cannot be unaware that such programs have, in fact, had
little impact on the problem of affordable housing for the poor.

Affordable housing programs that are rooted in the abolition or
waiver of zoning restrictions, in the name of new development, carry
with them another danger for the poor. Not only is there the danger
that deregulatory housing strategies will distract from, and seemingly
absolve local officials from, the creation of truly significant housing
for low-income families and the poor. There is the additional danger
that the development that these deregulatory schemes promote
involves the destruction of existing low-income housing and of the
poor and largely minority neighborhoods that such housing serves.
tory. In Berman v. Parker,68 decided in 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court
famously approved the use of local eminent domain powers to raze
to development more palatable to th
jorities. More than fifty years later, in Kelo v. City of New London,69
the Court again endorsed this strategy. In Kelo, city and state eminent
domain powers targeted for razing an area of small but well-kept
waterfront homes.70
The similarity between the Berman and Kelo situations was not in
the nature of the properties targeted; urban eminent domain in the
hoods, while the neighborhood to be razed in Kelo consisted of modest
older homes, originally built for the working class but currently with
diverse owners and occupants. Rather, the similarity lay in the apl interests in the character, indeed
the mere existence, of where they lived. The Berman opinion made
no mention of the interests of those whose homes and neighborhoods
were to be obliterated, and Kelo

68. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
69. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
70. See id. at 475.
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72

As I have previously written,
Kelo

or national residents, who desire[d] beautification, tax revenues,
high-end restaurants, waterfront shops, and other benefits. The
interests of the community which pre-existed the destruction
required to create those benefits [were] . . . simply not a part of
73

affordable-housing strategies,
the benefits that the government programs purport to create are
different, but the invisibility of the interests of those who live in affected low-income communities is too often the same. What is startling about contemporary deregulatory/affordable housing narratives
is that in the enthusiastic endorsement of these solutions by academics, policymakers, and government officials, the interests of
about how these initiatives will impact developers and high-realestate-value neighborhoods that might become the sites for the
building of the affordable housing that the initiatives promote. The
interests of lower-real-estate-valu
is as if policymakers assume that because these neighborhoods are
ing, the tearing down of low-rise structures, the destruction of open
space and neighborhood character, and so on do not even merit
mention. As one commentator at a meeting of the City Council of
resident expectations to consider
and no positive neighborhood character to protect.74
71. Id. at 480.
72. Id. at 483.
73. Laura S. Underkuffler, Kelo
, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 377, 385
(2006).
74. Comment by a member of the public, meeting of the Portland, Me. City Council
(June 3, 2019).
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In August, 2018, the de Blasio administration in New York City
pushed through a plan to rezone a fifty-nine-block area of the Inwood
neighborhood of Manhattan for the building of 4,348 housing units, a
75
Of the roughly 42,000
residents of the neighborhood, 53 percent were Dominican, with
another 22 percent identifying as Latino from other backgrounds.76
Residents objected to the plan as destroying their historic neighborhood, with cultural, physical, and ethnic cleansing.77 Opponents
claimed that the rezoning plan would push out more than 150 independent family businesses, many owned by immigrants, overcrowd
use of public space and schools, and change the leafy character of the
neighborhood with high-rise buildings and the infrastructure needed
to accommodate new residents.78
they claimed, would be lost.79 The plan was reportedly part of a larger
80

One year later, a state superior court judge struck down the Inwood
pact the neighborhood.81 Among other deficiencies, the city failed to
study the racial and socioeconomic impacts that the rezoning would
have on the neighborhood. Afterward, a member of the coalition of
residents who filed the suit hailed the decision as recognizing that
82
83

from across the

75. See Anna Sanders,
N.Y. POST (July 21, 2018, 4:09 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/07/21/inwood-residents-say-re
zoning-plan-is-an-ethnic-cleansing/; Caroline Spivack, Inwood Rezoning Struck Down Following
Community Challenge, CURBED N.Y. (Dec. 20, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://ny.curbed.com/2019/12
/19/21030664/inwood-rezoning-annulled-lawsuit-legal-challenge.
76. See Sanders, supra note 75.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Elizabeth Kim, In Huge Defeat for De Blasio, Judge Knocks Down Inwood Rezoning,
GOTHAMIST (Dec. 19, 2019, 6:01 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/huge-defeat-de-blasio-judge
-knocks-down-inwood-rezoning.
81. See Spivack, supra note 75.
82. Id.
83. YIMBYs have been described as millennials who advocate the building of housing, and
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country. It was held at Roxbury Community College, in the Roxbury
housing development. YIMBY advocates and other affordable housing
advocates extolled the theoretical and practical benefits of the elimination of zoning controls and the construction of nonconforming
YIMBY proposals to increase density in their neighborhood.84
What is striking about these deregulatory schemes is the assumption that the abandonment of zoni
sity, and other zoning restriction
jects, or the abolition of zoning re
anyone. The assumption seems to be that the zoning restrictions to
be abolished or waived have no legitimate function, whether the community that they protect is a leafy, high-income, high-real-estatevalue area of the city (the theoretical targets of these plans), or a
struggling, low-income, working-class neighborhood comprised of onestory homes that need maintenance and sit on small lots.
The legitimacy of existing zoning restrictions in higher-income and
higher-value neighborhoods is a complex policy question with many
factors involved.85 Whether one has great sympathy or no sympathy
for such owners is, however, of little practical consequence in this
Rise of the YIMBYs: The Angry Millennials with a Radical Housing Solution, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 2, 2017, 2:15 PM), http://theguardian.com/cities/2017/oct/02/rise-of-the-yimbys-angry
instance, the
San Francisco Mission District, a historically low-income, Hispanic neighborhood . . . has been rapidly transforming into an upscale enclave for mostly white,
well-heeled tech workers. . . . A 2014 study estimated that . . . [by 2020] a third
of the . . . Hispanic population will have disappeared . . . . YIMBY groups have
jumped right into this debate, arguing that any new housing is better than none
at all.
See id.
84. See, e.g., Tony Dutzik, Reflections on YIMBYTown: Beyond the Zero-Sum Game?,
FRONTIER GROUP (Oct. 1, 2018), https://frontiergroup.org/blogs/blog/fg/reflections-yimbytown
-beyond-zero-sum-game; Micah Wilson, Race, Land & Power: A Spatial History of Roxbury,
MA through Displacement and Resistance (Dec. 16, 2019), https://storymaps.arcgis.com
/stories/6692b8b353a94eb3aa6b37e54581dfa7 (discussing protest and its roots in racially discriminatory housing policies).
85. See Serkin, supra note 16.
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context. Despite the rhetoric of proponents, market forces which rule
private development will dictate that upper-middle-class or other
high-value residential neighborhoods will rarely be the sites chosen
for zoning-ignoring or zoning-abolishing inclusionary housing redehousing will be the far more likely targets. From the point of view of
low-income people and their neighborhoods, not only do these programs rarely provide housing for the lowest-income groups, they can
make the preservation of what little they do have, even less secure.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that there is a critical housing shortage in the
United States. This is particularly true for those whose low-income
wages are simply inadequate to pay for the shelter that they, as
human beings, require. Deregulato
for low-income people and the poor. Although these campaigns often
they rarely if ever provide housing for those who are truly poor. As
a matter of market economics, it is a mirage to think that private
to zoning-abolition or developerin our cities. Actually, the redevelopment that these laws accomplish is less likely to benefit those communities, than to hurt them.

TAKINGS AS COMPULSORY PURCHASE OF
COMMERCIAL UNITS

STEVEN J. EAGLE*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines recent Supreme Court decisions regarding
private property and eminent domain vis-à-vis growing demands for
government controls over land use, especially to ameliorate climate
change and to reduce regional economic disparities. It notes that tenregulatory takings jurisprudence
and assertive regulation will increase, a trend likely to be heightened
after Knick v Township of Scott. Its contribution is the assertion that
the current judicial regulatory takings apparatus be replaced with the
doctrine that, if owners can demonstrate that the property arrogated by government consists of
ter should be deemed a compulsory purchase, and just compensation
paid. Of course, borderline and unusual circumstances dictate some
continued reliance on substantive due process, which already plays
a crucial, if unacknowledged, role in contemporary regulatory takings doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article suggests a way to resolve the tension between asserted needs for the rapid expansion of state controls over land use
and recent Supreme Court decisions regarding private property and
less coherent, demands for enhanced government responses to climate
change and economic disparities increase. The Article concludes that
current conceptions of regulatory takings law are ill-suited to delineate and balance conflicting interests and suggests an alternative.
The first Part of this Article briefly reviews existing constitutional
protections of private property rights and how these are constrained
by police power regulation. The second Part discusses how changes
in the environment and the economy will result in increasing demands for more regulation at all levels of government. Finally, the
third Part presents my claim that the clash between constitutional
delineations of property and increased regulation might be ameliowhen government arrogates to it

e purposes. More fundamentally,
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property, that should be regarded as a compulsory purchase, and just
compensation paid. This must be supplemented in unusual situations by substantive due process, already a keystone of regulatory takI. PROPERTY, TAKINGS, AND REMEDIES
The ownership of private property was recognized as an inherent
human right by the Framers,1 presupposed and protected by the Due
Processes Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,2 and by
3
which has been described by
4

lation of property was greater than now generally assumed.5 In con6

The Supreme Court
7
As John

regulation is garnering national attention amid broader recognition
of the effects of zoning regulations not only on housing supply and
affordability, but also on regional and national economic growth, social
8

inherent and natural rights . . . among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
A. CONST., drafted by George Mason and unanimously adopted on
June 12, 1776. PA. GAZETTE, June 12, 1776, reprinted in PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
2. U.S. CONST
CONST
3. U.S. CONST
to Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See infra notes
4. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
(3d ed. 2008).
5. See generally John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996).
6. See Richard Briffault,
,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
7. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982).
8. John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid A Housing Crisis,
60 B.C. L. REV
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
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As noted in the foundational case upholding comprehensive
zoning, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,9 government regulaAs the Court immethis field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of
11
In the seminal regulatory takings case,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes stated famously,
goes too far it will be recognized
10

12

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,13 mandates that
courts engage in ad hoc, multifactor inquiries, which results in practitioners being unable to predict litigation outcomes.14 Given the impact of land use regulation on American society generally, and
current demands for amelioration of adverse effects of economic 15
and climate change,16 the legal framework for adjudicating the intensifying clash between regulation and private property rights
seems clearly insufficient.
A. The Framework of Takings Law
This basic framework17 notes that the Takings Clause,18 by requiring that government arrogation of property for public use be
9. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
10. Id. at 387.
11. Id.
12. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See infra
text for discussion.
14. See Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter Century Retrospective on
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 653,
15. See infra Part II for discussion.
16. See infra Part III for discussion.
17. See Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
307 (2007) (which remains a very useful summary of takings law). For a more comprehensive
review, see STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, chs. 1, 2 (5th ed. 2009, 2019) [hereinafter
EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS].
18. U. S. CONST.
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This
provision is applicable against the States and their political subdivisions.20 Until a century ago, the Supreme Court found the Takings
Clause applicable only to instances of direct government appropriation of private property or to instances where actual physical appropriation was unacknowledged.21 That changed in 1922, when, in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,22 Justice Holmes declared for the
regulated to a certain extent, if
23
While
19

regulations, intended to protect the public health and safety.24 The
boundary between these categories is not clear-cut, and, as noted in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,25 regulations going beyond
the prohibitions of common law nuis
the ambit of the police power.26

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York27
takings jurisprudence.28 Penn Central broadly set forth a test based
19. See
20. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (citing Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
21. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (
permanently submerged behind government-authorized dam).
22. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
23. Id. at 415.
24. The classic case is Mugler v. Kansas
country is held under the implie
of it shall not be injurious to
Id. at 665. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public. Both property and
liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing power of
the state in the exercise of those powers, and with such conditions the 14th Amendment was
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664)).
25. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
26. Id. at 1024.
27. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
28. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Re
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001)
Our polestar . . . remains the principles set forth in Penn Central
itself and our other cases that gove
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While conventionally this is known as a threefactor test, owner expectations are but a subset of economic impact, 30
and the delineation of the property to which takings analysis is
29

31

tance. Many other factors have been identified.33
For over forty years, Penn Central has been subject to an immense amount of criticism for its lack of doctrinal clarity.34 Thomas
32

area to a Scrabble board on which Penn Central is the first term set
down, and from which subsequent cases are built upon it for the
35

29. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc,
have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are,
of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental
und when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.
30. See Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero,
Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Central
Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 32 (2005).
31. Penn Central
ether a particular governmental
action has effected a taking, this Court focuses . . . on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole . . .).
32. See infra Section IV.B.1. See also Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central
Four
Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PA. ST. L. REV.
Factors].
33. See Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997) (dis34. See, e.g., Eagle, Four Factors, supra
Penn Central] doctrine has
become a compilation of moving parts that are neither individually coherent nor collectively
Jed Rubenfield, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1089 (1993) (noting that Penn
Central
Justifying Regulatory
Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV
long derided the regulatory
takings doctrine as incohe
35. Thomas W. Merrill,
Takings Doctrine and the Perils
of Common Law Constitutionalism, 34 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
sis builds upon ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (suggesting that
the common law is like a game of Scrabble in
nounced [can] be erased, but qualifications [can] be added
Id. at 8.
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Among the most significant of these cases is Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,36
hibit all economically beneficial use of land . . . cannot be newly
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the
37

Where there is such a severe deprivation, the regulation is per se a
taking without regard to the balancing tests of Penn Central. However, Lucas has proved not very consequential, since courts have
interpreted the need for deprivation of all economic use strictly.38
Also important is that analyses under Lucas and Penn Central are
Murr v.
Wisconsin,39
40

In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court held that conditions placed
41

impact on the locality,42
43
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.44
earlier formulation in Agins v. City of Tiburon45
tion of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if
the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state inter46
Lingle
prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings,
47

While the Court in Lingle attempted to sequester substantive due
process as antecedent to regulatory takings review, the success of
that enterprise is problematic.48
36. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
37. Id. at 1029.
38. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
a landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
See infra Section IV.B.1 for discussion.
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
Id. at 391.
Id.
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
Id. at 260.
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
See infra Section IV.C for discussion.
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Finally, in Murr v. Wisconsin,49 the Court compounded the confusion it created with its ad hoc, multifactor regulatory takings test in
Penn Central by adopting a separate, but overlapping, multifactor
test to define the parcel to which Penn Central should be applied.50
A different array of questions is
takings opinion, Knick v. Township of Scott.51 These will be discussed subsequently.52
B. Knick v. Township of Scott
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City,53 the Supreme Court established a twopronged test to determine whether takings claims against state and
local governments were ripe for review in federal court. The first
tions effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the
government entity charged with implementing the regulations has
reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations
54

provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the
property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation
Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compen55
Two years later, in First English Lutheran Evangelical
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,56 the Court ruled that
the remedy for a regulation that constituted a taking was not its
subsequent abrogation, but rather payment of just compensation.
If a property owner attempted to ripen a takings claim in state court
for subsequent federal judicial review as required by Williamson
County, however, that effort subsequently was determined to be stymied in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco.57
49. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
50. See infra Section IV.B.1 for discussion.
51. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
52. See infra Sections I.B and IV.A for discussion.
53. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
54. Id. at 186. See infra
relevance of this provision.
55. Id. at 195.
56. 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987).
57. 545 U.S. 323 (2005).

for discussion of the current
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State law takings principles adhere closely to the Federal Constitution, and the Court held in San Remo that application of the federal
full faith and credit statute58 would result in preclusion of the statelitigated issues from review in federal court. The plaintiffs argued
that issue preclusion would be unfair, since they sued in state court
concern may be, we are not free to disregard the full faith and credit
59

The state litigation prong of Williamson County recently was overruled by the Supreme Court in Knick v. Township of Scott.60 The
2012, the Township enacted an ordi
contained on private or public property, which has been set apart for

ordinance caused a taking of her property on its face and as-applied,
by authorizing public and governmental access to her land.61
62

mination that the case was unripe under the state-determination
prong of Williamson County.63
Writing for a five-to-four Court64 in Knick, Chief Justice Roberts
declared:
The state-litigation requirement relegates the Takings Clause
of Rights. Plaintiffs asserting any other constitutional claim are
guaranteed a federal forum under § 1983 [of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871], but the state-litigation
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 347.
139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
Id. at 2168.
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2017).
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169.
ion was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, dissented.
Justice Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence.
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Clause and our cases construing it requires overruling Williamson
County and restoring takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional status the Framers envisioned when they included the
Clause among the other protections in the Bill of Rights.65

a Catch-22: He cannot go to federal court without going to state court
first; but if he goes to state court and loses, his claim will be barred
66

of the state-litigation prong were not clear
until San Remo
out compensation violates the self-executing Fifth Amendment at
the time of the taking, the property owner can bring a federal suit
68
Thus, after Knick, takings claimants immediately
are free to bring suit in federal court. The effect of that will be considered subsequently.69
67

II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPERATIVES FOR CHANGE
ens perilous risks for our physical homes. It also poses a serious
70
Some environmental issues are
of long standing, such as protecting clean water and air. Others are
more recently comprehended, such as climate change in its manifold
effects, including dangers to coastal areas through sea-level rise.
Intriguingly, however, environmental cleanups, salutary for other
purposes, might themselves trigger problems such as congestion and
gentrification, as affluent homebuyers and tenants now seek residence in revitalized areas.71
65. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169 (internal citations omitted).
66. Id. at 2167. See also Ilya Somin, Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending a Catch-22 That
Barred Takings Cases from Federal Court, 2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153.
67. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
68. Id. at 2172.
69. See infra Section IV.A for discussion.
70. J. Peter Byrne, Property in the Anthropocene, 6 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF.
J. 259, 259 (2017).
71. See Sarah Fox, Environmental Gentrification, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 803 (2019).
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A. Climate Change
We now are in the early stages of considering how the law of property rights and government regulation will respond to substantial
rises in sea level. Many regulatory takings questions will arise.72
196973 requires federal agencies to ta
mental impacts of their actions and disclose public information, such
as the environmental impacts of a proposed action (including cumulative impacts), adverse effects that cannot be avoided, alternatives to
a proposed action, and commitments of resources for federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 74 In its
2016 guidance on how federal agencies should consider the impacts
of climate change in NEPA reviews,75 the Council on Environmental
consider greenhouse gas emisosed projects and their effects.
However, a new draft guidance proposed by the Trump administration in 2019 would eliminate the need to analyze the rise in sea levels
or climate change.76 Also, many states and the District of Columbia
77

Even before his election, President Donald Trump made statehealthy air and not distracted by the expensive hoax that is global
78
Regardless of the winds of politics, however, corporate
America and its providers of capital are well aware of the need for
companies to take climate change into account in their planning.79
72. See generally J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights,
and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69 (2012).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018).
75. Memorandum from the Council on Environmental Quality on Final Guidance for
Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the
Effects of Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews, 81 Fed. Reg. 51,866
(Aug. 5, 2016).
76. Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (June 26, 2019).
77. See Council on Environmental Quality, States and Local Jurisdictions with NEPA-like
Environmental Planning Requirements, NEPA.GOV, https://ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/states
.html (last visited July 21, 2020).
78. Cinnamon P. Carlarne, U.S. Climate Change Law: A Decade of Flux and an Uncertain
Future, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 387, 400 (2019) (quoting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 6, 2013, 7:38 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/4089837898 30815744).
79. See, e.g., Dawn Lim & Julie Steinberg, BlackRock to Hold Companies and Itself to
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Carbon taxes are the preferred method for reducing GHGEs, since
Limitations
on overall emissions and tradable permits (cap-and-trade) are an
alternative but subject to political allocation of initial entitlements
in lieu of their sale on the open market.81
82
Among suggested alternatives is the use of monetary exactions to force developers to
mitigate the effects of climate change.83
The Reformation of American
Administrative Law,84 averred that courts had lessened the con80

agency discretion is inevitably seen as the essentially legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of various private interests
85
However, Sidney Shapiro has complained
king is an inherently discretionary
and ultimately political act fails to credit how administrative law
insists on a reasoned judgment in the choice of a rule. It is misleading in another significant way. It disregards the role of expertise in
86

Higher Standards on Climate Risk, WALL ST.

cause the costs of climate change have rami-

80. Andrew L. Kinde,
as a Foundational Piece of Climate Legislation in the United States, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 474, 522
(2019) (quoting William G. Gale et al., Carbon Taxes as Part of The Fiscal Solution, in
ROUTLEDGE EXPLORATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, IMPLEMENTING A US CARBON TAX
8 (Ian Parry, Adele Morris & Roberton C. Williams III eds., 2015)).
Economic Advisors Gregory Mankiw to state:
The Fundamental Theorem of Carbon Taxation, GREG MANKIW S
BLOG (Aug. 2, 2007), http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2007/08/fundamental-theorem-of-carbon
-taxation.html.
82. Kinde, supra note 80, at 488.
83. See generally J. Peter Byrne & Kathryn A. Zyla, Climate Exactions, 75 MD.L. REV. 758
(2016). The authors argue
e and feasible approach for local
Id. at 759.
84. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667 (1975).
85. Id. at 1683.
86. Sidney A. Shapiro, Law, Expertise and Rulemaking Legitimacy: Revisiting the
Reformation, 49 ENVTL. L. 661, 677 (2019).
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In particular, Shapiro claimed, the Obama-era rule delineating
87
was a vital element of
the Clean Water Act,88
89

signed to clarify and simplify the definition and delineate bright line
distinctions where possible, [and] was not a matter of pure political
90
From a different perspective, the Trump administration recently promulgated a final rule that narrows federal oversight
of water pollution.91
As Bethany Noll and Richard Revesz have noted, the Trump adons promulgated by his predecessor.92
During its first two years, the Trump administration has sought to
93
including flat94
repealing and replac95

Clean Water Rule,

96

(June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232,
300, 302, and 401) [hereinafter WOTUS Rule]; Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
89. Id. § 1362(7).
90. Shapiro, supra
based not only on legal precedent and the best available peer-reviewed science, but also on
91. See

supra note 87, at 37,055).

codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117,
120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 401).
92. Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV.
1, 2 (2019) (these included abeyances in pending litigation and suspensions of final regulations).
93. Id. at 63.
94. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAF
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018) (to be codified
lished by the Environmental Protection Agency
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration on April 30, 2020. 85 Fed. Reg.
24,174 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86 and 600, 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, and 537).
95. Revisions to Emission Guideline Regulations, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746 (proposed Aug. 31,
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60). 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (April 21, 2020).
Reg. 34,899 (proposed July 27,
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 401); 85
Fed. Reg. at 22,250.
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rule.97 Of these, the only proposal finalized by July 2020 was the
replacement of the Clean Power Plan and the Clean Water Rule.98
As a result, after the final rules are eventually promulgated,
should President Trump not win re-election, the Justice Department might not have sufficient time to guide them through
litigation while it is still under his control. A Democratic administration could then seek abeyances in the pending litigation to
aid efforts to undo the rollbacks. And even if the litigation were
to be completed in time, rules with long compliance periods would
be vulnerable to suspension efforts.99

The effects of property in the land of climate change, perhaps most
particularly sea-level rise, will be dramatic. As Christopher Serkin
asserted, state and local governments may not be able to avoid takings
100

ernment prohibits or builds sea walls, its near-total control over the
allocation of the inevitable harm serves as a doctrinal hook for pas101

vent growth, but to accommodate and even to encourage it, albeit in
ways that protect the environment, strengthen existing communities, and reduce the fiscal burden of providing services to support
102

in areas where more dense developments are needed to avoid sprawl
(so development can go up rather than out) may use environmental
97. Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed and Modified Sources Review, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50,244c (proposed Sept. 24, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
98. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (Sept. 6, 2019) (codified at 40
C.F.R. 60); 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,250.
99. Noll & Revesz, supra note 92, at 63.
100. Christopher Serkin,
,
113 MICH. L. REV. 345 (2014).
101. Id. at 394.
102. Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of
Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 253 (2000).
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protection to prevent the development of (vertical) housing stock
103
However, he adds, people express environmental concerns that range from preventing conges104

Indeed, to avoid this problem there would need to be a dramatic
shift in the American housing paradigm, whereby people are content
living in condos reaching to the heavens rather than demanding
single family homes on a lot of a certain size. This is an incredibly
hard sell in the U.S., however, which is path dependent on sprawling
horizontally into the natural landscape.105
ban living is actually the preference of many,106 and brings to mind
that planners have their own biases.107 As one leading practitioner

Most planners will express a greater preference for row houses,
garden apartments, and elevator apartments than for singlefamily houses, and most will express a greater preference for
central or urban locations as opposed to suburban locations. It
is assumed that the American public has similar preferences but
is deprived by the operation of the housing market of opportunities to express them in the purchase or rental of homes.108

Perhaps the most important way economics exacerbates development
sprawl is that the solutions currently needed to protect the natural
103. Blake Hudson, Land Development: A Super-Wicked Environmental Problem, 51 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1123, 1147 (2019).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local
increased political polarization
Relationship?, 106 GEO.
marked by geographic political sorting, urban residents are more liberal than their suburban,
107. Steven J. Eagle, On Engineering Urban Densification, 4 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF.
108. Id.
Operations Research for Metropolitan Planning, 29 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS
074. Wheaton headed the Institute of Urban and Regional Development at the University of
California, Berkeley, taught planning at the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard, and
was on the board of the American Institute of Planners, a forerunner of the American Planning Association.
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environment can create unintended and burdensome economic con109

In recent years, a few cities and states have undertaken large steps
to increase density. For instance, Minneapolis recently was the first
major city in the country to abolish residential single-family zoning.110
In California, the highly publicized Senate Bill 827, which would
preempt local land use regulations in some areas of the state to permit denser development near public transit, died in committee.111
However, even more ambitious legislation, Senate Bill 50,112 a bill
throughout California by raising height limits and allowing mid-rise
apartments near transit stations and employment centers, as well as
113

preserving their lifestyle and less affluent city dwellers seeing a
114

III. ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES FOR CHANGE
In the United States, there has been a broad pattern of increasing
bifurcation between areas which have become wealthier and those
that have become poorer. Areas with prosperous industries and wellpaid specialized workers tend to attract more of the same, a process
known as economic agglomeration.115 Correspondingly, areas increasingly bereft of viable industries and good jobs find ambitious young
109. See Hudson, supra note 103, at 1146.
110. See Sarah Mervosh, Minneapolis Ends Zoning That Became Proxy for Race, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2108, at A12.
111. See John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid A Housing
Crisis, 60 B.C. L. REV
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces
/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB50.
113. Greg Cornfield,
50 Lifts Zoning Restrictions and Opens the Door for Denser Development Throughout the State,
COMMERCIAL OBSERVER (Jan. 9, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://commercialobserver.com/2020/01
/transit-housing-bill-is-back-in-cas-housing-crisis-fight/.
114. Conor Dougherty, California, Mired in a Housing Crisis, Rejects an Effort to Ease It,
N.Y. TIMES (January 31, 2020) at B1, https://nyti.ms/2uPY7Pm.
115. See generally EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM
The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
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people moving out and family, cultural, and civic decay, a developHillbilly Elegy.116
The percentage of Americans living in metropolitan areas where
family incomes are within 20 percent of the nation as a whole was
According to the Congressional
Budget Office, after taxes and means-tested government transfer
benefits, average household incomes in 2016 were about $21,000 for
the lowest quintile, $291,000 for the highest quintile, and $1.8 million
for the top one percent.118 This represented a change in inflationadjusted income after taxes and transfers since 1979 of 85 percent
for the bottom quintile, 101 percent for the highest quintile, and 226
percent for the top one percent.119
117

Recognition of the decline of large parts of America, culminating
the work of Angus Deaton and Anne Case, who described the ravages caused by drugs, alcohol and suicide in rural America.120 Also,
Consequently, an important public policy debate
concerns whether government assistance should be directed towards
benefitting people or towards benefitting places.122
There is a fundamental dichotomy between the goal of maximizing economic productivity and the goal of preserving deep roots in
121

116. J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS(2016).
117. Robert A. Manduca, The Contribution of National Income Inequality to Regional
Economic Divergence, 98 SOCIAL FORCES 622 (2019), https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/98/2
/622/5418441.
118. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE REPORT, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME,
2016 (July 9, 2019), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55413.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife
Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 PROCEEDINGS NAT L ACAD.
SCI. 15078, 15078 (2015), http://www.pnas.org/content/112/49/15078; Anne Case & Angus S.
Deaton, Suicide, Age, and Wellbeing: An Empirical Investigation
Research, Working Paper No. w21279, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621334.
121. Edward L. Glaeser, Joshua Gottlieb & Owen Ziv, Unhappy Cities
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20291, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20291.
122. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL.
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the community. For instance, David Schleicher maintains that many
123
In response, Naomi Schoenbaum asserts that those people might be
mobility so prized by Schleicher is
124

Economists have tended in the past to regard as problematic efforts
to improve the lives of those in less prosperous regions through subsidies. As Benjamin Austin, Edward Glaeser, and Larry Summers
policies because of a conviction that relief is best targeted towards
poor people not poor places, because incomes in poor areas were converging towards incomes in rich areas anyway, and because of fears
125

One ameliorative approach, suggested by Patrick Kline and Enrico
Moretti, is that subsidy programs sh
126
For instance, subsidies might require
that new employees be subject to a five-year residency requirement
127

A recent study by Cailin Slattery and Owen Zidar, Evaluating State
and Local Tax Incentives,128
there is now growing enthusiasm among many policymakers and acaargue that in recent decades, past convergence of regional economic
129

One

123. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE
L.J. 78 (2017).
124. Naomi Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of Place,
127 YALE L.J. F. 458 (2017). See also JOHN BRINCKERHOFF JACKSON, A SENSE OF PLACE, A
SENSE OF TIME (1994).
125. Benjamin Austin, Edward L. Glaeser & Larry Summers, Jobs for the Heartland: PlaceBased Policies in 21st Century America
Research, Working Paper No.
w24548, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170812.
126. Patrick Kline & Enrico Moretti, People, Places, and Public Policy: Some Simple
Welfare Economics of Local Economic Development Programs, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 629, 657
(2014), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041024.
127. Id.
128. Cailin Slattery & Owen Zidar, Evaluating State and Local Business Tax Incentives *1
, Working Paper No. w26603, 2020), J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3514341.
129. Austin, Glaeser & Summers, supra note 125, at 2.
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further problem is that people are discouraged from moving from
economically stagnant areas because of high housing prices in productive areas.130
Nevertheless, Slattery and Zidar conclude:
While we find some evidence of direct employment gains from
attracting a firm, we do not find strong evidence that firm-specific
tax incentives increase broader economic growth at the state and
local level. Although these incentives are often intended to attract and retain high-spillover firms, the evidence on spillovers
and productivity effects of incentives appears mixed. As subsidygiving has become more prevalent, subsidies are no longer as
closely tied to firm investment. If subsidy deals do not lead to high
spillovers, justifying these incentives requires substantial equity
gains, which are also unclear empirically.
The lack of clear spillovers and equity benefits suggest potentially large gains from reforms that direct resources to where efficiency and equity gains are largest . . . .131

As the Wall Street Journal
question the common practice of using narrow, firm-specific tax breaks
132

Shayak Sarkar and Josh Rosenthal
133
asserting that property assessment and tax limitations that privilege preexisting
Proposition 13,134
paying higher taxes because the law treats them with less regard
135

130. Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined? 102 J. URB. ECON. 76, 90 (2017). See Section III.B.1 for discussion of affordable housing.
131. Slattery & Zidar, supra
local governments across the U.S.
spend at least $30 billion a year to attract and keep companies, but the biggest deals generate
132. Richard Rubin, Economists Question the Benefits of Targeted Tax Breaks, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 6, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/economists-question-the-benefits-of-tar
geted-tax-breaks-11578308400?shareToken=st372e440a9ced4b87a410f6591df7d845.
133. Shayak Sarkar & Josh Rosenthal, Exclusionary Taxation, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
619, 619 (2018).
134. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a).
135. Sarkar & Rosenthal, supra note 133.
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1. Affordable Housing
Agglomeration refers to the virtuous circle of clusters of specialized businesses attracting specialized workers and vice versa.136 It
explains the rise of cities such as Detroit in the last century and the
Silicon Valley today.137
The past thirty years have seen a dramatic decline in the rate of
income convergence across states and in population flows to highincome places. These changes coincide with a disproportionate
increase in housing prices in high-income places, a divergence in
the skill-specific returns to moving to high-income places, and a
redirection of low-skill migration away from high-income places.138

As I have discussed elsewhere,139
the popularity of which is explained by its representing different
things for middle-class, moderate-income, and poor families; those
desiring neighborhood preservation; and for those seeking to further
equality by stressing either neighborhood integration or access to
equality of opportunity for education, employment, or culture. 140 In
affluent suburbs, upper-middle-c
and similar restrictions to exclude those they perceive as threatening home values, natural amenities, and school excellence.141
136. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
an industry has . . . chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long: so great are the
advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from near neighbourhood to one
137. The literature on agglomeration is extensive. See, e.g., EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF

THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER,

HAPPIER (2011); Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1373 (2014);
Schleicher, supra
AND

failing to generate agglomeration benefits. Fennell, supra
David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1737 (2013).
138. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 130, at 76.
139. Steven J. Eagle,
, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301 (2017).
140. Id.
141. See generally RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS:HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE
CLASS IS LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (2017).

2020]

TAKINGS AS COMPULSORY PURCHASE

269

While the cost of building materials and labor have not increased
substantially in recent years, Joseph Gyourko and Raven Molloy analyzed evidence suggesting that restrictions on buildable land have led
to the growth of a 60 percent wedge between house prices and the
cost of materials and labor.142Also, restrictive zoning constricts the
supply of new housing and results in higher prices.143 According to
a December 2019 study by Joseph Gyourko and others, this has remained unchanged.144
The most highly regulated markets are on the two coasts, with
the San Francisco and New York City metropolitan areas being the
most highly regulated according to our metric. . . . [T]he housing
bust associated with the Great Recession did not lead any major
market that previously was highly regulated to reverse course
and deregulate to any significant extent. Moreover, regulation
in most large coastal markets has increased over time.145

Government subsidies for development in distressed areas can lead
lords, some of whom may not live in the community, to capture some
of the benefits associated with a policy. This is more likely when the
housing market is already tight or when there are sharp restrictions
146

Affordable housing is not merely a localized problem, since many
workers cannot afford to move to areas where they would be most
productive. Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti estimated that the
economic effects of high housing costs resulted in a potential reduction in output in the United States of 13 percent between 1964 and
2009.147
142. Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20536, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20536.
143. See, e.g., Carolina K. Reid et al.,
Massachusetts Chapter 40B, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 241, 241 (2017).
144. Joseph Gyourko et al., The Local Residential Land Use Regulatory Environment Across
U.S. Housing Markets: Evidence from a New Wharton Index
Working Paper No. 26573, 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w26573.pdf.
145. Id. at 1.
146. Kline & Moretti, supra note 126, at 657.
147. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth and Aggregate Growth
Working Paper No. 21154, 2015), http://www
.nber.org/papers/w21154.pdf.
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2. Gentrification
In response to the claim that gentrification drives out low-income
and minority residents, Peter Byrn
good on balance for the poor and ethnic minorities. The most negative
effect of gentrification, the reduction in affordable housing, results
primarily not from gentrification itself, but from the persistent failure of government to produce or secure affordable housing more
148
He adds that
[m]oreover, cities that attract more affluent residents are more
able to aggressively finance affordable housing. Thus, gentrificanot three, given that it enhances
the political and economic positions of all, but exacerbates the
harms imposed on the poor by the failures of national affordable
housing policies.149

Indeed, gentrification can lead either to integrated living or greater
segregation.150
investment tax incentives is a contradiction between rhetoric and
reality. They are presented as laws that benefit low-income communities, yet the dominant types of place-based investment tax incentives
151
Even subsidy programs aimed at
poorer areas both resulted in negative consequences152 and also encouraged cherry-picking of projects least in need of government
assistance.153 A 2019 Presidential Executive Order created a White
148. J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 406 (2003).
149. Id.
150. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Unjust Cities? Gentrification, Integration, and the Fair
Housing Act, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 835 (2019) (asserting that the Fair Housing Act can help
establish integration in gentrifying areas).
151. Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax
Incentives and A Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745, 745.
152. See, e.g., George Lefcoe,
ght for California Redevelopment
Law, 52 HASTINGS
diverts substantial funds from local schools and county services to commercial mortgage
repayment).
153. Id.
to accept the fact that private developers had no capacity to re-build in the worst part
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House Council on Eliminating Regulatory Barriers to Affordable
Housing,154 but it is not clear whether it will prove effective.
Other proposed solutions for the creation and preservation of affordable housing include the use of public-private partnerships, predicated on the theory that government agencies will set the parameters
of development and private entities would effectuate it155 I have
contended that the concept has serious flaws.156 Other proposals
include the designation of government-specified infrastructure as
157
or, correspondingly, permitting government
to capture the value of infrastructure to alleviate affordable housing
problems.158 The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,159
version of a top-down approach,160 created the Opportunity Zones
program.161
[w]ithout [m]eaningful [m]onitoring [s]ystems.162
3. Mobility and Government Regulation
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures asserted that present and prospective homeowners in the
154. See Exec. Order No. 13,878, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,549 (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.white
house.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-establishing-white-house-council-eliminating
-regulatory-barriers-affordable-housing/.
155. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
from the tax-and-service wagon, [political leaders] have learned that they can steer more effectively if they let others do more of the rowing
best energies and brains
156. Eagle, supra
157. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice
Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 129 (2001)
by a government entity, such as a right to emit specified pollutants into the atmosphere under
the terms of a permit issued by a government
detailed explication, see
Steven J. Eagle, The Perils of Regulatory Property in Land Use Regulation, 54 WASHBURN L.J.
1 (2014).
158. See, e.g., Arpit Gupta et al., Take the Q Train: Value Capture of Public Infrastructure
Projects
ing Paper No. 26789, 2020), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3466847 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466847.
159. Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
160. George K. Yin,
the Tax Legislative Process, 39 VA. TAX REV
161. Investing in Opportunity Act,
www.congress.gov
/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/293/all-info.
162. Victoria Lee, Opportunity Without Reach: The Problems with the Opportunity Zone
Program and the Need for Clarification, Oversight, and Regulation, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
117, 129 (2019).
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suburbs of a metropolitan area could
the particular community that offered what they regarded as the
most preferred mix of amenities and taxes.163 What became known as
goods and services is inherently
164

However, Lee Anne Fennell and Richard McAdams recently have
edge, perfect mobility, no constraints associated with employment (all
people are assumed to live on dividend income), and no spillovers
165

166

An inverted TH thus looks for ways to improve the conditions of
mobility for everyone, increase awareness of the extrajurisdictional implications of local policies, and address interdependencies among communities so that the implicit price signals sent
by moves are accurate ones. This means examining the ways in
which local governmental policies impose costs on other local governments, such as through exclusionary housing policies. More
foundationally, it means focusing attention on how all households
can be given meaningful choices among local jurisdictions. 167

4. Fair Housing
Since the late 1970s, it had become clear that the Department of
edy exclusionary zoning, although problems of legal standing and
ewhat curtailed the effectiveness
168
However, two Obama-era developments showed a
promise of change.
163. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
164. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Inversion Aversion, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 797,
803 (2019).
165. Id. (citing Tiebout, supra
166. Id. at 797.
167. Id. at 804.
168. Thomas Silverstein, State Land Use Regulation in the Era of Affirmatively Furthering
Fair Housing, 24 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 305, 315 (2015).
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Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project.169 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted that
made it difficult to prove intent
to discriminate, thus justifying the basing of legally cognizable claims
onately adverse effect on minori170
How171

The rule required
that localities receiving HUD funding would have to submit performance assessments and future goals, using very detailed data compilation and analytical tools to be provided by HUD.173
During the Trump era, things have changed once more. In January
2018, HUD suspended the obligation of local governments to file
plans under the regulation and, in May 2018, withdrew the required
172

On
January 14, 2020, HUD published a proposed replacement of the
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing rule. 175
174

Since the issuance of the 2015 final rule, HUD has determined
that the current regulations are overly burdensome to both HUD
and grantees and are ineffective in helping program participants
meet their reporting obligations for multiple reasons. While some
of the burdens are a result of the assessment tools themselves, the
tools are closely tied to the regulatory language, which HUD believes is too prescriptive in outcomes for jurisdictions. Therefore,
169. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
170. Id. at 2513 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
171. Id. at 2522.
172. 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015).
173. 24 C.F.R. § 5.152 (2015).
Dev., HUD Issues Improved Fair Housing
Rule (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/HUD_No
_20_002.
175. 85 Fed. Reg. 2041 (Jan. 14, 2020).
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HUD believes it is necessary to revise the codified regulation,
not just the assessment tools.
First, the AFH required significant resources from program participants, and its complexity and demands resulted in a high failure rate for jurisdictions to gain approval for their AFH in the
first year of AFH submission. HUD became aware of significant
deficiencies in the Local Government assessment tool that impeded completion and HUD acceptance of meaningful assessments by program participants. The number of questions, the
open-ended nature of many questions, and the lack of prioritization
between questions made the planning process both inflexible and
difficult to complete.176

Further, the proposed AFFH rule emphasized that in Inclusive Communities
not an instrument to force housing authorities to reorder their priorire statistical imbalances in hous177

IV. TAKINGS LAW AND ITS CHALLENGES AFTER KNICK
Knick v. Township of Scott178
raises many legal issues which will impinge on the ability of both
federal and state courts to meet challenges to our nation, including
those presented by climate change and growth disparities. This section of the Article discusses some of them.
A. The Federalization of Land Use Law?
1. Is the Takings Clause Self-Executing? Sovereign Immunity
It is conventional to describe Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.
Co. v. Chicago179 as the case that applied the Takings Clause to the
states, although this case might better be viewed through the lens
of due process.180 While they can be sued for just compensation in
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 2042.
Id.
Inclusive Communities
139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
See infra
text for discussion.
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state court, one important problem left unresolved by Knick is whether
states possess sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment181
from suits for just compensation filed in federal court.
In United States v. Clarke,182
simply as a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when
183
The Court
self-executing character of the constitutional provision with
184
Later, in
185
cies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
ipse dixit,
may not transform private property into public property without
186

Important issues in federalism and land use will be litigated as
Knick v.
Township of Scott.187 One issue is whether Knick overruled prior sovereign immunity law with respect to Takings Clause cases. Thomas
vention principle to the effect that the government cannot avoid its
obligation to pay compensation by declining to exercise the power of

188

ory of regulatory takings actions
suggests that the Takings Clause was not regarded as having abrogated state sovereign immunity. The takings issue arose in tort
189
suits seeking damages from or in
181. U.S. CONST
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
182. 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (holding that a 1901 federal statute stating that Indian lands
permitted those aggrieved to bring actions in inverse condemnation).
183. Id. at 257.
184. Id. (citing 6 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972)) (emphasis added).
185. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
186. Id. at 164.
187. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
188. Thomas Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV.L.REV. 1630, 1637 (2015)
(citations and quotation omitted).
189. Id. at 1652 (citing United States v. Lee,
remedy for an owner whose land was unlawfully seized by the government was an injunction
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rier to seeking declaratory relief against the states would be surmounted by relying on the officer suit procedure of Ex parte Young 190
In an early post-Knick case, Bay Point Properties, Inc. v. Mississippi
Transportation Commission,191 the Fifth Circuit upheld the district
sequent to a state court condemnation award of only minimal damrecent decision in Knick v. Township of Scott192 overruled prior sovereign immunity law in Takings Clause cases. Citing Supreme Court
precedent, the Fifth Circuit held as
Congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity consistent with the Enforcement Clause of the
of which was present.193
Nothing in Knick alters these bedrock principles of sovereign
immunity law. To begin with, the Court did not even have occasion to reconsider sovereign immunity law in Knick, because
that case involved a suit against a locality, and it is well established that local governments are not entitled to the sovereign
immunity enjoyed by states.194
Nor does anything in Knick even suggest, let alone require, reconsideration of longstanding sovereign immunity principles protecting states from suit in federal court. Rather, Knick held only
takes his property for public us
ingly, Knick
owner [to] pursue state procedures for obtaining compensation
195

against continued possession by the relevant officers)).
190. Id.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
191. 937 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2566 (2020).
192. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
193. Bay Point Prop., Inc., 937 F.3d at 456 (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999)).
194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. Id. (citing Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170, 2173).
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Importantly, the Fifth Circuit implicitly denied that the Takings
Clause was self-executing when adding:
[T]o the extent that Knick has any effect on suits against state
governments, the Court simply put takings claims against state
governments on equal footing with claims against the federal
government. . . . And nobody disputes that takings claims against
the federal government require the waiver of sovereign immunity
contained in the Tucker Act.196

Regarding a similar issue, the Supreme Court recently declined
to consider whether states can claim sovereign immunity to shield
patents from challenge at the Patent and Trademark Office.197
Claims?
It generally is not at all clear why takings plaintiffs would prefer to
sue in federal court. As Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook
put it:
Federal Courts are not boards of zoning appeals. This message,
oft-repeated, has not penetrated the consciousness of property
owners who believe that federal judges are more hospitable to
their claims than are state judges. Why they should believe this
198

imposing barriers . . . to guard against the federal courts becoming
199
A recent empirical study
200
supports this position.
196. Id.
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170 (citing in turn the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1))); Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissent
197. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
908 (2020).
198. River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1994).
199. Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S.
See generally Steven J. Eagle, Penn Central
and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Eagle, Reluctant Muftis].
200. See James Krier & Stewart Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 35 (2017) (finding landowner wins in state court 12%, federal court 9%.).
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That said, the story might be different in some jurisdictions. California is reputed to have a state court system that favors localities,201
and Illinois likewise is reputed to favor landowners.202 Ultimately,
ernment actions that must be evaluated in light of numerous factors,
some inherently requiring a large dose of subjectivity. Plaintiffs
might well in many cases conclude that the judgment calls of local
state courts might be less favorable than those of federal judges.
3. Concurrent Jurisdiction and Abstention
defined by state law.203 Knick
of the Williamson County final-determination prong204 means that
state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over regulatory
takings claims, leading to many potential problems in ascertaining
states, for instance, require compensation for damages to property
206
as well as takings205
than
207
the federal standard under Kelo v. City of New London. Also, some
states require compensation for government actions impinging on
value but not rising to the level of a taking.208
201. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger,
8 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J. 9, 10

202. E.g.

With Regulatory Takings?,
s practiced constitutional

id. at 10 n.5.
rgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 160, 163 (1997). The Court
r, defendants may remove to the appropriate federal district

Id. at 163. The Court did not add that, had
the landowner brought the suit in district court, it could not have ruled on the merits under
the state litigation prong of Williamson County.
203. See, e.g.
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
205. See, e.g., CAL. CONST

damaged

206. See, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004) (repudiating
of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)).
207. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
208. See, e.g., Vale v. Palm Beach Cty., 259 So. 3d 951 (Fla. Dist. App. 2018) (discussing the
Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(1) (2019)).
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Moreover, Knick
does not purport to challenge the constitutional status of state
property law as the underpinning of federal Takings law. Nor
does it purport to challenge the test and principles that are to be
applied in determining whether an interference with a property
right under State law requires the payment of just compensation
as a matter of federal constitutional law.209

Nevertheless, as David Dana maintains, it might result in an
urts of the traditional state role
210
Another question is whether federal
judges will consider the informal bargaining of local officials with
211

There are several doctrines under which federal courts might
defer to state courts.
One doctrine, Pullman abstention
ing a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented
in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state
212
This doctrine seems particularly germane to regulatory takings
suits where the state law regarding contested property rights is unclear and a state court determination might obviate the federal issue.
One such issue where state court clarification might be needed involves ripeness. In the first prong of Williamson County,213 which was
not affected by Knick,214
that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a
209. David A. Dana, Not Just a Procedural Case: The Substantive Implications of Knick for
State Property Law and Federal Takings Doctrine, *1 (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. 19-11; Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 19-26, 2019), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=3508857.
210. Id.
ples of law that limit rights of titleholders, such as nuisance
211. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 618 (2013). See Steven J.
Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW. 1 (2014) (discussing the vast
power of local officials in informal land use negotiations); Timothy M. Mulvaney, The State of
Exactions, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169 (2019) (reviewing the approximately 130 lower court cases
citing Koontz after five years, and concluding that it
212. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959) (citing, inter alia,
n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
214. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
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property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding
215
As I discussed elsewhere, if a locality cannot be sued for a taking in federal
extemporize for extended periods. Because modern multifunctional
development is complex, suitability relies on the juxtaposition of many
ion in state, or now federal, court.216
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,217 the Supreme Court discussed the
somewhat complex case law on determining final-determination ripeness218 but provided a shortcut by noting that there was nothing to be
gained by going through the intricate procedures, since their usefulUndoubtably, the final determination prong
of Williamson County will see considerable future litigation.
Another doctrine, Burford abstention, had its genesis in a case
challenging an aspect of the complicated Texas administrative scheme
for regulating oil drilling.220
219

Burford allows a federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result
its adjudication in a federal forum
rts to establish a coherent policy
221

Burford abstention is appropriate only for cases demanding declaratory or equitable relief,222 which appears to bar its use in suits
215. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186.
216. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 17, § 8-6(b)(1).
217. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 619.
220. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
221. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of
turnColo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
222. See id.
remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford
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involving specific demands for just compensation.223 Thomas Merrill
in the form of a property owner being able to seek a declaratory
judgment in federal court,224 in which context Burford abstention
might apply.
A third doctrine, Younger abstention,225 involves improper restraint
of state criminal proceedings. It might come into play with respect
to federal environmental and other crimes pertaining to land use.
There is little case law, however, since such lawsuits might be filed
in federal court.226
More generally, in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States,227 the Supreme Court held that, while federal district
courts had jurisdiction over suits for determination of water rights
brought by the United States as trustee for certain Indian tribes,228 the
McCarran amendment provided consent to determine in state courts
federal reserved water rights held on behalf of the tribes as well. 229
tional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture
230

ha[s] been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends
231

harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction
has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal pro232
The Court found none of these applicable, observing:
223. See Westrum Land Dev. Corp. v. Whitpain Twp., 2002 WL 32351106 *2 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (distinguishing demands for just compensation from challenges to eminent domain
lation will not automatically mandate federal co
Izzo v. Borough of
River Edge, 843 F.2d 765, 769 (3d Cir.1982))).
224. Merrill, supra
of remedy I have in mind is a
declaratory judgment, authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C.
225. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
226. See United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 747 (D. Del. 1981).
227. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
228. Id. at 803 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1345).
229. Id.
t, 66 Stat. 560 (1952) (codified at 43
U.S.C.A. § 666)).
230. Id., at 814 (citing, inter alia, R.R. Co
231. Id. (citing La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959)).
232. Id. at 816 (citing, inter alia, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the excepDistrict Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise
of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to
the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly
before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances
where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would
233

4. Plausibility and Deference
Aside from formal abstention, there are other means by which
federal judges could make it difficult for takings claimants to maintain
suits in federal courts. One is stringent enforcement of the requirement for fact-based plausibility established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly234 and reiterated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.235
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufA claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.236

Given the subjectivity and nuances of many government actions
alleged to be takings, determining the true motives of officials might
require discovery, but that is of no avail if the case is dismissed on
the pleadings.237
More generally, the extent to which federal courts in takings
cases will examine and give credence to local norms and practices
will substantially affect the choice to bring such actions in federal
or state courts.238
233. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813 (citing County of Allegheny v.
234. 550 U.S. 444 (2007).
235. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
236. Id. at 678 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
237. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the dismissal of
a complaint based on Twombly that extensive redevelopment project condemnation was not
for public use).
238. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Local Evidence in Constitutional Law, 104 CORNELL
L. REV. 855 (2019).
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One of the most vexing problems in takings law today is defining
the appropriate property to which takings analysis should be applied.
In
,239 the Supreme
Court declared:
This case presents a question that is linked to the ultimate determination whether a regulatory taking has occurred: What is
the proper unit of property against which to assess the effect of
the challenged governmental ac
cause our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the
value that has been taken from the property with the value that
remains in the property, one of the critical questions is deter240

In Murr v. Wisconsin,241
242

Stewart Sterk has asserted that the process of determining the
denominator of the takings fraction in Murr works differently in
analyses of Lucas per se takings and Penn Central multifactor ad hoc
balancing test takings.243 He deemed that Penn Central
concern is assuring fairness to landowners, while the focus of Lucas
is on restricting government efforts to bypass the condemnation
process. . . . Although the [Murr
Penn Central objectives, it is less consistent with Lucas objectives,
244
and reduces the likelihood that Lucas
Lucas is primarily about takings, and Penn Central is primarily about substantive due process,
239. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
240. Id. at 497 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165, 1992 (1967)).
241. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1944 (2017).
242. Id. at 1944 n.10 (citing Eagle, Four Factors, supra note 32, at 631).
243. Stewart E. Sterk, Dueling Denominators and the Demise of Lucas, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 67,
67 (2018).
244. Id.
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a thesis for which I have considerable sympathy.245
opinion for the Court in Murr does not distinguish between Lucas and
Penn Central takings in constructing a preliminary balancing test to
determine the relevant parcel, but his test does overlap with Penn
Central balancing test factors. The new
246

pography, and the surrounding human and ecological environment.
In particular, it may be relevant that the property is located in an
area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental
247
Also,
courts should assess the value of the property under the challenged
regulation, with special attention to the effect of burdened land on
the value of other holdings. Though a use restriction may decrease
the market value of the property, the effect may be tempered if
the regulated land adds value to the remaining property, such
as by increasing privacy, expanding recreational space, or preserving surrounding natural beauty.248

specific approach will not be much help at all to property owners
trying to predict whether their expectations about their property
will be deemed to be reasonable enough that they should rely on
249
is on fairness, as opposed
to identifying established property rights, went quite against established legal principles. As Chief Justice Roberts declared in dissent:
Our decisions have, time and again, declared that the Takings
Clause protects private property rights as state law creates and
defines them. By securing such established property rights, the
245. See Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings, A Reappraisal,
51 ALA. L. REV
Reluctant Muftis, supra
246. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1946.
249. Robert H. Thomas, Restatement (SCOTUS) of Property: What Happened to Use in
Murr v. Wisconsin?, 87 UMKC L. REV. 891, 902 (2019).
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Takings Clause protects individuals from being forced to bear
the full weight of actions that should be borne by the public at
large. . . .
I would stick with our traditional approach: State law defines
the boundaries of distinct parcels of land, and those boundaries
takings cases. Whether a regulation effects a taking of that property is a separate question, one in which common ownership of
adjacent property may be taken into account.250

rights, it is imperative that individuals easily be able to distinguish
what Chief Justice Roberts referred
251
This observation is especially germane
since there are suggestions that the per se rule for physical takings
expectations and the character or purpose of the government action
in physical takings cases as well as in regulatory takings cases.252
2. Temporal Takings
Another substantive doctrinal problem posed by Knick, as dea compensable temporary taking has occurred, in such a way as to
253

state and (especially) local land use and other regulation, and effecTahoeSierra Preservation Council 254
Dana is correct insofar as an alleged deprivation of property
rights might involve no more than a short delay in consideration of
250. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
251. Steven J. Eagle, Property Rights and Takings Burdens, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF. J. 199, 229 (2018) (quoting Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
252. John Echeverria, What Is a Physical Taking? (Vt. L. Sch. Paper No. 1-19, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507783.
253. Dana, supra
254. Id.
U.S. 302 (2002)).
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a development application or a transient physical incursion.255 However, Tahoe-Sierra is problematic, partly due to its failure to establish bounds on the duration of such moratoria.256
More important, however, is the questionable validity of TahoeSierra
to the temporal unit itself being taken.257 This leads to my proposal

The combination of the ad hoc, multifactor Penn Central balancing test258 and the amorphous and overlapping Murr relevant parcel
test259 seems to require state and local regulators to do what courts
ultimately might deem reasonable and fair. More than the Williamson
County state-litigation prong260 repudiated in Knick,261 these vague
262

This indeterminacy in takings law has produced the merging of
parcels under the same ownership in Murr,263 and even attempts to
combine parcels with no overlapping ownership, when the owners
cooperated in building a road to their remote residential parcels and
coordinated architectural styles.264 Thus, it would be very helpful for
255. See, e.g., Landgate, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal

(Cal. 1998) (holding

had jurisdiction, was not a compensable taking).
256. See generally Steven J. Eagle,
Temporary Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 25 U. HAW. L. REV
J. Eagle, Tahoe-Sierra and Its Implications for Takings Law 15, 26, in TAKING SIDES ON
TAKINGS ISSUES (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2003).
257. See infra
See also Steven J. Eagle, Just Compensation for Permanent Takings of Temporal Interests, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 485 (2001) (arguing
that compensation must be provided for a temporary development moratorium).
258. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
260. W
261. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 392 (1994)).
262. Id. at 2169.
263. Murr
264. See Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel
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the Court to adopt a more objective formulation of what constitutes
the relevant parcel for takings analysis.
Such an objective way of determining the relevant parcel in regulatory takings litigation would
a sliver of all rights in the deeded
parcel.265 Along these lines, the Court said in Concrete Pipe that,
ways taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether
the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in ques266
However, just as important as this attempted reduction of
the denominator in the takings fraction is the fact that a government defendant might enlarge the takings denominator by including large areas beyond the deeded parcel.267 I have referred to this
268
As the predecessor of the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims observed in Ciampitti v. United States,
269

As a first step towards a solution, Chief Justice Rehnquist obextinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an identifiable segment
270

well elude the takings defendant, and vice versa. Clearly, an objective standard is needed to prevent both the property owner and the
government defendant from manipulating the denominator.
as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV

tion by the California Coastal

265. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV
particular portion cons
Id.
266. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.
602, 644 (1993).
267. A classic example is the New York Court of Appeals decision in Penn Central, where
it included in the takings denominator a large amount of valuable land that the railroad owed
along both sides of Park Avenue all the way uptown from Grand Central Terminal. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of Ne
grounds, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
268. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 17, § 7-7(b)(2).
C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

nedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 517 (1987) (Rehnquist,
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tion.271
[m]eans such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a single
whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially
impairs its character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article (as a machine) or a set of
articles (as a suite of furniture, or an assortment of sizes) or a
quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated
in use or in the relevant market as a single whole.272

The mere assertion by a property owner that the part of the property allegedly taken was such a unit would not suffice. Instead, the
owner would have to demonstrate that the part was regarded as a
regularly traded in the vicinity, or individual condominiums in buildings were under construction, or small areas were adjacent to highways or railroad lines, that generally would suffice. Obviously, there
would be close cases, but the latitude for exaggeration by either
property owner or government would vastly be reduced.
In his recent article The Eagle Theory,273 Thomas Merrill ex274
The first
275

The second

effectively adopted, most notably in its foundational Penn Central
276

The third path to regulatory takings is to adopt a literal con-

271. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 17, § 7-7(e)(5).
272. U.C.C. § 2-105(6).
273. Thomas W. Merrill, The Eagle Theory, 9 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J. 17 (2020)
[hereinafter Merrill, The Eagle Theory].
274. Id. at 27.
275. Id. at 18 (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)).
276. Id. at 18 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
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Kanner prize] honoree Steven Eagle has advanced this conception of regulatory takings on several occasions.277 . . . Basically,
the idea is that a regulation should be deemed a taking when the
government acquires, through the regulation, a set of interests
that a private party would ordinarily have to acquire either by
purchase or by exercising a delegated power of eminent domain.
The work here is done by asking whether the regulation has
without paying just compensaoperative provision, rather than
278

government is acquiring . . .what can fairly be characterized as
pay just compensation, regardless of
279

Merrill summed up his thesis by stating:
The Article argues that the Eagle theory has the most plausible
basis in the original understanding of the Takings Clause, rests on
a theory about the Clause that enjoys the broadest contemporary
support, and is the most capable of generating predictable outcomes at a reasonable cost. The primary drawback of the Eagle
theory is that it cannot serve as a general source of protection for
property rights against arbitrary or oppressive government action. If adopted as the basis for the regulatory takings doctrine,
therefore, the Eagle theory would have to be supplemented with
a second source of constitutional protection for property, such as
substantive due process. This, as it happens, is precisely what
Steven Eagle has urged.280
277. Id. at 19 (citing STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS §§ 7-7(e)(5), 7-8, 7-17 (4th ed.
2009); Steven J. Eagle, Property Rights and Takings Burdens, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF. J. 199, 247 (2018); Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU. L. REV. 899, 901 (2007) [hereinafter Eagle, Property Tests].
Merrill himself has done some writing along these lines. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W.
MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS ch. IV (2002); Merrill, supra
278. Merrill, The Eagle Theory, supra note 273, at 19.
279. Id. at 26.
280. Id. at 17.
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horizontally definable parcel, containing at least one economically
viable use independent of the immediately surrounding land seg281

zontal parcel approach captures the virtue of objective definition
that must necessarily be supported in an individual case by factual
lumpy as a positive matter, filled
with doctrines and approaches that deal with the world in discrete,
282
nt regulatory takings
doctrine seems almost to assume a form of reverse lumpiness in
which losses scarcely register until one has lost almost the whole
283
some
284
Similarly, in Fee Simple Obsolete, Fennell has challenged the
285

coordination of property rights.286 Finally, in Property Attachments,
287

An important merit of the commercial unit test is that it leaves
room for all of those possibilities. A set of things that regularly are
bought and sold in a marketplace can be considered a discrete property, and, if government takes it, just compensation ought to result.
a Commercial Unit Context
commercial unit context. In United States v. General Motors Corp.,288
the Court held that there was a compensable taking when the government took a leasehold for its own occupation. Tahoe-Sierra cited
281. John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1994).
282. Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV
283. Id. at 1974.
284. Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016).
285. Id. at 1459.
286. Id. at 1464.
287. Lee Anne Fennell, Property Attachments, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE
288. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
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General Motors,289 but distinguished it as a physical taking, rather
than a regulatory taking.290 The issue in Tahoe-Sierra was the imposition of two moratoria to study and plan for ecologically sound
rectives, virtually all development

291

Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, rejected the notion that
this constituted a per se taking of
categorical rule of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.292
An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds
that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years
that describes the temporal aspe
dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be viewed in
of the entire area is a taking
a temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in value
is not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless
by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.293

While Justice Stevens showed complete awareness of present value
context,294 in Tahoe-Sierra

295

Justice Thomas, writing in dissent,
sion that the temporary morato-

296

289. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Ta
(2002).
290. Id.
distinction between acquisitions of property for public
use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 306.
Id.
Id.
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (Stevens, J., plur

amount because the creditor cannot use the money right away, inflation may cause the value
295. Tahoe-Sierra
296. Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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While this questionable rule has been applied to various alleged
regulatory takings, it was, in my view, rejected in the context of
temporal deprivations of property by First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, which held
when a landowner is deprived of all beneficial use of his land. I had
thought that First English

background principles of state property law prevent it from being
297

government restriction deprives a landowner of all economic value
for a month, or a season, when parcels in that area normally would
should be the same for regulatory takings as for physical takings.
This view also has important consequences for the constitutionality
of rent control ordinances. Where a tenant has purchased a fixed
term, that would be the relevant parcel. Where the ordinance regulates rents beyond the end of the term by giving the tenant a statutory right of renewal, or forbids the landlord from charging a market
rent to a new tenant or converting the apartment for personal use,
it stretches credulity to justify the ordinance as a modification of the
original landlord-tenant contract.298
C. Substantive Due Process
299

His Seventh Circuit colleague Frank Easterbrook acerbically
t some time looking through the

297. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting First English Evangelical Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
298. See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516 (1944) (the rent control statute did
to offer any accommoda
would clarify the notion that there had been a corresponding and uncompensated transfer from
rent control as creating no rights in the tenant, but constituting the police power regulation
of the landlord-tenant relationship (i.e., police power modification of the lease contract).
299. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Constitution for the Substantive Due Process Clause without finding
300
Yet their adamancy elides both constitutional history, 301 and
Penn Central reality. In the foundational case of Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago,302 the Supreme
Court declared:
[I]f, as this court has adjudged, a legislative enactment, assuming arbitrarily to take the property of one individual and give it
to another individual, would not be due process of law, as enjoined
by the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be that the requirement
of due process of law in that amendment is applicable to the direct
appropriation by the State to public use, and without compensation, of the private property of the citizen. The legislature may
prescribe a form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private property for public use, but it is not due process of law if
provision be not made for compensation.303

In his dissent in Dolan v. City of Tigard,304 Justice Stevens stated
that Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Lochner 305
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, tersely responded:
there is no doubt that later cases have held that the Fourteenth
Amendment does make the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States. Nor is there any doubt that these
cases have relied upon Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City
of Chicago to reach that result.306

In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,307 the Supreme Court unanimously renounced its often-articulated formula in Agins v. City of
Tiburon,308 that compensation is required under the Takings Clause

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

See Eagle, Property Tests, supra
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Id. at 236.
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
Id.
Id. at 384 n.5.
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
447 U.S. 255 (1980).

Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1995).

g Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).

294

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:249

309

cast aside in Lingle, but rather recharacterized as a separate cause
of action for deprivations of property without due process of law.310
Nevertheless, contemporary regulatory takings law remains steeped
Penn Central
regulatory takings opinion emphasized the often-quoted formulation
of Armstrong v. United States311:
While this Court has recognized
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.312

Penn Central
313
correctly describes a qualificaEastern

Enterprises v. Apfel,314
Clause operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge. The Clause
presupposes what the government intends to do is otherwise con315
Murr v.
Wisconsin, however, seems to conflate whether there is a taking
a use restriction may decrease the market value of the property, the
effect may be tempered if the regulated land adds value to the remaining property, such as by increasing privacy, expanding recre316

309. Id.
310. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
311. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
312. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (citation omitted).
313. Sterk, supra note 243, at 267. See supra
discussion.
314. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
315. Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
316. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1946 (2017) (emphasis added). See supra
panying text for discussion.

anying text for
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CONCLUSION
bought and sold in the market
can be acquired by government, and paid by just compensation,
317

whether the regulation has appropri
318

Of course, the commercial unit rule cannot be applicable in all
cases, since relevant private market transactions might be lacking,
or because a reduced takings doctrine would not cover other forms
of deprivation of property. Thus, in spite of the hostility of many
jurists to an expanded use of substantive due process,319 it will continue to be needed.
Given the increased stresses that will be brought about by climate
change,320 and by increasing economic disparity,321 change of the type
I have advocated would be beneficial in resolving the complexities
that can overwhelm our current regulatory takings jurisprudence.

317. See, e.g.
LAW

Planning Blight: The Anglo-American Experience, 29 URB.
erican law of eminent domain (usually referred to as

318. Merrill, The Eagle Theory, supra note 273, at 19.
319. See supra
see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989):
When one is dealing, as my Court often is, with issues so heartfelt that they are
believed by one side or the other to be resolved by the Constitution itself, it does
mild substantive distortion that any generalization introduces, to have a clear,
previously enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the decision.
Id. at 1178.
320. See supra Part II for discussion.
321. See supra Part III for discussion.

